Ruiz and Montes told authorities of the African mutiny, which led to the imprisonment of the Africans. The Spanish men, Gedney, Green, and Fordham all filed claims for either all or part of the ship and its cargo’s value. Meanwhile, President Martin Van Buren pressured the U.S. attorney in Connecticut to file a claim on behalf of the Spanish government. The Africans—the so-called Amistads—were placed on trial for murder.
The civil claims took predominance as the courts had to sort out whether the slaves were property and if so, who owned them. A federal trial court judge determined that the Amistads were free men who were unlawfully transported by the Spanish and should be returned to their native land. The United States appealed the decision to Circuit Judge Smith Thompson, who affirmed. Then, the United States appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
What was the ruling in The Amistad case?
In a unanimous ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in an opinion written by Justice Joseph Story that “these negroes never were the lawful slaves of Ruiz or Montes, or of any other Spanish subjects.” The government attorney argued that the Amistads should still be returned to Spain pursuant to the obligations of a treaty between the two nations. Story rejected that argument, noting that the Africans were aboard the ship on a fraud in violation of even Spanish law. He added that the Africans have just as much rights as the Spanish subjects.
What attorneys argued on behalf of the Amistads before the U.S. Supreme Court?
The Amistads were represented by Roger Baldwin, the future governor of Connecticut, and John Quincy Adams, the former president of the United States.
A newspaper clipping shows the death of Amistad captain Ferrer. The Amistad was the source of a U.S. Supreme Court trial involving African slaves held captive by the crew of a Spanish ship. Hulton Archive/Getty Images.
Who was the only justice to dissent in The Amistad case?
The erratic and mentally unstable Henry Baldwin dissented but did not write an opinion to provide his rationale.
In what decision did the Taney Court uphold the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793?
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 in Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), while striking down a Pennsylvania state “personal liberty” law that conflicted with the Fugitive Slave law. The case involved professional slavecatcher Edward Prigg, who tracked down former slave Margaret Morgan and returned her to her Maryland owner, Margaret Ashmore.
Prigg returned Morgan to Maryland without obtaining the required certificate under federal law because a Pennsylvania state judge refused to issue him one. Pennsylvania authorities then charged Prigg with kidnapping. The two states fast-tracked the litigation and it reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
In his opinion, Justice Story wrote: “Upon these grounds, we are of opinion, that the act of Pennsylvania upon which this indictment is founded, is unconstitutional and void. It purports to punish as a public offence against that state, the very act of seizing and removing a slave, by his master, which the constitution of the United States was designed to justify and uphold.”
CourtSpeak: The Amistad Slavery Case (1841)
Justice Joseph Story (majority): “It is also a most important consideration in the present case, which ought not to be lost sight of, that, supposing these African negroes not to be slaves, but kidnapped, and free negroes, the treaty with Spain cannot be obligatory upon them; and the United States are bound to respect their rights as much as those of Spanish subjects. The conflict of rights between the parties under such circumstances, becomes positive and inevitable, and must be decided upon the eternal principles of justice and international law …. The treaty with Spain never could have intended to take away the equal rights of all foreigners of the protection given them by other treaties, or by the general law of nations. Upon the merits of the case, then, there does not seem to us to be any ground for doubt, that these negroes ought to be deemed free; and that the Spanish treaty interposes no obstacle to the just assertion of their rights.”
In what decision did the Taney Court strike down a provision in a state constitution?
The Taney Court ruled 6–3 in Dodge v. Woolsey (1856) that the provision of the Ohio Constitution that increased taxes on banks violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides: “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” The Court majority, in an opinion written by Justice James Wayne, reasoned that the Ohio Constitutional provision in 1851 and subsequent statute in 1853 impaired the contractual obligation that the state had with banks pursuant to an 1845 law that provided for a lesser tax.
In other words, the Court determined that the state of Ohio impaired its contractual obligation with banks in 1845 by passing a new law that raised taxes. Justice John Campbell dissented, arguing that the Court had invaded the province of state governments.
In what case did the Taney Court have to decide between two bridge-builders?
The Taney Court ruled 4–3 in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837) that the Massachusetts legislature could contract with the Warren Bridge Company to build a new bridge between Boston and Charlestown. The Warren Bridge businessmen convinced the legislature it would be a better deal for the public and the state, as they would not charge tolls after their construction costs were recovered. The problem was that years earlier the state legislature had granted a charter to the Charles River Bridge Company for the construction of the existing Charles River Bridge between the two cities. The Charles River Bridge officials did not want the construction of a new bridge to compete with them, as the tolls they had received over the years had proven quite profitable.
CourtSpeak: Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Construction Case (1837)
Chief Justice Roger Taney (majority): “The object and the end of all government is, to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established; and it can never be assumed, that the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created; and in a country like ours, free, active and enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth, new channels of communication are daily found necessary both for travel and trade; and are essential to the comfort, convenience and prosperity of the people. A state ought never to be presumed to surrender this power.”
Justice Joseph Story (dissenting): “No man will hazard his capital in any enterprise, in which, if there be a loss, it must be borne exclusively by himself; and if there be success, he has not the slightest security of enjoying the rewards of that success, for a single moment. If the government means to invite its citizens to enlarge the public comforts and conveniences, to establish bridges, or turnpikes, or canals, or railroads, there must be some pledge, that the property will be safe; that the enjoyment will be co-extensive with the grant; and that success will not be the signal of a general combination to overthrow its rights and to take away its profits. The very agitation of a question of this sort is sufficient to alarm every stockholder in every public enterprise of this sort, throughout the whole country.”
The Charles River Bridge Company sued, seeking an injunction to prevent the building of a new bridge by the Warren Bridge Company. The Charles River Bridge Company argued that the state legislature violated the Contract Clause by impairing the original contract it had with the state. However, the Warren Bridge Company countered that the important public interests at stake trumped whatever private property rights Charles River Bridge had. The majority of the Court was concerned that if the monopoly was upheld, then improvements in transportation that would benefit the public at large could only take place at the whim of the private property owner.
The Taney Court