The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature. Samuel Pufendorf

these Particulars, I suppose, may be easily discovered; not only the certain Bounds and Limits which distinguish the Law of Nature, as we have defined it, from Moral Divinity; but it may likewise be concluded, that the Law of Nature is no way repugnant to the Maxims of sound Divinity; but is only to be abstracted from some particular Doctrines thereof, which cannot be fathom’d by the Help of Reason alone. From whence also it necessarily follows, that in the Science of the Law of Nature, a Man should be now consider’d, as being deprav’d in his very Nature, and upon that Account, as a Creature, subject to many vile Inclinations: ^‡For although none can be so stupid as not to discover in himself many Evil and inordinate Affections, nevertheless, unless we were inform’d so much by Sacred Writ, it would not appear, that this Rebellion of the Will was occasioned by the first Man’s Transgression; and consequently, since the Law of Nature does not reach those Things which are above Reason, it would be very preposterous to derive it from the State of Man, as it was uncorrupt before the Fall; ^*especially since even the greatest Part of the Precepts of the Decalogue, as they are deliver’d in Negative Terms, do manifestly presuppose the deprav’d State of Man. Thus, for Example, in the First and Second Commandment, it seems to be supposed, that Mankind was naturally prone to the Belief of Polytheism and to Idolatry. For if you should consider Man in his Primitive State, wherein he had a clear and distinct Knowledge of the Deity, as it were by a peculiar Revelation; I do not see how it could ever enter into the Thoughts of such a one, to frame any Thing to himself to which he could pay Reverence, instead of, or together with, the true GOD; or to believe any Divinity to reside in that which his own Hands had form’d; therefore there was no Necessity of laying an Injunction upon him in Negative Terms, that he should not worship other Gods; but this Plain Affirmative Precept would have been sufficient; Thou shalt love, honour, and adore GOD, whom you know to have created both your self, and the whole Universe. And the same may be said of the Third Commandment: For why should it be forbidden, in a Negative Precept, to blaspheme God, to such a one who had at the same time a clear and perfect Understanding of his Bounty and Majesty; and who was actuated by no inordinate Affections, and whose Mind did chearfully acquiesce in that Condition, wherein he was placed by Almighty God? How could such a one be Guilty of so great Madness? But he needed only to have been admonish’d by this Affirmative Precept; That he should glorifie the Name of GOD. But it seems otherwise of the Fourth and Fifth Commandments; which, as they are Affirmative Precepts, neither do they necessarily presuppose the deprav’d State of Man, they may be admitted, Mankind being consider’d as under either Condition. But the thing is very manifest in relation to the other Commandments, which concern our Neighbour; for it would suffice plainly to have enjoyn’d Man, consider’d as he was first created by GOD, that he should love his Neighbour, whereto he was beforehand inclin’d by his own Nature. But how could the same Person be commanded, that he should not kill, when Death had not as yet fall’n on Mankind, which enter’d into the World upon the account of Sin? But now there is very great Need of such a Negative Command, when, instead of loving one another, there are stir’d up so great Feuds and Animosities among Men, that even a great Part of them is owing purely to Envy, or an inordinate Desire of invading what belongs to another; so that they make no scruple, not only of destroying those that are innocent, but even their Friends, and such as have done them signal Favours; and all this, forsooth, they are not asham’d to disguise under the specious Pretence of Religion and Conscience. In like manner, what Need was there expressly to forbid Adultery, among those married Persons, whose mutual Love was so ardent and sincere? Or, what Occasion was there to forbid Theft, when as yet Covetousness and Poverty were not known, nor did any Man think that properly his own, which might be useful or profitable to another? Or, to what purpose was it to forbid the bearing False Witness, when as yet there were not any to be found, who sought after Honour and Reputation to themselves, by Slandering and Aspersing others with false and groundless Calumnies? So that not unfitly, you may here apply the Saying of Tacitus,^*Whilst no corrupt Desires deprav’d Mankind, the first Men liv’d without Sin and Wickedness, and therefore free from Restraint and Punishment; and whereas they coveted nothing but what was their due, they were barr’d from nothing by Fear.

      Whether the Law of Nature would have been the same it is now, had Man continu’d in his State of Innocence.

      And these Things being rightly understood, may clear the way for removing this Doubt; ^*whether the Law was different, or the same, in the Primitive State of Nature, before the Fall? Where it may be briefly answer’d. That the most material Heads of the Law were the same in each State; but that many particular Precepts did vary, according to the Diversity of the Condition of Mankind; or rather, that the same Summary of the Law was explain’d by diverse, but not contrary Precepts; according to the different State of Man, by whom that Law was to be observ’d. Our Saviour reduced the Substance of the Law to two Heads: Love God, and Love thy Neighbour: To these the whole Law of Nature may be referr’d, as well in the Primitive, as in the Deprav’d State of Man; (unless that in the Primitive State there seems not any, or a very small Difference between the Law of Nature, and Moral Divinity.) For that Mutual Society, which we laid down as a Foundation to the Law of Nature, may very well be resolv’d into the Love of our Neighbour. But when ^†we descend to particular Precepts, there is indeed a very great Difference, both in relation to the Commands and Prohibitions.

      And as to what concerns the Commands, there are many which have place in this State of Mankind, which seem not to have been necessary in the Primitive State: And that partly, because they presuppose such a Condition, as, ’tis not certain, could happen to that most happy State of Mankind; partly, because there can be no Notion of them, without admitting Misery and Death, which were unknown there: As for Instance, we are now enjoyn’d by the Precepts of the Law of Nature, not to deceive one another in Buying or Selling, not to make use of false Weights or Measures, to repay Money that is lent, at the appointed Time. But it is not yet evident, whether, if Mankind had continu’d without Sin, there would have been driven, any Trade and Commerce, as there is now in the World; or whether there would then have been any Occasion for the Use of Money. In like manner, if such Kind of Communities as are now adays, were not to be found in the State of Innocence, there would be then likewise no Occasion for those Laws which are presuppos’d as requisite for the well-ordering and Government of such Societies. We are also now commanded by the Law of Nature, To succour those that are in Want. To relieve those that are oppressed. To take care of Widows and Orphans. But it would be to no purpose to have inculcated these Precepts to those who were no ways subject to Misery, Poverty, and Death. The Law of Nature now enjoyns us, To forgive Injuries; and, To use our utmost Endeavours towards the promoting of Peace amongst all Mankind. Which would be unnecessary among those who never offended against the Laws of Mutual Society. And this too is very evident in the Prohibitory Precepts which relate to the Natural, not Positive, Law. For although every Command does virtually contain in it self a Prohibition of the opposite Vice; (as, for Instance, he that is commanded to love his Neighbour, is at the same time forbidden to do such Actions, as may any ways thwart or contradict his Duty of Love:) Yet it seems superfluous that these things should be ordain’d by express Commands, where there are no disorderly Inclinations to excite Men to the committing such Wrongs. For the Illustration of which, this may be taken notice of, that ^*Solon would by no Publick Law enact any Punishment for Parricides, because he thought that no Child could be guilty of so horrid an Impiety. In like manner we find an Account, in the ^†History of the West‐Indies, concerning the People of Nicaragua; that in their Laws no Punishment was appointed for those who should kill the Cacique, by which Name they call their Princes; because, say they, there can be no Subject, who would contrive or perpetrate so base an Action. I am afraid it may savour too much of Affectation to enlarge any farther in the Proof of what is in it self so clear and evident. Yet I shall add this one Example, fitted to the meanest Capacity. Suppose there are two Children, but of different Dispositions, committed to the Care of a certain Person: One of which is Modest and Bashful, taking great delight in his Studies; the other proves Unruly, and Surly; giving himself over more to loose Pleasures, than to Learning. Now the Duty of both these is the same, To follow their Studies; but the particular Precepts, proper to each, are different; for it is sufficient to advise the Former to what Kind of Studies he must apply himself, at what Time, and after what Manner they are to be follow’d: But as for the Other, he must be enjoyn’d under severe Penalties, not to Wander abroad, not to Game, not to sell his Books, not to