Third, investigation may reveal not only that perspectives may differ, but that they are inconsistent with each other, or even contradict each other. From the perspective of the Indian state, for example, education may first and foremost consist in basic primary education according to the prescriptions of the Right to Education Act of 2009. From the point of view of a tribal community, such a prescription may present a mortal danger to the educational practices of the community and thus be anti-educational in nature. We have here two radically different perspectives on education, with accompanying different criteria for what is to count as an educational practice.26 But we are not here dealing with two different realities, but with different perceptions of what is to count as a worthwhile educational practice. We can understand both perspectives but only if we are able to take the kind of imaginative and hermeneutic steps necessary to comprehend each. Persuading one party of the other’s point of view is another matter and may involve a range of possibilities.
CONCLUSION
We began by offering a criterial conception of truth which preserves objectivity in educational research. The alternative of a substantive theory such as the correspondence theory which purports to explain what truth is was rejected on the grounds of circularity. A criterial conception does not explain what truth is, but invites us to consider the various ways in which truth claims are assessed, including in EER as well as in the practices which EER investigates. A criterial approach demands in turn that we rely on a ‘thin’ categorial framework which allows us to comprehend the conceptual as well as empirical diversity that is constitutive of the universal human phenomenon of education. This categorial framework does not absolve researchers of the hard work of understanding educational practices and beliefs, nor of developing concepts adequate to describe them, but it provides a foothold for beginning such investigations which, at their best, involve both hermeneutic and empirical considerations.
We considered perspectivalism involving ‘multiple realities’ relating to multiple participants in practice as an alternative point of view. Both this chapter and the previous one argued that such perspectivalism involves both acknowledgement of a perception-independent reality but also of a conception-dependent categorial framework for making sense of diverse perspectives.
We then considered whether or not the presupposition of rationality was adequate for making sense of such diversity or whether the acknowledgement of commonality in a categorial framework was able to bear the diversity of educational phenomena to be encountered. Rationality is not a monolithic concept, but its different facets, provided they are carefully respected, do allow us to comprehend diversity within a human unity.
Finally, objections to a criterial conception of truth adequate for EER were considered.
Notes
1 1 Some claim (e.g. Schoonenboom 2018) that objectivity is possible with a multiple realities perspective. I reject this view as it seems to entail multiple truths, even if there is a strong degree of convergence in truth claims from different researchers using different methods.
2 2 Peirce however sees truth as the inevitable result of converging lines of enquiry. These lines not only converge on each other but on the Real. In some respects this position is similar to the argument in this chapter if we hold that lines of enquiry require criteria for the making of assertions concerning truth and falsity.
3 3 ‘Any idea upon which we can ride …; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.’ (James 1907, p. 34).
4 4 The redundancy view does not exclude the meaningful use of such statements as ‘What you say is true’ where there is anaphoric reference to the interlocutor’s statement, or ‘All the propositions of Physics are true’, where a collectivity of propositions are referred to.
5 5 There is a separate question as to whose judgement prevails. Often, this is a question of authority or power (Alexander 1992).
6 6 This is similar to what Kölbel (2005) calls ‘soft truth’.
7 7 Here we should recognise that understanding is one of the primary tasks of the educational researcher.
8 8 See Wittgenstein (1953), II, xii.
9 9 Is storytelling a form of lying? Brice-Heath (1983), in her study of two different communities, showed that how storytelling is conceptualised (and hence encouraged or discouraged) may well vary between subcultures within the same society. What is indisputable though is that there is some practice going on, whether it be described as ‘lying’ or ‘storytelling’.
10 10 In admitting this, we do not have to commit ourselves to the view that all we see is ‘bare behaviour’. For a start, it is clear that intentionality plays a role (Taylor 1968).
11 11 Indeed, within our own culture religion is very often dismissed as irrational because it does not conform to scientific criteria for establishing truth. On the wider issue, see Evans-Pritchard 1936; Winch, P. 1964.
12 12 Such a phenomenological approach does not entail that each perspective is a purely subjective experience dependent on the deliverances of the senses, although it depends on them. It is also a ‘world view’ with its own coherence and logic developed through the synthesising powers of the mind (Schutz 1932, 1976). These considerations do not, however, make such a reality objective in the sense that there are commonly held criteria for determining the truth or falsity of propositions.
13 13 This form of chronic aspect perception should be distinguished from what Wittgenstein calls ‘continuous’ aspect perception, which is related to an exercise of the will (Arahata 2015).
14 14 It is difficult to understand the aims of German vocational education without understanding the way in which know-how can be expressed both as Fähigkeit and Fertigkeit, a distinction not readily available in English. But it is also a distinction that might with profit be adopted when considering English vocational education.
15 15 A notorious example is the extrapolation of characteristics of effective schools from observation of schools with high contextual value-added (CVA) scores. Quite apart from questions about causality, it is difficult to see how to separate the normative commitments about ‘good practice’ (Alexander 1992) from genuine observation.
16 16 See for example the ‘progressive’ commitments of Leeds City Council and the more sceptical approach taken by the researchers into the Primary Needs Programme (Alexander op. cit.).
17 17 Clark (2011) for a contrary view. Clark is wrong to think that values and norms in use cannot