The German Conception of History. Georg G. Iggers

the historian could trace the historical background of the values and institutions of a society and that he could describe the conflicting forces in a society at a given moment; however, when he identified certain forces as those which alone represented the historical direction of the nation, he was making an arbitrary choice. Even if he could exclude revolutionary attempts to remodel society as inorganic and unhistorical, he would still be confronting a pluralism of traditions and of interests. The pious distinction made by the writers in the tradition of the Historical School since Burke, between deliberate attempts at directing social change and natural, organic growth, is a doubtful one. In the face of the conflicting interests, traditions, and values which exist in any society, the statesman is forced to guide the state consciously in a definite direction. He can not merely follow the direction of history, as Ranke had hopefully assumed, but must decide whether to champion the maintenance of Prussian state power, the restoration or preservation of feudal privileges, or the extension of representative institutions.

      2. As we have already observed, Ranke’s empiricism has often been misunderstood, and not only in the United States. Empiricism refers to a methodological position, as well as to a philosophical concept of reality. The empiricist insists that knowledge can be gained only through sense data and through inductions resulting from these data. Empiricism generally implies a philosophically nominalist position. For the most part, empiricists hold that phenomena alone are real or that knowledge cannot go beyond phenomena. In the philosophic sense, Ranke was no empiricist. His position was much closer to philosophic realism.⁵¹ Just as he saw a deeper reality behind historical phenomena, so he saw in phenomena merely the concrete expressions of metaphysical forces. In the methodological sense, Ranke was an empiricist only to a limited degree. Despite his insistence upon the objective, critical observation of the particular event as the beginning of all historical study, Ranke never found in such data the only means of obtaining knowledge. Rather, the intuitive understanding of these data was to open up the possibility of attaining glimpses of the reality underlying the ephemeral appearance of the world of senses. Ranke’s desires for objectivity must be therefore understood not merely as a call for the exclusion of one’s own subjective desires and prejudices from historical cognition. Ranke agreed with the empiricists that the object of the historian’s research must be to establish what had actually been (wie es eigentlich gewesen), but for him this historical reality was not exhausted by historical events. Rather, Ranke assumed that there was an objective order behind these events. “The historian is merely the organ of the general spirit which speaks through him and takes on real form (sich selber Vergegenwärtigt).’⁵² His impartiality (Unpartheilichkeit) consisted less in not approaching the great “struggles of might and ideas” without an opinion of his own, but “only in this, that he recognizes the positions occupied by the active forces (in history) and does justice to the relationships peculiar to each. He sees these (forces) appear in their particular selves, confront each other and struggle. In such conflicts the events and fates that dominate the world are carried out.”⁵³ In fact, Ranke is not very far removed from Hegel.⁵⁴ What distinguishes the two men sharply is Ranke’s insistence that knowledge of the objective order can be gained only through thorough study of the individual event, which must never be approached with abstract concepts, and his conviction that the plan of the universe is beyond man’s grasp, that man can only intuitively suspect (ahnden) its outlines. “For although every spirit (geistiges Wesen) stands in relationship to God, the human spirit is not identical with God.” As Ranke quotes St. Augustine: “The Human spirit gives witness of the Light but is not the Light. The true Light is the Word, which is God and has created all.”⁵⁵

      In the lectures which he delivered in 1831 on the “idea of Universal History,” Ranke developed his thoughts regarding the methods and intent of historiography. History as a science shares with philosophy the task to grasp “the core of Existence”; it resembles art in its manner of “reproducing life that has vanished.” It differs from art in referring to a “real” rather than an “ideal,” to a subject matter which requires an empirical approach. Historical thinking requires elements of both philosophical and artistic thought directed toward a “real” subject matter.⁵⁶

      The most significant difference between philosophy and history is in approach. The philosopher approaches reality from the perspective of general concepts. He attempts to subsume all of life under a “unifying concept” (Eiriheitsbegriff), to schematize life and history. The historian proceeds from the “condition of existence” (Bedingung der Existenz).⁵⁷ For the philosopher the individual matters only as a part of the whole; for the historian the individual is of interest. Both sciences have disputed the sole truth of their approach. The historians have questioned the possibility of nonhistorical truth. They have considered philosophical cognition to be timebound.

      (History) does not want to recognize philosophy as something Absolute (Unbedingt) but only as an appearance in time. History assumes that the history of philosophy is the most exact form of philosophy; that absolute truth cognizable by mankind is found in the theories which appear in various ages, no matter how contradictory these theories may be. History goes one step further and assumes that philosophy, especially when it attempts to define doctrines is merely the expression in linguistic form of national cognition (nazionalen Erkenntnis). The historian denies that philosophy has any absolute validity.⁵⁸

      Ranke is quite aware of the radically relativistic possibilities inherent here in the historical approach. But he does not draw radically relativistic conclusions. As he writes: “When the philosopher regards history from the perspective of his field, he looks for the infinite only in progress, development and totality. The historian, on the other hand, finds an infinity in every existence, an eternal element coming from God in every being, and this eternal element is its principle of life. For this reason,” Ranke notes, “the historian inclines to turn to the individual. He makes the particular interest count. He recognizes the beneficient and enduring. He opposes disintegrating change. He acknowledges a portion of truth even in error.”

      But can we be convinced that existence really has a divine basis? “It is not necessary to prove elaborately the presence of an eternal element within the individual,” Ranke replies. For our endeavors rest on this religious foundation. We believe that nothing can exist without God or live without Him. Although we have emancipated ourselves from certain narrow theological notions, we nevertheless acknowledge that all our efforts derive from a higher, a religious source.”⁵⁹ But Ranke never asks himself what remains, once the religious foundations in which he believes so fervently have been destroyed by doubt?

      From this belief in the metaphysical foundations of historical reality, Ranke draws several methodological demands. The first is the “pure love of truth.” Because we acknowledge “a higher reality” in the event, the situation, or the person that we wish to understand, we must have respect for what actually happened. But this does not mean “that we should stop with the appearances.” For “then we would grasp only something external although our own principle directs us to what is within.”⁶⁰ From this arises the need for a thorough, penetrating study based upon sources, without which we are incapable of historical cognition. For historical understanding is not a mechanical act of which everyone is equally capable. Here the differences between Ranke’s epistemology and that of empiricism becomes very clear. For the “essence” (Wesen) and “content” (Inhalt) of the appearances which the historian studies are spiritual unities (geistige Einheiten) which can be grasped only by spiritual apperception (geistige Apperception).⁶¹ But apperception is not an empirical act of description or explanation. Rather, it involves a degree of genius present to an extent in everyone, but in very unequal degree.⁶² There follow the remaining demands for a universal interest on the part of the historian, a concern with establishing causal relationships, impartiality, and the search of the total context. Ranke regards it as “certain” that behind the outward appearance of the historical events, persons, and institutions studied, there is always a totality (Totalität, Totales), an integrated, spiritual reality.

      The whole (Totale) is as certain as is its every outward expression at every moment. We must dedicate our full attention to it.… (If we are studying) a people, we are not interested in all the individual