In extending organisational rights to trade unions and in supporting centralised collective bargaining, the 1995 LRA was sending a clear message that stable labour relations depended on capable parties that could bargain effectively. The exercise of power should be reserved for the pursuit of matters of interest in an orderly fashion and as a last resort. The vision of the law was expressed clearly in the report of the Comprehensive Labour Market Commission which placed a strong emphasis on ‘voice regulation’ in the labour market:
It is the need to balance flexibility with security that justifies the Commission’s emphasis on voice regulation of the labour market, namely, the constructive role that bargaining between workers (and their unions) and employers (and their associations) can play in the productivity-enhancing redesign of the work process, in training and skills development, in employment equity planning and in many other aspects of the employment relationship. The ILO argues, and the Commission agrees, that excessively bureaucratic regulation is inimical to flexibility while an over-reliance on market forces is incompatible with labour market security and may result in increased inequality. Voice regulation provides the best means of charting a course that avoids both of these undesirable outcomes’ (Report of the Commission to Develop a Comprehensive Labour Market Policy 1996: 3).
Relying on voice regulation requires bargained arrangements between strong, stable and well-informed employer and employee representatives. This policy approach articulated well with the legal framework in the LRA in relation to trade union rights and collective bargaining.
TRADE UNION GROWTH AND STRUCTURE
In the period 1994 to 2012, union membership increased by 557 919, or 18.4 per cent. Membership peaked between 2000 and 2004 and this coincided with a mushrooming in the number of registered trade unions (see Table 1 below). The sharp increase in the number of trade unions (but with a relatively modest increase in membership) was caused first by an unintended consequence of the new, open approach to freedom of association and trade union registration. This open approach led to the exploitation of union status for financial gain by individuals; a number of trade unions were established by labour consultants to gain rights of appearance available to unions and employer organisations in processes at the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).
Minor amendments to the Labour Relations Act in 2002 and a concerted drive by the registrar of labour relations to de-register non-genuine trade unions led to a sharp decrease in the number of registered trade unions. The exploitation of union status for financial gain did, however, signal the arrival of an entrepreneurial orientation to trade unionism. This darker side of trade unionism has continued in different guises.
A second, expected, consequence of the new labour dispensation, was the spread of unionisation to the public sector and the public service in particular. Prior to 1993, unions had not been formally recognised in the public service. A number of unions had been active in parastatals such as Eskom and Transnet since the late 1980s and a few unions had begun to recruit members in the health services, in education and the police service. In the civil service itself, only staff associations had been recognised and it was only in the early 1990s that the state began informal discussion with the newly emerging unions and with staff associations that began to transform themselves into trade unions. Between the early 1980s and 1996 the number of organisations within the public service increased from one to over twenty, representing roughly 760 000 employees. In December 2011, there were 1 168 774 union members in the public service (excluding parastatals) – roughly 36 per cent of total union membership in the country.
Developments in other sectors were not as spectacular. Mining has increased in union density to a high of 77 per cent. In 1980, union density in mining was at 6.8 per cent, rocketing to 55.2 per cent in 1990. Manufacturing increased from 41 per cent in 1980 to 70 per cent in 1990, before declining to 31 per cent in 2012. The change in union density is, of course, explained not only by changing union membership but also by changes in employment. Declining employment in mining has contributed to the increased density, although the declining union density in manufacturing is certainly affected by changing employment patterns combined with a drop in union membership.
Table 1: Trade unions, union membership and density. 1994 to 2012
Note that density figures for 1994 to 1996 are based on non-agricultural employment, hence the higher density. The figures for 2001 to 2007 are from the former Labour Force Survey (all sectors) and the 2010 to 2012 figures are from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Figures for trade unions and their membership are from the records of the Department of Labour.
The change in employment patterns is also likely to have affected union density in sectors such as construction and wholesale and retail which have been characterised by a growth in contracting and sub-contracting arrangements that have made it difficult for unions to retain members. Although the post-1994 legal dispensation has supported unionisation and collective bargaining, it has not regulated non-standard employment. This has very likely been a factor in impeding union growth in a number of sectors.
Table 2: Trade union density by main industry sector 1980 to 2012 (per cent)
Figures for 1980 and 1990 (from Hinks et al. 2007) exclude employment in agriculture and domestic work from the denominator, in part accounting for the high density in some sectors.
An important feature of union growth is that unionisation has not grown in sectors that have historically been characterised by low union density, sectors such as agriculture, construction and domestic work (private households). The particular difficulties posed by these sectors, such as diffuse employment, low numbers of employees per workplace, and difficulty of access to workplaces, have continued to elude union organisation both before 1994 and afterwards.
The trajectory of union growth post-1994 has thus been one of stable union membership overall and a reasonably stable union density, with some significant variation in different sectors. Compared to the pre-1994 period, the most significant growth has been in the public, mining and electricity sectors with other sectors such as manufacturing and finance showing a decline in unionisation. In the pre-1994 period, trade unionism showed a spectacular growth, particularly during the 1980s, which constituted the takeoff phase in union growth in South Africa. This growth was a product not only of effective organisation at factory level by the emerging, independent unions, but also a product of the increased bargaining position of African workers (Hinks et al. 2007; Macun 2002).
The post-1994 period is perhaps best characterised as a phase in which trade unionism has held its own. This stabilising of unionisation should be viewed in the context of gradually declining employment, changing patterns of employment and low economic growth. The market power of trade unions associated with numerical strength has helped to sustain unionisation, as evidenced by the higher earnings of union members compared to non-members.
South Africa’s unionisation rates are not unusually high, as some would think, but are comparable to the OECD countries and other large middle-income countries (Budlender