A critical dimension to trade union power is clearly its organisational strength, not only in a numerical sense, but in relation to the degree of unity and cohesion within union structures and their ability to represent the interests of members democratically and coherently, including their administrative capacity. In his analysis of the 2012 mining strike wave, Hartford (op. cit.: 6) summed up the dilemma facing the NUM and other large unions as follows:
The union like any social organisation, is not a static, monolithic entity. It’s a complex entity whose most constant feature is change – change in both its internal processes and a change in its external processes as a social actor and change agent itself. But the change that happens at the very bottom of the union, at the interface of the union shop steward with the member, is the key driver which determines much of the strategic change processes in any union. To understand what is happening in any union, one must investigate this relationship between the member and the shop floor leader in particular. Because if a union loses its capacity to democratically account and promote the views of members, it loses the capacity to hold the loyalty of those members.
This same challenge of ensuring democratic worker control will face new unions such as Amcu who will, over time, have to find ways of responding to these pressures if they are to sustain themselves organisationally. Similarly, trade unions whose internal operations have not been characterised by democratic practices and worker control may well find themselves having to adapt and to ensure greater accountability to members where members demand this as a condition for loyalty and trust.
While trade unions operate along different dimensions of power, it is perhaps this dimension, the organisational power of trade unions, that has been exposed as the Achilles heel of a number of trade unions. After almost two decades of survival and growth in post-apartheid South Africa, continued growth will be significantly affected by the ability of unions to strengthen their day-to-day operations and their representation of their members’ interests.
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CHAPTER 3
Citizen Wal-Mart? South African food retailing and selling development1
Bridget Kenny
INTRODUCTION
In public debate throughout 2011 and much of 2012, Wal-Mart’s entry into South Africa’s economy sparked fierce debate. The Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court processes became a match between the formidable US multinational – the world’s largest private employer with some 2.1 million employees in fifteen countries2 – and what appeared to many as activist ministries within the state, fighting to uphold ‘public interest’ in its merger with Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed Massmart Holdings, Inc., trading as subsidiaries Game, Dion, Makro, Builder’s Warehouse and Cambridge Foods, among others. South African unions, most notably the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saccawu), with support from global union federation UNI Global and the US union the United Food and Commerical Workers (UFCW), put up a resolute defence against an uncomplicated and quick merger approval (Kenny 2012b).
Wal-Mart/Massmart claimed to offer cheap goods to a growing middle and working class consumer base, and as such their ‘everyday low prices (EDLP)’ would bring the majority of South African consumers, previously excluded from consumption, into participation in this market. The chief executive officer (CEO) of Wal-Mart International, Doug McMillon, wrote in an op-ed in Business Day on 26 January 2011 that the company’s ‘core mission – to save people money so they can live better’ would be its contribution to South Africa. He concluded, ‘Walmart looks forward to earning our credentials as a responsible and productive citizen of SA.’
But the protracted merger approval process was to belie any easy acceptance of Wal-Mart. In its report in February 2011, the Competition Commission recommended, in what can only be acknowledged as a political misstep, that the deal be approved with no conditions. When the Competition Tribunal in March and May of 2011 rolled around, the hearings had become the terrain of battle. The state’s representatives, led by the minister of economic development, Ebrahim Patel, became increasingly frustrated with the merging parties’ unwillingness to provide information or come to informal agreement over conditions for the merger. The Departments of Economic Development (EDD), Trade and Industry (DTI) and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) were concerned about the effects of Wal-Mart’s entry on South African manufacturing and agricultural jobs in the context of the power of this global buyer to import through its supply chain the