§ 18. In this personal Identity is founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery, [340]being that, for which every one is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. […]
§ 19. This may shew us wherein personal Identity consists, not in the Identity of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of consciousness, wherein, if Socrates and the present Mayor of Quinborough agree, they are the same Person: If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen.
§ 20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the Word I is applied to, which in this case is the Man only. And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at [342]different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions, Humane Laws not punishing the Mad Man for the Sober Man’s Actions, nor the Sober Man for what the Mad Man did, thereby making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself, or is besides himself; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that self was changed, the self same Person was no longer in that Man.
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§ 22. But is not a Man Drunk and Sober the same person, why else is he punish’d for the Fact he commits when Drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same Person, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same Person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Humane Laws punish both with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge; Because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in Drunkenness or Sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the Drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures justly punish him; because the Fact is proved against [344]him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience accusing or excusing him.
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Of other Relations
§ 1. BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of Time, Place, and Causality of comparing, or referring Things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.
First, The first I shall name, is some one simple Idea; which being capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple Idea, v. g. Whiter, Sweeter, Equal, More, etc. These Relations depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple Idea, in several Subjects, may be called, if one will, Proportional […].
§ 2. Secondly, Another occasion of comparing Things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that Consideration some other thing, is the Circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations, depending thereon, as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong; […] and these I call natural [346]Relations: Wherein we may observe, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the truth and extent of Things. For ’tis certain, that in reality, the Relation is the same, betwixt the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several Races of other Animals, as well as Men: But yet ’tis seldom said, This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf; or that two Pigeons are Cousin-Germains. […]
§ 3. Thirdly, Sometimes the foundation of considering Things, with reference to one another, is some act, whereby any one comes by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do some thing. Thus a General is one, that hath power to command an Army; and an Army under a General, is a Collection of armed Men, obliged to obey one Man. A Citizen, or a Burgher, is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon Men’s Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call Instituted, or Voluntary; and may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the Persons, to whom they have sometimes belonged, though neither of the Substances, so related, be destroy’d. […]
§ 4. Fourthly, There is another sort of Relation, which is the Conformity, or Disagreement, Men’s voluntary Actions have to a Rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: which, I think, may be called Moral Relation; as being that, which denominates our Moral Actions, and deserves well to be examined […].
[348]§ 5. Good and Evil, as hath been shewn, […] are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. Morally Good and Evil then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from the Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call Reward and Punishment.
§ 6. Of these Moral Rules, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. […] This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all Law, properly so called.
§ 7. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The Divine Law. 2. The Civil Law. 3. The Law of Opinion or Reputation, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of these, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins, or Duties; by the second, whether they be Criminal, [350]or Innocent; and by the third, whether they be Vertues or Vices.
§ 8. First, The Divine Law, whereby I mean, that Law which God has set to the actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation. […] he has Power to enforce it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another Life […]. This is the only true touchstone of moral Rectitude; and by comparing them to this Law, it is, that Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions; that is, whether as Duties, or Sins, they are like to procure them happiness, or misery, from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.
§ 9. Secondly, The Civil Law, the Rule set by the Commonwealth, to the Actions of those, who belong to it, is another Rule,