Whichever authority we are talking about, its genesis is spontaneous, including that of the father who, in order to be endowed with authority, still has to ‘become a father (or, in the derivative case, reach a more or less advanced age)’. This means that there is no conditioned authority that comes into being ‘as a result of acts other than those of he who will maintain it’. This is why Kojève distances himself from Rousseau and social contract theory, since in this context the authority that comes from the contract is ‘conditioned by something other than itself’ – by the preliminary existence of another authority. Phenomenological analysis excludes the possibility of the coming into being of authority by the effect of a social contract and an ‘erroneous interpretation of the existence of (political or other) elections’, which cannot result in the generation of an authority that does not already exist. Neither the majority nor the minority can invoke an original, pure, and sui generis authority. More fundamentally, the pretentions to a total and absolute authority of the whole over the parts, of the majority over the minority, only took shape artificially from the moment when the general will ‘ceased to have a divine character (or even an “ideological” one, interpreted by “spiritual” leaders)’, and the idea was conceived that the ‘“general will” is expressed through the will of the Majority’. Thus Kojève does not attribute any original place to social contract theory in relation to the genesis of authority. And it becomes impossible to disregard his analysis in political science and political philosophy.
It is the same with his analyses of the transmission of authority, whether this takes place by way of heredity, election, or nomination. The term ‘transmission’ expresses the idea that authority exists – the same and in itself – without being linked to a determinate person. If it is realised by heredity, a correlation with the authority of the father is the most adequate – as is the case with the authority of tradition. The other two forms of transmission, similar as they are, are nevertheless distinct:
there is transmission of Authority by nomination when the candidate for Authority is designated by the person (or persons) who already possess an Authority, and one of the same type (a Leader nominated by a Leader, for example); there is transmission by election when the candidate is designated by a person or persons who either have no Authority or have an Authority of another type (a Judge nominated by a Leader, for example).’ [p. 45]
This last analysis even leads the author to claim that, since the elector does not have a proper authority and his choice does not have any value for others, therefore, ‘strictly speaking, election does not differ in essence from the drawing of lots’. In fact, ‘The random choice of jurors is a kind of spontaneous genesis of the authority of the judge’. As Kojève notes, the consequence of this would require, in phenomenological terms, a number of supplementary analyses.
Kojève certainly does not intend to limit himself to this field of investigation. In this respect, he adopts an attitude similar to that which he followed in the Esquisse. Already there, he mentioned the need to divide all human phenomena into juridical and nonjuridical ones in order to find
a satisfying definition – that is, applicable to all the phenomena in question and to them only. And it would still be necessary to complete the phenomenological description by an analysis of the metaphysical (cosmological) and ontological substructure of the phenomenon being described in order to ward off the risk of the advent in the future of a new case, forcing the revision of the definition that was conforming to the cases realised in the present and the past … It should be understood that I have not even tried to reach this ideal in the pages that are going to follow … I have deliberately avoided a metaphysical or ontological analysis.30
Kojève adopts a different approach with regard to the notion of authority, since he follows phenomenology with metaphysics and ontology, though not without emphasising the very cursory character of his reflections. These two further developments indicate what a similar investigation of the question of right and its essence would have been, if he had had the time for this. As for authority, we see clearly that phenomenology, despite nourishing philosophical reflection, nevertheless leaves the mind eager for more in-depth knowledge and comprehension. The existence of four pure types corresponding to four philosophical theories does not excuse us from looking into what they have in common, what corresponds to the use of the same term. This search manifests a centripetal movement of thought.
Reflection then continues on its path towards metaphysics from a conception of authority that is necessarily social and historical, implied by the possibility of a reaction, in relation to a society, or even better, in relation to a state, that may be religious or political, and so on. The author, adhering to this latter form, thinks that the foundation of authority pertains to a ‘modification of the [human or historical] entity “time”’. As distinct from natural times that correspond to the primacy of the (physical) present or the (biological) past, the time of authority is linked to the primacy of the future so much so that ‘authority par excellence is that of the … “revolutionary” leader (whether driven by political, religious or other motives) with a universal “project”.’ But the fact remains that undoubtedly ‘time has, as such, the value of an authority … in all of its three modes.’
The primacy of the (‘venerable’) past speaks for itself. Arendt has argued this point in terms of foundation and tradition. The passing of time, which, added to the belief and imagination of men, founds the compulsory character of customs, is also a basis of the legitimacy both of a people and of monarchs. From this common foundation may result disputes over frontiers or identity that are subsequently overcome in the further course of events. There is in fact also for Kojève an authority of the future, that of ‘tomorrow’s man’, that of the ‘young’. As for the authority of the present, it is lived on a daily basis, as with ‘fashion’ for instance, or more generally, with the ‘“real presence” of something in the world … as opposed to the “poetic” unreality of the past and the “utopian” unreality of the future’.
What is revealed here is the primary importance of metaphysical analysis and the taking into account of temporality. ‘[A]ll these “temporal” Authorities are set against the Authority of eternity … the negation of Time’ – that is to say, one of its modes of time. The key question that presents itself at that point is whether the Authority of eternity is a ‘sui generis Authority’ or a direct ‘manifestation’ of the metaphysical bases of the four ‘pure’ types of Authority’ [pp. 49–50]. Kojève believes that this second analysis is correct, which leads to a fundamental conclusion asserting the primacy of eternity. The latter is authoritarian only in and through its relations with time: ‘[B]eing the negation of the particular modes of Time, [it] can be considered as the totality or the integration of the latter’ [p. 52]. Now, this integration leads to ‘the idea of seeing the authority of the judge as closer to the eternal’. At the same time, the place of the judge is in a way magnified: ‘[T]he Authority of the Judge (“justice”) can be interpreted as the “integration” of the three others – the latter being unable to form a harmonious unity, not even one that is stable or “eternal”, except on condition of subordinating themselves en bloc to the Authority of the Judge or to that of “Justice” ’ [p. 52].
Kojève’s analysis proceeds on two levels. First, by way of an increasing comprehension of what is truly behind the primary (visible?) authorities of the past, future, and present considered as such. No explanation is acceptable that would disregard the existence of the eternal in terms of causality: ‘[I]f Eternity is realized by a “formal cause”, Time realizes the Past qua “material cause”, the Future qua “final cause” and the Present qua “efficient cause” (see Aristotle)’ [p. 55], without the metaphysical analysis ceasing to ‘justify’ the phenomenological one.
This is even more clear in so far as the authority of the judge is isolated in relation to the three others, and considered superior to them: a singularly revealing route for a philosophy bringing innovative and convincing answers to questions raised since the dawn of time by judges and their institution. We