In this passage, it argued that it is not an individual’s apprehension of philosophical theory in itself that is considered to be the goal of their education, but rather their successful application of philosophical doctrines to their life (or the philosophy’s orders/prescriptions—παραγγέλλω). For Arius Didymus, the tenets of philosophy should be transferred (μεταφέρω) to impact a person’s deeds (ἔργα) and how they live (βιόω) their life. Meanwhile Seneca, laconically but notably, states: “She [philosophy] is not a thing to be followed at odd times, but a subject for daily practice,” Non est res subsiciva, ordinaria est; domina est.23 Moreover, a catalogue of stories regarding individuals whose exposure to philosophy instigated a dramatic, lifelong reorientation of their lives, such as the effect that Plato’s philosophizing had upon Speusippus, that Diogenes’ had upon Crates, and that Xenocrates’ had upon Polemo, is documented in classical literature.24 In particular though, note Lucian’s portrayal of the effect that a lecture on Platonism had upon one audience member:
When he had said this and much more of the same sort, he ended his talk. Until then I had listened to him in awe, fearing that he would cease. When he stopped, I felt like the Phaeacians of old,25 for I stared at him a long time spellbound. Afterwards, in a great fit of confusion and giddiness, I dripped with sweat, I stumbled and stuck in the endeavor to speak, my voice failed, my tongue faltered, and finally I began to cry in embarrassment; for the effect he produced in me was not superficial or casual. My wound was deep and vital, and his words, shot with great accuracy, clove, if I may say so, my very soul in two.26
ταῦτά τε καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα διελθὼν κατέπαυσε τὸν λόγον. ἐγὼ δὲ `τέως μὲν ἤκουον αὐτοῦ τεθηπώς, μὴ σιωπήσῃ πεφοβημένος: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπαύσατο, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τῶν Φαιάκων πάθος ἐπεπόνθειν πολὺν γὰρ δὴ χρόνον ἐς αὐτὸν ἀπέβλεπον κεκηλημένος εἶτα πολλῇ συγχύσει καὶ ἰλίγγῳ κατειλημμένος τοῦτο μὲν ἱδρῶτι κατερρεόμην, τοῦτο δὲ φθέγξασθαι βουλόμενος ἐξέπιπτόν τε καὶ ἀνεκοπτόμην, καὶ ἥ τε φωνὴ ἐξέλειπε καὶ ἡ γλῶττα διημάρτανε, καί τέλος ἐδάκρυον ἀπορούμενος: οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ὁ λόγος καθίκετο, βαθεῖα δὲ καὶ καίριος ἡ πληγὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ μάλα εὐστόχως ἐνεχθεὶς ὁ λόγος αὐτήν, εἰ οἷόν τε εἰπεῖν, διέκοψε τὴν ψυχήν.
In this vivid account, Lucian depicts the recounting of Platonic tenets as having induced an almost-epiphinal moral awakening in this student (eliciting wonder/awe τέθηπα), which produced a wound so deep that it cut his soul in two and manifested itself in his physical distress and immobilization.27 The significant impact that philosophy could have upon the character of its students is, however, perhaps most effectively relayed by Seneca’s profound remark: “I feel, my dear Lucilius, that I am being not only reformed, but transformed (transfigurari),” Intellego, Lucili, non emendari me tantum sed transfigurari. 28 Descriptions such as these, and others, regarding the reorientation of an individual’s values and aspirations because of their introduction to philosophical theory (e.g. see also Seneca’s description of the “burning” (flagro) desire that new adherents of philosophy can feel for learning all they can about their chosen philosophy and Marcus Aurelius’ reflections on the effect that the writings of the Stoic Aristo had upon him29) have led some scholars to conclude that “conversion” is often the most apt word in modern parlance to describe an ancient person’s decision to commit themselves to a philosophical school, regardless of the particular tradition that they opted to associate with.30
Conversely, people who failed to observe the robust moral principles that were advocated by the philosophy they professed to adhere to are censured by numerous classical writers, with particular criticism being made of philosophers who betray an interest in seeking glory and money, in feasting, or in pursuing acts of sexual deviance.31 Being wary of such duplicitous individuals, potential students (including Stoic ones) are recorded as carefully scrutinizing the conduct of their intended philosophical instructor for any signs of moral laxity before they would entrust their philosophical development to them.32 Seneca even portrays a friend of his seeking to counter Seneca’s attempts to persuade him of the value of the philosophical life by recounting examples of Stoics who chase after money and girls and who are gluttonous.33 What is of relevance to us here is that such venally oriented people are often asserted in our sources to not just be hypocrites, but to have ended their ability to legitimately identify themselves with their chosen philosophy. For example, this is bluntly stated in Dio Chrysostom’s writings,34 and in Plutarch’s account of his attempt to arbitrate between two brothers in a legal dispute, one of whom was reputed to be a philosopher, but—after observing his contemptuous behavior toward his sibling—Plutarch concludes has been assigned a false epithet (ψευδεπίγραφος).35 In addition, Aulus Gellius documents that a philosopher (of unspecified persuasion) associate of his had a particular dislike of base and idle people whom he judged as seeking to put a cover (pallium) over their failings by adopting the dress of a philosopher, and recounted that the sophist and senator Herodes Atticus reproved a man who he had judged falsely (falso) laid claim to the title and character of a philosopher.36 In addition, in a passage that lays bare that gaining knowledge of an individual’s good conduct was deemed to be necessary before confidence in their status as a philosopher could be established, Gellius narrates that when a man who was dressed as a Cynic, but who turned out to be of worthless character, approached Herodes and requested money, Herodes replied by asking who he was because “I see, said Herodes, a beard and a cloak; the philosopher I do not yet see.” “‘Video’ inquit Herodes, ‘barbam et pallium, philosophum nondum video.’”37
Strikingly, Gellius also documents that Herodes sought to expose a pompous and self-affected student of Stoicism by appealing to the records of Epictetus’ discussions in a way that both disclose the ancient expectation that a philosopher should adhere to a high standard of moral behavior and also reveal a near contemporary of Epictetus framing his stance on this topic in a way that parallels the one that will be supplied in this chapter.
“Allow me, mightiest of philosophers, since we, whom you call laypeople, cannot answer you, to read from a book of Epictetus, greatest of Stoics, what he thought and said about such big talk as that of yours.” And he bade them bring the first volume of the Discourses of Epictetus, arranged by Arrian, in which that venerable old man with just severity rebukes those young men who, though calling themselves Stoics, showed neither virtue nor honest industry, but merely babbled of trifling propositions and of the fruits of their study of such elements as are taught to children. Then, when the book was brought, there was read the passage which I have appended,38 in which Epictetus with equal severity and humor set apart and separated from the true and genuine Stoic, who was beyond question without restraint or constraint, unembarrassed, free, prosperous and happy, that other mob of triflers who styled