Communicating in Risk, Crisis, and High Stress Situations: Evidence-Based Strategies and Practice. Vincent T. Covello. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Vincent T. Covello
Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited
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Жанр произведения: Отраслевые издания
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781119081791
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– a neighborhood in Niagara Falls, New York, infamously known as the location of a 70‐acre landfill and massive environmental pollution – and at Three Mile Island (1979) – a location near Middletown, Pennsylvania, where a nuclear power plant partially melted down, creating the most serious accident in US commercial nuclear power plant operating history.

      4.2.2 Historical Phase 2: Listening and Planning

      Phase 2 covered the period from approximately the mid‐1980s to the mid‐1990s. Researchers and decision‐makers focused on the characteristics of effective risk and crisis communication, such as anticipating, planning, practice, trust, message clarity, risk perceptions, the effective use of delivery channels, and listening to the needs of those interested and affected. Leiss’s Phase 2 corresponds to Fischhoff’s Stages 3‐6.

      4.2.3 Historical Phase 3: Stakeholder Engagement

      Phase 3 covers the period from the mid‐1990s onward. Researchers and decision‐makers shifted focus to consensus building; meaningful interaction with stakeholders; social and cultural factors influencing risk perceptions; and how trust can be built, maintained, or repaired through constructive dialog. Frequent beginning observations about trust in Phase 3 research include: Trust is situation specific and difficult to achieve. Trust accumulates and deposits over time in trust “accounts” that are based on words, interactions, relationships, and responsible actions. Trust is hard to gain and easy to lose. The importance of trust varies by hazard and respondent group.

      Leiss’s Phase 3 corresponds to Fischhoff’s Stages 7 and 8. Leiss points out that each phase emerged in response to the earlier one. The earlier ones do not become irrelevant; instead, they are incorporated into the later phases. Each has value.

      4.2.4 Covello and Sandman’s Four Stages of Risk Communication

      Covello and Sandman argued it was in this crucible that the basic tenets of risk and crisis communication were born. The tenets were created, in part, to guide the new partnerships and dialogs with those affected by risks and crises. They provided science‐based guidance for confronting the dilemma that perception equals reality, or becomes reality, and that which is perceived as real is real in its consequences.

      Recognizing this dilemma, researchers examined whether there were science‐based and ethical ways to calm people and provide reassurance, particularly when data showed a risk was not large but people perceive it to be large and are upset, angry, or outraged. Researchers also examined whether there were science‐based and ethical ways to overcome apathy when data shows a risk is large and yet people perceive it to be insignificant and not deserving their attention.

      This is the general context for the interest in risk communication that began in the 1960s and continues to this day.

      In part, risk communication principles and tools were identified and developed to overcome communication obstacles. These obstacles included inconsistent, overly complex, confusing, or incomplete messages about risks; the lack of trust in information sources; selective reporting by the media; and psychological and social biases that affect how risk‐related information is processed.

      4.2.4.1 Stage 1: Ignore the Public

      The first stage was simply to ignore the public. This stage was prevalent in the United States until the late 1960s. The approach was built on the assumption that many people were apathetic about most health, safety, and environmental risk issues. As a result, they were willing to delegate decision‐making to technical, engineering, and scientific professionals. Under these conditions, the best communication strategy was to ignore the public, or, when necessary, mislead them. Protect the public’s health, safety, and environment, but do not let them take part in the decision‐making.

      For a long time, the public was content to be ignored regarding risk issues. But this approach stopped working, particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Movements focused on taking back power and participating more directly in risk‐related decision‐making. Increasingly, when risk management authorities ignored the public, controversies became larger. This was the experience for many industries, including the nuclear power, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries. For example, in the early 1960s, thalidomide, a widely used drug for the treatment of nausea in pregnant women, was taken off the market due to massive pressure from the press and public. Experts estimated that thalidomide led to deaths and serious birth defects in thousands of children.

      4.2.4.2 Stage 2: Explaining Risk Data Better

      Since ignoring the public did not work, risk managers and communicators advanced to the second stage: learning how to explain risk data better. This is where many organizations are still today. Researchers developed new techniques for explaining risk assessment concepts, such as parts per billion, how assessments are conducted, and how management decisions are made. Researchers developed improved methods for interactions with the media, for reducing or eliminating the use of jargon, and for developing and using visual aids.

      Most important, risk managers and communicators discovered listening and motivation were keys to learning. While risk communication materials can be developed for an average person to comprehend, people will process the information only if they are motivated and feel their concerns have been heard. When people are sufficiently motivated and feel heard, they can understand even complex technical material. For example, average people can process the probabilities associated with gambling and the complexities of mortgage rates.

      For some risk problems, when the risk is large and the controversy is minimal, doing a better job with explaining risk information is the most important piece of the puzzle. For example, when people believe they have control over a particular risk, when the risk is perceived to be voluntary, and when risk management institutions are trusted, explaining data better often leads to improved decision‐making. For other risk problems, such as when experts claim the risk is not significant or large, but