The Notion of Authority. Alexandre Kojève

– that is to say, the order of the four “pure” types of authority that it implies’: that of the master, victor of Verdun; that of the leader; capable of foreseeing events; that of the judge, impartial and disinterested; and that of the father, attached to the traditions of the past. This presentation does not at any point express any attachment of a political nature, and neither does it judge the legality or legitimacy of the power of Vichy or that of London. ‘We have good reasons to think’, writes Dominique Auffret, ‘that Kojève believes that the enemy must be embraced the better to strangle him … we know that [this reflection] theorised a politics of the worm in the bud, susceptible to different interpretations, but which, for Kojève, must be read in a highly sophisticated way. It suggests that he did not exclude the option of having to live with the reality of the Pétainist state.’³¹ Despite the example selected being a burning question, Kojève’s argument actually pertained to an approach that was mainly methodical, foreign to either Collaboration or Resistance, to right or left, to the activities of the one or the other. What Kojève underscored, again in a profoundly Hegelian manner, was the authority of a man gathering in his person – as seen by those who noted this fact and in line with his philosophical theory – the characters of the four pure types.

      Moreover, the author notes that, after two years in power, the authority of the Marshal has not withstood the test of time, as could not have been avoided bearing in mind its very origin. The master, as military leader, was thus necessarily fragile because of his age, which explained the resort to the admiral (François Darlan). As for the father, his reference to tradition was diminished by the necessity to ‘penetrate into the Future’, and Kojève notes a similar weakening of the authority of the judge, with ‘the unfortunate turn that the Riom trials have taken’. The slippages noted here lead us therefore to recognise, in the combination analysed, the primacy of the authority of the leader. But its persistence, subordinated to the necessity of a ‘project’, was supported in this instance only by a programme, or rather a topos – a ‘logical place [that is] still empty’: the Révolution nationale, because ‘in May 1942, France does not yet have a revolutionary idea’. Even so, Kojève does not ‘make any claim to be able to propose a (national) revolutionary idea to France in 1942’ [p. 102]. He nevertheless constructs, precisely out of variants of the different types, the form of a state that realises the political authority corresponding to the analysed combination in terms of constitutional structure – even envisaging, in relation to work, the existence of corporations.

      At the same time, when Kojève was conceiving the notion of authority, one of the great minds to have followed his teaching, Father Gaston Fessard, was pursuing a parallel reflection.³² He too asked key questions about legitimacy: Where is to be found the common good of the people and the authority necessary to lead the will of everyone towards this unique goal? The conclusions reached by both authors complement each other.

      Master, leader, judge, and father. Kojève reveals and explains a typology that is already present in consciousness and in behaviour, while outlining an enriched philosophy and a programme with a universal susceptibility to further in-depth analysis. His thought surpasses the tripartite schemas discovered in the Indo-European world and in Georges Dumézil’s triad of the flamines³³ in Roman religion. It also allows us to understand better in our own time all crises of authority, respect, and obedience. It leads towards a distinction between the four forms of power deduced from the four pure types described. In a world driven by an anguished quest for its bearings, Kojève’s reflection marks a renewed return to reason.

Preliminary Remarks

      It is a curious fact that the problem and notion of authority have been little studied. Questions pertaining to the transfer of authority and its genesis have been the main concern, while the actual essence of this phenomenon has rarely attracted any attention. However, it is obviously impossible to tackle political power or even the structure of the state without knowing what authority is as such. A study of the notion of authority, albeit provisional, is therefore essential, and must precede any study of the question of the state.

      To say that theories of authority are lacking is not to say that they are nonexistent. If we forget about variants, we can say that four distinct (essentially different and irreducible) theories have been proposed in the course of history:

      1. The theological or theocratic theory: primary and absolute Authority belongs to God; all other (relative) authorities are derived from it. (This theory was elaborated mainly by the Scholastics, but the partisans of ‘legitimate’, not to say hereditary, monarchy also claim it as their own.)

      2. Plato’s theory: ‘Just’ or ‘legitimate’ authority is based on, and emanates from, ‘justice’ or ‘equity’. Any authority that has a different character is only a pseudo-authority that is in reality nothing other than (more or less brute) force.

      3. Aristotle’s theory, in which the justification for authority is found in wisdom, knowledge, and the possibility of anticipating, of transcending the immediate present.

      4. Hegel’s theory, which reduces the relationships of authority to that of master and slave (of victor and vanquished), the former having been ready to risk his life to be recognised while the latter has chosen submission over death.

      Unfortunately, only the last theory has received comprehensive philosophical elaboration, developed not only on the level of phenomenological description but also that of metaphysical and ontological analysis. The remaining theories have not gone beyond the level of phenomenology, and are not, moreover, in any way complete even in this department. (It must be said that Hegel’s theory has never been truly understood and that it was very quickly forgotten. Thus, Hegel’s most important successor – Marx – completely neglected the problem of Authority.)

      All four theories are exclusive. Each of them acknowledges only one type of Authority (namely, the one it describes), and sees in the other ‘authoritarian’ phenomena nothing other than a manifestation of pure and simple force.

      Note: There is, certainly, yet another ‘theory’ of Authority, which sees in the latter nothing but a manifestation of force. But we shall see later on that Force has nothing to do with authority, being even its direct opposite. Reducing Authority to Force is therefore simply either to deny or ignore the existence of the former. It is for this reason that we have not listed this erroneous opinion among the theories of Authority.

      In order to be able to judge and criticise these theories (indeed to understand them in the proper sense of the word), one would have to start by drawing up a comprehensive list of all phenomena that could be filed under the rubric ‘Authority’ and see if these phenomena correspond (in whole or in part) to one (or several) of the proposed theories.

      Theories for which there are no corresponding phenomena are to be rejected as false. As for the remaining ones, we must see whether they account for all or only part of the phenomena.

      To this end, the phenomena of Authority must be subjected to a phenomenological analysis with a view to unearthing ‘pure phenomena’, that is to say, those that are irreducible to one another (or showing, in the case of ‘compound’ phenomena, the ‘pure’ elements of which they are made up).

      If we find ‘pure’ phenomena that none of the suggested theories account for, further theories must then be formulated.

      In other words, the phenomenological analysis (A, I) must answer the question ‘What is it?’ addressed to all phenomena that in a manner of speaking we qualify ‘instinctively’ as authoritarian. It must reveal the essence (the idea: das Wesen) of Authority as such, as well as the structure of this ‘essence’, that is to say, the various irreducible types of its manifestation (while ignoring ‘accidental’ variations caused by simple divergences in local and temporal conditions of the realisation of Authority as such).

      But phenomenological analysis can carry out its function only on condition of being truly complete. We must be certain that all possible types of Authority have been enumerated