VON STEENGRACHT: It is true that many people remained in their positions although at heart they disapproved of Hitler's methods of government and, indeed, were inimical to those methods.
There are various reasons for this.
First, it must be said that the NSDAP had come into power according to the rules of parliamentary procedure as being the strongest Party in the Relchstag. The officials employed had no reason at all to retire from service on account of the change of government. In consequence of the change to dictatorial government and the completely different concept of the State which the change of government involved, the individual suddenly found that he was no longer allowed to take a position of his own concerning this regime. The notorious reign of terror began. Everywhere, in the ministries and chancelleries, in private dwellings, and in restaurants there hovered spies who, out of fanaticism or for pay, were willing to report everything they heard.
Nevertheless, many would deliberately have risked the gravest consequences, if their withdrawal could have in any way improved anything. But it became obvious that such persons merely sacrificed themselves and especially their families unavailingly, because cases of the kind were painstakingly withheld from publicity and therefore had no effect. Worst of all was the fact that the appointment vacated was filled by an especially radical man. Many people realized this and remained at their posts in order to prevent the development that I have just described. The great number of atrocities committed or ordered by Hitler or Himmler have led many foreigners to the conclusion that the German people as a whole shared the guilt for these crimes, or at least had knowledge of them. This is not the case. The majority of people even in high government positions did not learn details of these matters or the extent to which they were carried on-until the war was over. Perhaps the key to this is found in the speech which Himmler delivered in Posen on 3 October 1943 to his Gruppenführer, and which I learned of for the first time here. This speech directed that his special assignments-that means the actions against the Jews and the concentration camps-were to be kept just as secret as had been the events of 30 June 1934, of which the German people have only now learned the authentic story.
Guilt for all these occurrences rests only on a relatively small group, to be appraised at a few thousand people. It was these who carried out this unparalleled terror against the German people. But those who thought differently and who remained are chiefly to be thanked for the fact that, for example, the Geneva Convention was not renounced, that tens or even hundreds of thousands of English or American airmen and prisoners were not shot, that the unfortunate prisoners, those seriously wounded, were returned during the war to their families in their home countries; Greece in her dire need received food; exchange was stabilized as far as possible, as in Belgium and France, and militarily pointless destruction ordered in foreign countries and in the home country could be in part prevented or at least lessened; indeed that the principles of human justice, in some places at least, remained alive. These circles were discouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact that no foreign power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for breaking off diplomatic relations, but that almost all, until the outbreak of war negotiated with National Socialism, concluded treaties and even had their diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist Party Days at Nuremberg. It was particularly noted that National Socialist Germany, outwardly at any rate, received much more consideration, understanding, and respect from foreign countries than ever had the Weimar Republic despite all its fidelity to treaties or its integrity.
Then the war came, and with it special duties for civil servants, officers, and every individual German. Should, and if so when and how could these people who still felt themselves to be the servants of the nation, leave their posts under these circumstances? Would they, above all, by taking such a step be useful to their country and to humanity? Would they have frightened Hitler or even warned him?
DR. HORN: Did you make peace suggestions of a foreign political nature to Von Ribbentrop after the French campaign?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no official position. But I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it was a heartfelt wish of many, if not all, Germans, to see peaceful conditions again in the world as soon as possible. On the day of the capitulation of the King of the Belgians, I suggested: Firstly, the creation of a United States of Europe on a democratic basis. This would have meant independence of Holland, Belgium, Poland, and so on.
Secondly, if this could not be brought about with Hitler, at any rate to have as few encroachments on the autonomy of the countries as possible.
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this matter?
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. But at that time Hitler considered such plans as premature.
DR. HORN: Did you speak to Von Ribbentrop again in the winter of 1942-43 on the same subject?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also worked out very concrete proposals. They provided for the sovereignty and independence of all conquered countries, including Poland, and in addition, a far-reaching ecoaomic collaboration.
DR. HORN: How did Hitler react then to these proposals?
VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler turned down these proposals giving as reason the fact that the time was not suitable, the military situation not favorable enough, that this would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
DR. HORN: Now to another question. Before the outbreak of the Russian campaign, did Von Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck's statement about the danger of preventive wars?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop told me several times that he was very concerned about the pact with Russia. In regard to preventive war, he had stated to Hitler: "The good God does not let anyone look at His cards." I know too that Ribbentrop made efforts to bring our experts on Russia to Hitler in order to explain to him the situation there and to advise him against a war. Hitler did not permit these people to see him, so far as I know. Only Ambassador Count Schulenburg was granted a short audience. He, who considered such a war ill-advised and emphatically rejected the idea, could not, however, advance his views on Russia and the reasons against a war; for Hitler, having delivered a speech of his own on this subject, after about 20 minutes dismissed him abruptly without letting him speak a word.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that witnesses might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness appears to the Tribunal to have read practically every word he has said. That is not refreshing your memory with notes. That is making a speech which you have written out beforehand, and if that sort of thing goes on the Tribunal will have to consider whether it is necessary to alter its rule and adhere to the ordinary rule, which is that no witness is allowed to order to any notes at all except those made at the time.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed the questions with the witness; but his notes, if they have been made, were made by the witness independently and without my knowledge of the exact contents. I shall now ask the witness to answer my questions without making use of any means which I do not know. I do not-that I want to emphasize once again-know these answers.
Witness, is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop tried to use his influence with Hitler to stop the damaging tendencies against the Church and the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently with Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely in despair about the policy toward the Church and the Jews, and for this reason had occasion to speak to him about it often, as I have said. But he explained to me again and again when he returned from Hitler: "Hitler cannot be spoken to on this point. Hitler says that these problems have to be solved before he dies." DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any knowledge of the military planning?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop frequently told me that he was completely in the dark in military