I should judge the number of these to be approximately thirty.
For example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Labor Front, the SS, the Rosenberg office with its Foreign Political office, the Propaganda Ministry, the office Waldeck, the Ribbentrop office, the Nordic Society; further, the VDA, the German Academy, the Reich Railways (Reichsbahn) and others. Besides these offices, the immediate entourage of Hitler and personalities like Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann had an influence in the shaping of foreign Policy. Göring, too, as I see it, had perhaps a certain influence, but only until 1938-at any rate, in matters of foreign politics, scarcely later than that.
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop make efforts to prevent such influences or to exclude them?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own observation, I can give only the following judgment: Almost every one of those persons, who had never before lived in foreign countries and who, as an occasional traveling salesman for the Third Reich, in peacetime, or after the occupation of a foreign country, had eaten well in the capital of this or that foreign country, considered himself an unrivaled expert on this country. They all had a predilection for bringing their enlightenment and discernment to Hitler. Unfortunately the further they were removed from actual conditions, the more they were in contradiction to the political requirements and necessities, and especially, unfortunately, the more so-called strength was shown and the more they stood in contradiction to the elementary feelings of humanity, the more they pleased Hitler. For Hitler regarded such statements and representations as sound judgment, and they had sometimes an irreparable effect, and formed in Hitler's mind, together with his so-called intuition, the start of some fundamental idea. To the possible objection that it should have been easy for an expert to criticize such an opinion or view, I should like to point out the following: As long as the future German Ambassador in Paris was still a teacher of painting, Hitler read his reports with interest; but when he became the official representative of the Reich, his reports were mostly thrown unread into the wastepaper basket. Himmler's reports, the slanted opinions of Goebbels, and Bormann's influence played, on the other hand, a decisive role, as did reports from agents which could not be checked and which carried more weight than the opinions of experts on the countries.
DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for relations with all foreign countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to remark further here that I have not yet answered the second part of your question, namely, regarding the elimination of this influence.
With Hitler's methods of work, these so-called counterinfluences simply could not be eliminated. Against this "organized disorganization" Ribbentrop waged an unmitigating, bitter war, and that against almost all German offices. I should like to state further that at least 60 percent of his time was devoted to these things alone.
DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for the relations with all foreign countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: In peacetime, yes. DR. HORN: Did the position of the Foreign Office change with the outbreak of war?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. In point of fact, the Foreign Office to its competency toward the country concerned at the moment when the German bayonet crossed the border. The exclusive right to maintain direct relations with foreign governments was eliminated in all occupied territories; in most instances even the right to have a representative of the Foreign Office whose post was for observation only and without competency. This is particularly true for the Eastern Territories and for Norway.
Where Ribbentrop made the effort to maintain, in spite of the occupation, a certain degree of independence of a country, as, for example, in Norway, this activity of our diplomats was termed weak, traitorous, stupid, and those responsible had to stop their work at once, on Hitler's orders, and disappeared from the Foreign Office.
In general the changed position of the Foreign Office during the war is best characterized by Hitler's statement: "The Foreign Office shall, as far as possible, disappear from the picture until the end of the war." Hitler wanted to limit the Foreign Office to about 20 to 40 people, and it was even, partially forbidden to form or to maintain any connection with the Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office, as such, and its officials were detested by Hitler. He considered them objective jurists, defeatists, and cosmopolitans, to whom a matter can be given only if it is not to be carried out.
DR. HORN: Was there any foreign policy, in a traditional sense, in Germany?
VON STEENGRACHT: No; at least, I never noticed anything of it, for Hitler had in effect made the statement: "Diplomacy is defrauding the people. Treaties are childish; they are respected only as long as they seem useful to the respective partners." That was Hiver's opinion of all diplomats in the world.
DR. HORN: Did the Foreign Office have any influence in the Eastern territories and the territories that were under civilian administration?
VON STEENGRACHT: I have already touched on this question.
I have already said that in the territories in which there was a military government or a civilian administration, a representative of the Foreign Office-if he was tolerated at all-was tolerated only as an observation post, at any rate had no functions; that was the rule.
I think I would be going too far if I went through the condition in every country. The situations varied.
DR. HORN: Do you consider Von Ribbentrop a typical National Socialist or not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop was, in his whole attitude, no typical exponent of National Socialism. He knew extraordinary little of the dogma and doctrines of National Socialism. He felt himself only personally bound to Hitler, whom he followed with soldierly obedience, and he stood under a certain hypnotic dependence on Hitler. However, I cannot characterize him as a typical exponent of National Socialism.
DR. HORN: Was Hitler a man who was accessible to suggestions and objections?
VON STEENGRACHT: In the first years after 1933 he is said still to have been; but during the course of years he shut himself off more and more from expert objections and suggestions. From the time that I became State Secretary, I saw him only twice on official occasions. I can thus speak only on the success or lack of success of Our work. In the course of my activities, covering almost 2 years, I can now recall almost no case in which he agreed to one of our suggestions. On the contrary, it was always to be feared that by some suggestion of a personal nature he would be led to take violent action in an opposite direction. The basic trait of his character was probably lack of confidence, and this bore unprecedented fruit.
Thus, experts and decent people who tried to influence Hitler to their way of thinking were engaged, in my opinion, in an altogether vain task. On the other hand, irresponsible creatures who incited him to take violent measures, or who voiced their suspicions, unfortunately found him extremely accessible. These men were then termed strong, whereas the behavior of anyone who was even half-way normal was condemned as weak or defeatist; through a reasonable opinion voiced only once, the influence of that man could be forever destroyed.
DR. HORN: What conclusions did Hitler draw from contradictory viewpoints in respect to the contradicting persons?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question in general terms. I have already shown it in my previous answers. First of all the reaction depended very much, in my opinion, on the mood of the Dictator at the time. It was also a matter of importance as to who contradicted and how much strength or weakness he had already shown or seemed to have shown. But what the atmosphere was can perhaps be demonstrated by the following case, shortly after the death of President Roosevelt, as told by Ribbentrop's liaison agent with Hitler, a man named Hewel. He said:
"Today I almost met my doom. Goebbels came from the Führer, and reported on Germany's prospects, as far as the Führer saw them affected by Roosevelt's death, and he drew up a very hopeful picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the opinion that such a view was not justified and remarked as much cautiously to Goebbels. Goebbels fell into a rage, called me a spirit who demoralized everyone, who trampled on the happy moods and hopes of every decent person.