1. It is most necessary to the decision of this case, to understand how far the inferior that voweth was sui juris, and had the power of himself when he made the vow, as to the making of it, and how far he is sui juris as to the act which he hath vowed; and to that end to know, in a case where there is some power over his act, both in his superior and in himself, whether his own power, or his superior's, as to that act, be the greater.
2. It is therefore needful to distinguish much between those acts that are of private use and signification only, and those that (antecedently to the ruler's command) are of public use and nature, or such as the ruler is as much concerned in as the inferior.
3. It is needful to understand the true intent and sense of the command of our superior; whether it be really his intent to bind inferiors to break their vows, or whether they intend only to bind those that are not so entangled and pre-engaged by a vow, with a tacit exception of those that are.77 And what is most just must be presumed, unless the contrary be plain.
4. It must be discerned whether the commands of superiors intend any further penalty than that which is affixed in their laws: as in our penal laws about using bows and arrows, and about fishing, hunting, &c.; whether it be intended that the offender be guilty of damnation, or only that the threatened temporal penalty do satisfy the law; and whether God bind us to any further penalty than the superior intendeth.
5. The end of the laws of men must be distinguished from the words; and a great difference must be put between those forbidden acts that do no further harm than barely to cross the letter of the law, or will of a superior, and those that cross the just end of the command or law; and that either more or less, as it is more or less hurtful to others, or against the common good: for then the matter will become sinful in itself.
6. Whether perjury, or the unwilling violation of human laws, be the greater sin, and which in a doubtful case should be most feared and avoided, it is easy to discern.
Rule XXVII. A vow may be consequently made null or void, 1. By cessation of the matter, or any thing essential to it, (of which before,) or by a dispensation or dissolution of it by God to whom we are obliged. No doubt it is in God's power to disoblige a man from his vow; but how he ever doth such a thing is all the doubt: extraordinary revelations being ceased, there is this way yet ordinary, viz. by bringing the matter which I vowed to do, under some prohibition of a general law, by the changes of his providence.
Rule XXVIII. As to the power of man to dispense with oaths and vows, there is a great and most remarkable difference between those oaths and vows where man is the only party that we are primarily bound to, and God is only appealed to as witness or judge, as to the keeping of my word to man; and those oaths or vows where God is also made (either only or conjunct with man) the party to whom I primarily oblige myself. For in the first case man can dispense with my oath or vow, by remitting his own right, and releasing me from my promise; but in the second case no created power can do it. As e. g. if I promise to pay a man a sum of money, or to do him service, and swear that I will perform it faithfully; if upon some after bargain or consideration he release me of that promise, God releaseth me also, as the witnesses and judge have nothing against a man, whom the creditor hath discharged. But if I swear or vow that I will amend my life, or reform my family of some great abuse, or that I will give so much to the poor, or that I will give up myself to the work of the gospel, or that I will never marry, or never drink wine, or never consent to popery or error, &c.; no man can dispense with my vow, nor directly disoblige me in any such case; because no man can give away God's right: all that man can do in any such case is, to become an occasion of God's disobliging me: if he can so change the case, or my condition, as to bring me under some law of God, which commandeth me the contrary to my vow, then God disobligeth me, or maketh it unlawful to keep that vow. And here because a vow is commonly taken for such a promise to God, in which we directly bind ourselves to him, therefore we say, that a vow (thus strictly taken) cannot be dispensed with by man; though in the sense aforesaid, an oath sometimes may.
The papists deal most perversely in this point of dispensing with oaths and vows; for they give that power to the pope over all the christian world, who is a usurper, and none of our governor, which they deny to princes and parents that are our undoubted governors: the pope may disoblige vassals from their oaths of allegiance to their princes, (as the council of Lateran before cited,) but no king or parent may disoblige a man from his oath to the pope: nay, if a child vow a monastical life, and depart from his parents, they allow not the parents to disoblige him.
Rule XXIX. In the determining of controversies about the obligation of oaths and vows, it is safest to mark what Scripture saith, and not to presume, upon uncertain pretence of reason, to release ourselves, where we are not sure that God releaseth us.
Rule XXX. That observable chapter, Numb. xxx. about dispensations, hath many things in it that are plain for the decision of divers great and usual doubts; but many things which some do collect and conclude as consequential or implied, are doubtful and controverted among the most judicious expositors and casuists.
1. It is certain that this chapter speaketh not of a total nullity of vows ab initio, but of a relaxation, or disannulling of them by superiors. For, 1. Bare silence (which is no efficient cause) doth prove them to be in force. 2. It is not said, She is bound, or not bound; but, Her vow and bond shall stand, ver. 4, 7, 9, 11: or, shall not stand, ver. 5, 12: and, He shall make it of none effect, ver. 8. The Hebrew, ver. 5, signifieth, Quia annihilavit pater ejus illud. And ver. 8, Et si in die audire virum ejus, annihilaverit illud, et infregerit vitam ejus.78– 3. It is expressly said, that she had bound her soul before the dissolution. 4. It is said, The Lord shall forgive her, ver. 5, 8, 12, which signifieth a relaxation of a former bond. Or at the most, the parent's silence is a confirmation, and his disowning it hindereth only the confirmation. So the Chaldee paraphrase; the Samaritan and Arabic, Non erunt confirmata; the Syriac, Rata vel irrita erunt.
2. It is certain that a father hath the power of relaxation here mentioned as to an unmarried daughter, in her youth living in his house, and a husband over his wife; for it is the express words of the text.
3. It is certain that this power extendeth to vows about all things in which the inferior is not sui juris, but is under the superior's care and oversight, and cannot perform it (in case there had been no vow) without the superior's consent.
4. It is certain that it extendeth not only to matters concerning the governors themselves, but concerning vows to God, as they are good or hurtful to the inferiors.
5. It is certain that there are some vows so necessary and clearly for the inferior's good, that in them he is sui juris, and no superior can suspend his vows: as to have the Lord for his God; and not to commit idolatry, murder, theft, &c. No superior can disoblige us here; for the power of superiors is only for the inferior's indemnity and good.
6. It is certain that the superior's recall must be speedy or in time, before silence can signify consent, and make a confirmation of the vow.
7. It is certain that if the superior have once ratified it by silence or consent, he cannot afterwards disannul it.
8. It is agreed, that if he awhile dissent and disannul it, and afterwards both inferior and superior consent again, that it remaineth ratified.
9. It is agreed that the superior that can discharge the vow of the inferior, cannot release himself from his own vows. If the pope could release all men, who shall release him?
But in these points following there is no such certainty or agreement of judgments, because the text seemeth silent about them, and men conjecture variously as they are prepared. 1. It is uncertain whether any but women may be released by virtue of this text: 1. Because the text expressly distinguishing between a man and a woman doth first say, Si vir– If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. And 2. Because women are only instanced in, when Scripture usually speaketh