What was the significance of the bridge-builders decision?
The chief importance of the decision was that the Supreme Court was now considering the public interest as paramount when reviewing Contract Clause claims. The Court established that the state government has a police power to pass legislation that furthers the interests of the public. Some allege the decision actually helped business by promoting competition and innovation.
Who were the attorneys who argued the case?
The case was argued by some of the country’s finest lawyers. Daniel Webster argued on behalf of the Charles River Bridge Company, while Simon Greenleaf and John Davis represented the Warren Bridge Company.
What other Taney Court decision involved the height of a bridge?
The Taney Court ruled 7–2 in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (1852) that the state of Pennsylvania had a valid claim against a company’s bridge that was built so low that it negatively impacted interstate commerce. The Virginia legislature chartered the company to build the Wheeling Bridge across the Ohio River into Pennsylvania. The Court ruled that it impeded interstate commerce and ordered the bridge either removed or raised.
What happened to the bridge?
Congress did not agree with the Court’s decision and subsequently passed a federal law mandating that the original height of the bridge was proper. The law read: “That the bridges across the Ohio River at Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, and at Bridgeport, in the State of Ohio, abutting on Zane’s Island, in said river, are hereby declared to be lawful structures in their present positions and elevations, and shall be so held and taken to be any thing in the law or laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.” It was the first time that Congress had legislatively overruled a Supreme Court decision. The case went back up to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled the bridge did not impede interstate commerce.
In what decision did the Taney Court say that a corporation has diversity jurisdiction?
The Taney Court ruled unanimously in Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson (1844) that a New York citizen could sue in federal court a railroad corporation that was chartered in South Carolina because the federal court had diversity jurisdiction, which permits a federal court to entertain suits between parties (litigants) from different states. The Court determined that the railroad company was deemed to be a citizen in the state in which it was chartered. The decision made it easier for corporations to sue and be sued in the federal courts.
Civil War critic and former U.S. representative Clement Vallandigham is arrested in his Dayton, Ohio, home on May 5, 1863, for declaring sympathy for the enemy. In Ex Parte Vallandigham, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it could not review a military court decision. Hulton Archive/Getty Images.
What were the License Cases?
The License Cases were a trio of cases—Thurlow v. Massachusetts, Fletcher v. Rhode Island, and Peirce v. New Hampshire—in which the Taney Court unanimously upheld state laws that taxed alcoholic beverages imported into the state. The laws were designed to favor local retailers. The local retailers convinced the state legislatures that they needed an advantage over out-of-state merchants. Individuals who sold out-of-state beverages without a license challenged the constitutionality of the state laws, arguing that the laws infringed on the federal government’s control of interstate commerce. Instead, the justices determined that the statutes were justified by the state’s police powers. “Every State … may regulate its own internal traffic, according to its own judgment and upon its own views of the interest and well-being of its citizens,” Chief Justice Taney wrote.
In what case did the Taney Court rule it could not review a military court decision?
The Taney Court ruled that it could not conduct a habeas corpus review of the military trial of outspoken Civil War critic and former U.S. representative Clement Vallandigham of Ohio in Ex Parte Vallandigham (1864). In the spring of 1863, General Ambrose Burnside, without consulting President Abraham Lincoln, had arrested Vallandigham for publicly expressing sympathies for the enemy. At a speech in Mount Vernon, Ohio, Vallandigham said that “the present war was a wicked, cruel, and unnecessary war, one not waged for the preservation of the Union, but for the purpose of crushing out liberty and to erect a despotism.”
Fort Sumter flies under a Confederate flag on April 4, 1861. President Abraham Lincoln issued an order to block Confederate ports despite the lack of a formal declaration of war by Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in The Prize Cases that the president had the constitutional authority to do that. Hulton Archive/Getty Images.
In May 1863, military officials tried and convicted Vallandigham. Instead of throwing him in jail, President Lincoln ordered him moved to Murfreesboro, Tennessee, in the Confederacy. Vallandigham appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court; it ruled in February 1864 that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain a review of the military court ruling. “The Supreme Court of the United States has no power to review by certiorari the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a general officer of the United States Army, commanding a military department,” Justice James Wayne wrote for the Court.
What happened to Vallandigham after his banishment to the South?
The Confederates treated him well; he wound up in Bermuda, then sailed to Canada. Having been nominated in July 1863 for governor of Ohio, he ran in absentia but lost. He returned to Ohio in 1864 where many cheered him as a hero. Not wanting to create a martyr, Lincoln ignored him and did not arrest him. Vallandigham also ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate in 1869 and then had great success as a trial lawyer. Unfortunately, as an attorney for the defendant in a murder trial, Vallandigham accidentally shot himself to death while demonstrating how the victim had been shot.
CourtSpeak: The Prize Cases (1863)
Justice Robert Grier (majority): “This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized insurrections. However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprung forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war. The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could change the fact.”
Justice Samuel Nelson (dissenting): “Now, in one sense, no doubt this is war, and may be a war of the most extensive and threatening dimensions and effects, but it is a statement simply of its existence in a material sense, and has no relevancy or weight when the question is what constitutes war in a legal sense, in the sense of the law of nations, and of the Constitution of the United States? For it must be a war in this sense to attach to it all the consequences that belong to belligerent rights….
“Congress alone can determine whether war exists or should be declared; and until they have acted, no citizen of the State can be punished in his person or property, unless he has committed some offence against a law of Congress passed before the act was committed, which made it a crime, and defined the punishment. The penalty of confiscation for the acts of others with which he had no concern cannot lawfully be inflicted.”
In what famous case did the Court narrowly