SECTION CCXXI
Our obligation to beneficence.
That degree of love, which we called above love of beneficence (§214), is of a sublimer kind, because it excites us to exert ourselves to the utmost, and even with detriment to ourselves, to promote the good of others. Now, since what we would desire to be done to us by others we are obliged to do to them (§88), and many cases happen in which we ourselves would be very unhappy unless others should liberally bestow upon us what we want, and there is none who does not desire that others should so treat him; the consequence is, that we are obliged, in such cases, to supply others liberally with what they stand in need of, even with some detriment to ourselves.† <160>
SECTION CCXXII
What is meant by beneficent, and what by officious.
A benefit is a service rendered to one without hope of restitution or retribution; and therefore readiness to render such services we call beneficence; as readiness to do good offices, to lay on obligation of restoring or compensating by services to one’s self is called officiousness by Sidon. Apollin. 23. v. 478.1 But tho’ such services be not properly called benefits; yet they ought to be highly valued, and gratefully received, if they are greater than to admit of payment, or are rendered to us by one whom the nature of the good office did not oblige to do it.*
SECTION CCXXIII
Beneficence ought to proceed from inclination to be useful to others.
Since therefore beneficence is readiness to render such offices to others as we have reason to think will be serviceable to them (§222), every one must <161> see that they have no title to the praise of beneficence, who, as the servant in Terence, Hecyr. 5. 4. v. 39. “do more good ignorantly and imprudently, than ever they did knowingly, and with design (§48),” or who do good with an intention to hurt; or who do good only, because they think the benefit will turn more to their own advantage than to that of the receiver. From all which it is manifest, that in judging of benefits the mind and intention of the benefactor are more to be considered than the act or effect itself.*
SECTION CCXXIV
Benefits ought to be dispensed with prudence.
Since benefits flow from love, which is always joined with prudence (§83), it is plain that whatever is not agreeable to reason is profusion, and any thing rather than liberality: nor are those offices deserving of the name of benefits, which proceed from ambition and vain-glory, more than from love, and are bestowed upon the more opulent, and not the indi-<162>gent;† upon unworthy persons preferably to men of merit; or, in fine, which are done contrary to that natural order founded in natural kindred and relation, of which above (§220).
SECTION CCXXV
Benefits ought to be proportioned to the necessity and condition of persons.
Besides, because benefits ought to be advantageous to persons (§222), it is evident from hence, that benefits ought to be suited to every one’s condition and necessities; and therefore that those are not benefits which do no good to a person; much less such as do him great hurt, or at least are attended with considerable inconvenience to him.* <163>
SECTION CCXXVI
The degrees of kindred and connexion are to be considered.
Since that love of humanity and beneficence which binds to render good offices, extends even to enemies (§219), it is clear that those have a much better title to our love, who have done us all the kindnesses they had in their power; and that they are the worst of men, nay, more hard-hearted than the most savage brutes, who are not won to love by favours: they are so much the more unjust that it cannot be denied, that by accepting favours, we bind ourselves to mutual love (§221).
SECTION CCXXVII
The obligation to gratitude.
Love to benefactors is called a grateful mind or gratitude; wherefore, seeing one is obliged to love him from whom he hath received favours, the consequence is, that every one is obliged to shew gratude in every respect: yet this duty is imperfect, and therefore one cannot be compelled to perform it; an ungrateful person cannot be sued for his ingratitude in human courts, unless the laws of the state have expressly allowed such an action. Some such thing we have an example of in Xenophon’s institution of Cyrus, 1. 2. 7. p. 9. Edit. Oxon.*2 <164>
SECTION CCXXVIII
The rules relating to it.
Seeing gratitude is love to a benefactor (§227), it follows, that one is obliged to delight in the perfection and happiness of his benefactor; to commend and extol his beneficence by words, and to make suitable returns to his benefits; not always indeed the same, or equal, but to the utmost of his power; but if the ability be wanting, a grateful disposition is highly laudable.
SECTION CCXXIX
The obligation to the other.
In fine, since we are obliged, even to our own detriment, and without any hope of restitution or retribution, to do good to others (§221), the consequence is, that we ought much less to refuse favours to any one which he desires with the promise of restitution or retribution; and therefore every one is obliged to render to another what we called above officiousness (§222), provided this readiness to help others be not manifestly detrimental to ourselves (§93).
REMARKS on This Chapter
It is not improper to subjoin the few following observations upon our Author’s reasoning in this chapter.
1. When duty is defined to be something enjoined by the divine will under a sanction, duties cannot be distinguished into perfect and imperfect in any other sense but this: “That some precepts of God give a right to all mankind to exact certain offices or duties from every one. But other precepts do not give any such right.” Thus the precept of God not to hurt any one, but to render to every one his due, gives every one a right to exact his due, and to repel injuries. But the precept to be generous and bountiful, gives no man a right to exact acts of generosity and bounty, tho’ it lays every man under an obligation to be generous and bountiful, to the utmost of his power. So that he who sins against the former is more criminal, or is guilty of <165> a higher crime than he who does not act conformably to the other. This is the only sense in which duties can be called, some perfect, and others imperfect, when duty is considered, with our Author, as an obligation arising from the divine will commanding or forbidding. For all such obligation is equally perfect, equally full. The distinction takes its rise from the consideration of what crimes do, and what crimes do not admit of a civil action, consistently with the good order of society; and it is brought from the civil law into the law of nature. But it would, in my opinion, be liable to less ambiguity in treating of the law of nature, instead of dividing duties into those of perfect and those of imperfect obligation, to divide them into greater or lesser duties, i.e. duties, the transgression of which is a greater crime, and duties the omission of which is a lesser crime: or, in other words, duties the performance of which may be lawfully exacted, nay compelled; and duties the performance of which cannot be compelled or even exacted. But our Author’s terms mean the same thing, and cannot, if his definitions be attended to, create any ambiguity. However, we may see from his reasoning in this chapter, the necessity (as we observed in our preceeding remarks) of having recourse to internal obligation (as our Author calls it) or the intrinsic goodness and pravity of actions, in deducing and demonstrating human duties.
2. Since our Author’s reasoning wholly turns upon the reasonableness of this maxim, “Do as you would be done by; and do not to another what you would not