A Christian Directory, Part 3: Christian Ecclesiastics. Baxter Richard. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Baxter Richard
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in the masculine gender, when it includeth both sexes, or extendeth it to both. 3. And in the recapitulation in the end, it is said by way of recital of the contents, ver. 16, "These are the statutes which the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife; between the father and his daughter – in her youth in her father's house: " as if he would caution us against extending it any further. And though many good expositors think that it extendeth equally to sons as to daughters, in their minority, because there is a parity of reason, yet this is an uncertain conjecture: 1. Because God seemeth by the expression to bound the sense. 2. Because God acquainteth not man with all the reasons of his laws. 3. Because there may be special reasons for an indulgence to the weaker sex in such a weighty case. And though still there is a probability it may extend to sons, it is good keeping to certainties in matters of such dreadful importance as oaths and vows to God.

      2. It is uncertain whether this power of disannulling vows do belong also to other superiors,79 to princes, to inferior magistrates, to pastors, masters, to commanders, as to their soldiers, as well as to parents and husbands. Some think it doth, because there is, say they, a parity of reason. Others think it is dangerous disannulling oaths and vows upon pretences of parity of reason, when it is uncertain whether we know all God's reasons: and they think there is not a parity, and that it extendeth not to others. 1. Because parents and husbands are so emphatically named in the contents in the end, ver. 16. 2. Because it had been as easy to God to name the rest. 3. Because there is no instance in Scripture of the exercise of such a power, when there was much occasion for it. 4. Because else vows signify no more in a kingdom than the king please, and in an army than the general and officers please, and among servants than the master please; which is thought a dangerous doctrine. 5. Because there will be an utter uncertainty when a vow bindeth and when it doth not to almost all the people in the world; for one superior may contradict it, and another or a hundred may be silent: the king and most of the magistrates through distance will be silent, when a master, or a justice, or a captain that is at hand may disannul it: one officer may be for it, and another against it; a master or a pastor may be for it, and the magistrate against it: and so perjury will become the most controverted sin, and a matter of jest. 6. Because public magistrates, and commanders, and pastors, have not the near and natural interest in their inferiors as parents and husbands have in their children and wives; and therefore parents have not only a restraining power, (as husbands here also have,) but also a disposing power of the relation of their infant children, and may enter them in baptism into the vow and covenant of christianity, the will and act of the parents standing for the child's till he come to age; but if you say that, upon a parity of reason, all princes, and rulers, and pastors may do so with all that are their inferiors, it will seem incredible to most christians. 7. Because public magistrates are justly supposed to be so distant from almost all their individual subjects, as not to be capable of so speedy a disowning their personal vows. Whatever this text doth, it is certain that other texts enough forbid covenants and combinations against the persons, or power, or rights of our governors, and not only against them, but without them, in cases where our place and calling alloweth us not to act without them. But it is certain that God, who commanded all Israel to be entered successively into the covenant of circumcision with him, would not have held them guiltless for refusing that covenant, if the prince had been against it. And few divines think that a subject, or soldier, or servant, that hath vowed to forbear wine, or feasting, or marriage, is discharged, if his prince, or captain, or masters be against it. Jonathan and David were under an oath of friendship, (called the Lord's oath, 2 Sam. xxi. 7). Saul as a parent could not discharge Jonathan, as being a man at full age. Quære whether Saul as a king being against it, did null the oath to David and Jonathan? No; the Scripture showeth the contrary. 8. Because else that benefit which God extendeth only to a weaker sort, would extend to any, the wisest and most learned persons through the world, whose vows to God, even for the afflicting of their own souls, may be nulled by the king or other superiors. Many such reasons are urged in this case.

      3. It is uncertain whether this chapter extend to assertory or testimonial oaths (if not certain that it doth not): it speaketh but of binding their souls to God, which is to offer or do something which by error may prove prejudicial to them. But if a parent or husband (much more a king or general) might nullify all the testimonial oaths of their inferiors that are given in judgment, or discharge all their subjects from the guilt of all the lies or false oaths which they shall take, it would make a great change in the morality of the world.

      4. It is not past all controversy how far this law is yet in force: seeing the Mosaical law as such is abrogated; this can be now no further in force than as it is the law of nature, or some way confirmed or revived by Christ. The equity seemeth to be natural.

      Rule XXXI. It is certain that whoever this power of disannulling vows belongeth to, and to whomsoever it may be given, that it extendeth not to discharge us from the promise or vow of that which is antecedently our necessary duty, by the law of God. Else they should dispense with the law of God, when none but the lawgiver can relax or dispense with his laws (unless it be one superior to the lawgiver): therefore none can dispense with the laws of God. But I speak this but of a duty necessary also as a means to our salvation, or the good of others, or the honouring of God: for otherwise as to some smaller things, the duty may be such as man cannot dispense with, and yet a vow to do that duty may be unnecessary and sinful: as if I swear to keep all the law of God, and never to sin, or never to think a sinful thought; to do this is good, but to vow it is bad, because I may foreknow that I shall break it.

      Rule XXXII. In some cases a vow may oblige you against that which would have been your duty if you had not vowed, and to do that which would else have been your sin: viz. if it be such a thing as is sin or duty but by some lesser accident, which the accident of a vow may preponderate or prevail against. As if you swear to give a penny to a wandering beggar, or to one that needeth it not, which by all circumstances would have been an unlawful misemploying of that which should have been better used; yet it seemeth to me your duty to do it when you have moved it. To cast away a cup of drink is a sin, if it be causelessly; but if you vow to do it, it is hard to say that a man should rather be perjured than cast away a cup of drink, or a penny, or a pin. The Jesuits think it lawful to exercise the obedience of their novices by bidding them sometimes cast a cup of wine into the sink, or do some such action which causelessly done were sin: and shall not a vow require it more strongly? Suppose it would be your duty to pray or read at such or such an hour of the day (as being fittest to your body and occasions); yet if you have (foolishly) vowed against it, it seemeth to me to be your duty to put it off till another time. For perjury is too great a thing to be yielded to on every such small occasion. Dr. Sanderson80 ubi supra giveth this instance: If there be a law that no citizen elected to it shall refuse the office of a prætor; and he that doth refuse it shall be fined: Caius sweareth that he will not bear the office: his oath is unlawful, (and disobedience would have been his sin if he were free,) yet it seems he is bound to pay his fine, and disobey the precept of the law, rather than break his vow.

      Rule XXXIII. There are so great a number of sins and duties that are such by accidents and circumstantial alterations, and some of these greater and some less, that it is a matter of exceeding great difficulty in morality to discern when they are indeed sins and duties and when not, which must be by discerning the preponderancy of accidents; and therefore it must be exceeding difficult to discern when a vow shall weigh down any of these accidents, and when not.

      Rule XXXIV. The exceeding difficulty and frequency of such cases maketh it necessary to those that have such entanglements of vows, to have a very wise and faithful counsellor to help them better to resolve their particular cases, upon the knowledge of every circumstance, than any book or general rules can do, or any that are not so perfectly acquainted with the case. And oh what great ability is necessary in divines that are employed in such works!

      Rule XXXV. Thus also the case must be resolved whether an oath bind that hindereth a greater good which I might do if I had not taken it. In some cases it may bind: as if I swear to acquaint none with some excellent medicine which I could not have known myself unless I had so sworn; or in case that the breaking of the oath will do more hurt to me or others than the good comes to which I omit:81 or in case, all things considered,


<p>79</p>

Dr. Sanderson, Prælect. 4. sect. 5. p. 104, 105, limiteth it to De his rebus in quibus subest: in those same things in which one is under another's government; adding, sect. 6, a double exception: Of which one respecteth the person of the swearer, the other the consent of the superior: the first is that As to the person of the swearer, there is scarce any one that hath the use of reason that is so fully under another's power, but that in some things he is sui juris, at his own power: and there every one may do as pleases himself, without consulting his superior, so as that by his own act, without his superior's license, he may bind himself. 2. As to the consent of a superior, A tacit consent, antecedent or consequent, sufficeth. Quasi diceret, si dissensum suum vel uno die dissimulet, votum in perpetuum stabilivit.

<p>80</p>

Sanderson, p. 73.

<p>81</p>

Sanders. Præl. iii. sect. 12.