Once we assume, as Ranke did, that all institutions or ideas that have roots in history are valuable, a basis for judging political decisions is established. Not that the historian can measure political decisions by abstract, universal ethical standards, but he can unearth the extent to which such acts followed the historical lines of development of a state. “True politics,” Ranke observes, “constantly keeps in mind what constitutes practical interests, what is necessary, and what can be carried out.” Such politics does “not surrender its part at any moment for the sake of possibly deceptive prospects. Rather such politics aims at tranquil progress (Fortgang) and gradual but certain development.”35 This type of true politics proceeds on the basis of positively existing and dominant trends. It eschews innovation and planned reform. For nothing is more urgent for our time “than to remind ourselves of the difference between regular (gesetzmässig) progress and impatient, disruptive innovation, between intelligent preservation (of existing institutions) and the onesided defense of antiquated forms which have become lifeless.”
Even if Ranke knew that statesmen could not be guided by ethical doctrine in following the practical and necessary interests of the state, he was nevertheless sublimely confident that the statesman’s pursuit of such historic necessities would not conflict with the “immutable, eternal principles.” For “men of insight knew at all periods of history what was good and great, what was permitted and right, what constituted progress and what decay. In its broad outlines it is inscribed within the human breast. Simple reflection suffices for us to understand it.”36
It is an obvious conclusion from this concept of historical growth that liberal institutions, developed abroad, were not applicable in Germany. For, as Ranke observes: “… every people has its own politics.”37 The task of Germans is to create a genuinely German state which corresponds to the spirit of the nation.38 France had shown the ill effects of drafting foreign, British, and especially North American political ideas onto her traditional institutions.39 The danger of the French Revolution had lain less in the strength of French arms than in the spread of “doctrines of seemingly universal validity.”40 Behind the diversity of states and national character, Ranke sees a divine purpose: through the diverse nations, God gave expression to the “idea of mankind.” The idea of the state finds its expression in the various states. If there were only one possible and right form of the state, then the only meaningful form of government would be a universal monarchy. However, this is not the case. The task of every great people, “the condition of its existence (was) to provide the human spirit with a new form of expression, to articulate this expression in its own new forms and to reveal it anew. This is the task God has given it.” Everything great in Germany since the French Enlightenment, had been achieved not in imitation, but in opposition to French forms and ideas.41
This position is not very different from Humboldt’s. Even certain political demands made by Ranke for his immediate time were similar. With Humboldt he saw the danger of creating a unitary German state wherein provinces and states would lose their individual character.42 Closer bonds needed to be drawn, particularly in regard to defense and commercial relations and notably the control of the press, without creating a uniformity of institutions. For Germany existed in diversity. “Who will ever be able to define in concepts or put into words what is German?”43 “It is as if they wished to depict the genus but destroy the species. The genus appears only in the species. It possesses no other way of manifesting itself.” To destroy the differences would be to kill the living reality.44 Ranke differs from Humboldt in his far less critical identification of the then existing German governments with the historical trends. Hence his portrayal of Germany as forming “one family” with its legitimate princes.45 Unlike either Haller on the right or liberals such as Stein or Humboldt, Ranke does not question the centralizing reforms of the eighteenth-century enlightened despots in Germany. He accepts unconditionally the bureaucratic structure of Prussia, and observes that the military power upon which” Prussia’s prestige rests “requires that its needs be met without any reductions or interruptions; it requires unity and strict subordination.”46 He opposes a constitution for Prussia, and argues against a Prussian Parliament representing the estates (Ständeversammlung)47 for which Stein and Humboldt had called.
Completely missing from his essays is the demand for greater local self-administration, characteristic of liberal and even conservative political programs of the time. Ranke nowhere acknowledges the rights of individuals against the state which Humboldt and Haller had defended from opposing political positions. Absent in his concept of Prussia is both the conservative view of “liberties” (Libertäten) and the liberal idea of the integrity of the individual. Although Ranke recognizes that the Carlsbad Decrees, adopted by the German states in 1819 to suppress “demagogic” agitation, following the murder of Kotzebue, were emergency measures too stringent to be maintained as permanent legislation, he nevertheless justifies press censorship. Certainly, he admits scholars must have full freedom to investigate truth, but the communication of scientific truth must be distinguished from that of political opinions. The political press, when left uncontrolled, has circulated not only “doctrines and ideas,” but has stirred up passions and represented diverse interests “so that immediately strong opposition is organized against the supreme authority, creating a conflict of parties. It is questionable, he continues, whether this situation which points at a pluralistic society is in accord with the “general welfare.” The defenders of freedom of the press “would have to prove that such a condition is at all desirable for the lives of nations; that it is also useful and beneficial to young states still in the process of formation.”48
These diverging concepts regarding the structure of the Prussian state, held by men like Haller, Ranke, or Wilhelm von Humboldt, point at a basic dilemma inherent in the historicist orientation. It had been a fundamental assumption of the Historical School that political and other values could be clearly and indisputably recognized within the historical context in which they operated. The ethics to be followed by the Prussian state was determined by Prussia’s nature and history as a state. This implied, of course, that every state or nation was an organic body with one tradition. If this tradition could be identified, then one could separate the extraneous elements from the state. But what happened if within the same social group there were several, diverging traditions? The naive assumption that the dominant political forces were the sole ones with roots in history, and hence the only ones that could claim to be legitimate, proved to be much more problematic than Ranke realized. No significant thinker held this position unconditionally. Ranke drew the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate rulers common to conservative thought. In recognizing the reality of change, he admitted that there were elements in existing states which were antiquated and lifeless.49 Moreover, one government might combine two conflicting forces. In Ranke’s opinion, this had been the case in the Charte of the French Restoration which had wedded the two irreconcilable principles of monarchy and constitutional