9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of the army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties during the war.
10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute to this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great in the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, when armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well organised money will no longer exercise the same influence—at least for one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money will procure soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made to support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its efforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of the cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d'Yvernois, announced that France was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had 200,000,000 francs[3] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies.
A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the scales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happy combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of sustaining a long war.
A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron, and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing resources to an assailant.
We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are not directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and localities may make in these relations.
FOOTNOTES:
It will be recollected that the author wrote this many years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, which he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.—TRANSLATORS.
There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall of Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.
ARTICLE XIV.
The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations.
Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain that if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or Napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country.
As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince, (which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public resources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one will present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to great embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from its communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at head-quarters!
When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the Prussian government with Blücher—viz.; he should be accompanied by two generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability, the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army of Silesia in 1813.
The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser, who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, I think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor.
If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles, he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of the staff, and another general distinguished for