SECTION CLXXVII
Every man ought to treat every other as his equal.
First of all, it ought to be laid down as a maxim, that men are by nature equal (§172), being composed of the same essential parts; and because tho’ one man may share perfections, as it were by his good lot, above others, yet different degrees of perfection do not alter the essence of man, but all men are equally men: whence it follows, that every one ought to treat every other as equally a man with himself, and not to arrogate to himself any privilege in things belonging to many by perfect right, without a just cause; and therefore not to do to <126> any other what he would not have done to himself (§88).*
SECTION CLXXVIII
And then no person ought to be injured.
Since therefore we ought not to do to any one what we would not have done to ourselves (§177); but none of us would like to be deprived by any other of our perfection and happiness which we have by nature, or have justly acquired; i.e. to be injured or hurt (§82); the consequence is, that we ought not to render any one more imperfect or unhappy, i.e. injure any one. And because to what constitutes our felicity and perfection, belongs not only our body, but more especially our mind, this precept must extend to both these parts, and an injury to our mind must be as much greater than an injury to our bodily part, as the mind is more excellent than the body.* <127>
SECTION CLXXIX
No person may be killed, no injury may be done to one’s body, health, &c.
The perfection and happiness of man consists in life, i.e. in the union of his soul and body (§143), which is of all he hath received from nature the most excellent gift, and is indeed the basis or foundation of all the rest: since therefore it is unlawful to deprive any one of the perfection and happiness he hath received from nature, and we would not choose to have our life taken away by another, (§178), it is self-evident, that it is our duty not to kill any person; not to do the least detriment to his health; not to give any occasion to his sickness, pain, or death, or not to expose him to any danger, without having a right to do it, or with an intention to have him killed.*
SECTION CLXXX
Unless necessity obliges to lawful self-defence.
Yet since none is obliged to love another more than himself (§94), and it may often hap-<128>pen that either one’s self or another must perish; the consequence is, that in case any one attack us, in this doubtful state of danger, every way of saving one’s self is lawful (§163); and therefore we may even kill an aggressor, provided we do not exceed the limits of just self-defence.
SECTION CLXXXI
Its limits.
But what are the limits of just self-defence none will be at a loss to understand, who calls to mind, that absolute or inevitable necessity merits favour, (§158): For hence it follows, That blameless self-defence takes place, if one be in absolute necessity, or even in relative necessity, provided he be so, not by his own fault (§158): That all danger being past, there is no further any right of defence: That when danger can be avoided without hurting the aggressor, or by a lesser evil, there is no right to kill him;† because of two evils the least ought always to be chosen.
SECTION CLXXXII
Against whom we may use it.
These evident principles being attended to, nothing can be more easy than to answer all the questions which are commonly proposed with relation to due moderation in self-defence. For if it be asked against whom it is allowable, you will answer rightly, if you say, against all by whom we are brought into danger without any fault of our own (§81); and therefore even against mad persons, persons disordered in their senses, and even against those <129> who attack you by mistake, when they are intending to assault another. For as Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 2. 1. 3. has well observed, the right of self-defence in such cases does not proceed from his injustice or fault, by whom the danger is occasioned, but from our own right of repelling all danger by any means, and of not preferring in such circumstances the life or safety of another to our own.*
SECTION CLXXXIII
The extent of it in a state of natural liberty.
Nor will it be less easy to determine how long this right of defence against an aggressor continues. For here doctors justly distinguish between those living in a state of nature, and subject to no magistrate, by whom they may be defended and protected, and those who live in a civil state, and under magistracy. For since, in a state of natural liberty, there is none to protect us against injuries, our right of self-defence cannot but begin the moment our danger commences, and cannot but continue while it lasts, or till we are absolutely secure, (§181). But our danger begins the moment one shews a hostile disposition against us, and while that continues, our right of self-defence lasts.* <130>
SECTION CLXXXIV
And in a civil state.
On the other hand, in a civil state, one who shews enmity against another, trapps, or lays snares for him, may be coerced by the civil magistrate; the consequence of which is, that a member of a civil state, hath not a right, by his own force and arms, to resist another member who attacks him, or lays snares for him; nor, when the danger is over, to take that revenge at his own hand which he might expect from the magistrate. And therefore, the space or time of just self-defence is confined within much narrower limits in that state; it begins with the danger, and lasts no longer than the danger itself lasts.†
SECTION CLXXXV
The measure of violent self-defence.
Moreover, from these principles (§181), you may easily see that self-defence to the point of killing the aggressor is not lawful; if one was forewarned of the assault, or foreseeing it in time, could have kept at home, or retired into a safer place, or could, by wounding or maiming the injurious person, disable him:‡ tho’ no person, when he is assaulted, be absolutely obliged to betake himself to flight, because of the danger or uncertainty of it, unless there be near at hand a place of most secure refuge, <131> (Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 2. 5. 13.). But upon this head it is proper to observe, that under civil governments, the time of making an unblameable self-defence being confined within very narrow bounds, and indeed almost reduced to a point or instant, since, in such a perturbation of mind, one cannot think of all the ways of escaping; therefore, with good reason, such cases ought not to be too rigidly exacted, but great allowances ought to be made.
SECTION CLXXXVI
For what things it is lawful.
Hence we may likewise perceive for what things one may proceed to self-defence by force and violence: for since some calamities are bitterer to man than death, and not only extreme necessity, but even that which may be undergone with safety to our life, merits favour (§158); the consequence is, that what is allowable for the sake of life, is permitted likewise in defence of health, the soundness of our bodies, and even our chastity;* and likewise in defence of magistrates, parents, children, friends, and all others whom we find in danger. <132>
SECTION CLXXXVII
Whether it be allowable in defence of our honour and reputation?
The question,