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§ 17. The primary Ideas we have peculiar to Body, as contradistinguished to Spirit, are the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating Motion by impulse. These, I think, are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body; for Figure is but the consequence of finite Extension.
§ 18. The Ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to Spirit, are Thinking, and Will, or a power of putting Body into motion by Thought, and, which is consequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but communicate its Motion by impulse, to another Body, which it meets with at rest; so the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The Ideas of Existence, Duration, and Mobility, are common to them both.
§ 19. There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I make Mobility belong to Spirit: For having no other Idea of Motion, but change of distance, with other Beings, that are considered as at rest; and finding that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate, but where they are; and that Spirits do operate [296]at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite Spirits […].
§ 20. […] No Body can imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united to his Body, it constantly changes place all the whole Journey, between Oxford and London, as the Coach, or Horse does, that carries him; and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in motion: Or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear Idea enough of its motion, its being separated from the Body in death, I think, will: For to consider it as going out of the Body, or leaving it, and yet to have no Idea of its motion, seems to me impossible.
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§ 22. Let us compare then our complex Idea of an immaterial Spirit, with our complex Idea of Body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one, than in the other, and in which most. […] I know that People, whose Thoughts are immersed in Matter, and have so subjected their Minds to their Senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which, perhaps is true: But I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.
§ 23. If any one says, he knows not what ’tis thinks in him; he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that [298]solid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks; I answer, Neither knows he how he is extended; how the solid parts of Body are united, or cohere together to make Extension. […]
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§ 28. Another Idea we have of Body, is the power of communication of Motion by impulse; and of our Souls, the power of exciting of Motion by Thought. These Ideas, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, every days experience clearly furnishes us with: But if here again we enquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For in the communication of Motion by impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by Thought; which we every moment find they do. […] And if we consider the active power of Moving, or, as I may call it, Motivity, it is much clearer in Spirit than Body; […] and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of Spirits, and passive power of Matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created Spirits are not totally separate from Matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure Spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure Matter is only passive; those Beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of [300]both. But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear Ideas belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Substance of each being equally unknown to us […].
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§ 32. […] which ever of these complex Ideas be clearest, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident, that the simple Ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have received from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our other Ideas of Substances, even of God himself.
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§ 35. For it is Infinity, which joined to our Ideas of Existence, Power, Knowledge, etc. makes that complex Idea, whereby we represent to our selves the best we can, the supreme Being. For though in his own Essence, (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real Essence of a Peble, or a Fly, or of our own selves,) God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have no other Idea of him, but a complex one of Existence, Knowledge, Power, Happiness, etc. infinite and eternal: which are all distinct Ideas, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of others […].
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Of Collective Ideas of Substances
§ 1. BESIDES these complex Ideas of several single Substances, as of Man, Horse, Gold, Violet, Apple, etc. the Mind hath also complex collective Ideas of Substances; which I so call, because such Ideas are made up of many particular Substances considered together, as united into one Idea, and which so joined, are looked on as one; v. g. the Idea of such a collection of Men as make an Army, though consisting of a great number of distinct Substances, is as much one Idea, as the Idea of a Man: And the great collective Idea of all Bodies whatsoever signified by the name World, is as much one Idea, as the Idea of any the least Particle of Matter in it; it sufficing, to the unity of any Idea, that it be considered as one Representation, or Picture, though made up of never so many Particulars.
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Of Relation
§ 1. BESIDES the Ideas, whether simple or complex, that the Mind has of Things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The Understanding, in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise Object: It can carry any Idea, as it were, beyond it self, or, at least, look beyond it, to see how it stands in [304]conformity to any other. When the Mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to t’other: This is, as the Words import, Relation and Respect; and the Denominations given to positive Things, intimating that Respect, and serving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it self denominated, to something distinct from it, are what we call Relatives; and the Things so brought together, Related. […]
§ 2. […] Relations, expressed by relative terms, that have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as Father, and Son; Bigger, and Less; Cause, and Effect, are very obvious to every one, and every Body, at first sight, perceives the Relation. […] But where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not always so easily taken notice of. Concubine is no doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife: But in Languages where this, and the like Words, have not a correlative term, there People are not so apt to take them to be so, […] Hence it is, that many of those Names, which duly considered, do include evident Relations, have been called External Denominations. […]
§ 3. Another sort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external Denominations: which yet, under the form and appearance of