China's Omnidirectional Peripheral Diplomacy. Группа авторов

As alluded to earlier, the implementation of some of Xi’s big ideas on foreign policy initiatives should also start from China’s periphery. For example, Xi’s initiative to build a community with a shared future is meant to be oriented to China’s neighbors and other developing countries as a priority. China should start from its neighborhood and other developing countries in building a community of shared future for mankind. China and its neighbors share the natural conditions to build such a community.⁶⁷

      While Chinese foreign policy elites conclude that China should pay more attention to its neighboring countries rather than just major powers, the United States is still looming large in the mind of some Chinese analysts. They believe that the key for China to maintain a stable peripheral environment is still the United States. To carry out peripheral diplomacy effectively, the roadblock China cannot walk around is the United States. How the two countries could reach a consensus on the regional order in the Western Pacific region is vitally important.⁶⁸ In this regard, some argue that Trump’s policy toward Asia-Pacific may create opportunity for China’s peripheral diplomacy. They characterized Trump’s foreign policy style as “transactional diplomacy” which is very often unpredictable and short-term. Such a policy would reduce U.S. strategic credibility in the region. China could take advantage of this transactional diplomacy to make breakthrough in its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Once China’s neighbors are convinced that China is a more principled and reliable partner, Trump’s transactional hardline policy toward China is unlikely to get support from these countries.⁶⁹

       Conclusion

      The above brief discussion of China’s perspective of its periphery environment seems to suggest that most Chinese foreign elites have recognized the significant changes in the periphery surrounding China in recent years. However, they have different opinions about the extent, nature and implications of these changes. Some emphasize the severity of the challenges imposed by the United States and its regional allies while others pay more attention to China’s strengthened capability to handle the challenges. Interestingly, while the United States and some of its allies in Asia are still largely blamed for the more troublesome periphery environment of China, some Chinese analysts began to attribute the changes more to China’s economic and military rise in the region. However, they stop short of exploring how the enhanced material basis for China’s peripheral diplomacy could also lead to the changes in China’s international behavior, which may also contribute to more negative reactions from its neighbors. Chinese perception of its periphery has also evolved in recent years, from being more pessimistic during the Obama administration to being more optimistic more recently. No matter what, one thing is clear, the importance of peripheral diplomacy in China’s overall foreign policy has significantly increased during the Xi Jinping era. Regarding how to more effectively manage China’s periphery, there is an emerging consensus that the exiting foreign policy strategy and instrument are insufficient to deal with new challenges. New ideas and approaches are badly needed. Even Xi Jinping could come up with some new concepts and discourses, yet how to implement them could still be a problem. While the Chinese rhetoric, as manifested by Xi’s speech on China’s peripheral diplomacy, is full of nice and sensible phrases, its deeds sometime are perceived otherwise by China’s neighboring countries as illustrated by the examples of ADIZ in East China Sea and island-building activities in South China Sea. In this respect, China is still struggling to find a right balance of exercising its soft and hard power in its complex and dynamic periphery.

      ¹Wang Baofu, Focusing peripheral security and stability in responding to the changes in the world situation, Study Times, March 2, 2017, see http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0302/c40531-29119169.html (accessed on March 18, 2018).

      ²Zhang Yunlin, New changes in China’s peripheral environment and the counter measures, Ideological Front, no. 1 (2012), see http://www.zhongdaonet.com/NewsInfo.aspx?id=4162 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

      ³How to look at China’s current and future security environment, Hong Kong Review, November 2000.

      ⁴Amitav Acharya, Asia-Pacific: China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia, New York Times, November 8, 2003.

      ⁵How to create a favorable security environment in light of the evolution and development in China’s peripheral security situation, see https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/207276222 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

      ⁶Liu Jiangyong, International structure and China’s periphery security, World Economics and Politics, no. 6 (2013).

      ⁷Zhang Yunling, To grasp the big picture of new changes in periphery environment, International Economic Review, no. 1 (2012), pp. 11–12.

      ⁸Ren Jingjing, China’s peripheral security environment: new trends and new features, Theoretical Horizon, no. 5. (2011), p. 48.

      ⁹Zhang Yunlin, op. cit.

      ¹⁰Zhang Yunling, op. cit., p. 12.

      ¹¹Ruan Zongze, China needs to build what kind a periphery? Studies of International Issues, March 2014, see http://www.ciis.org.cn/gyzz/2014-03/26/content_6772740.htm (accessed on March 19, 2018).

       ¹² Ibid.

      ¹³Jiang Zeming’s speech at the graduation ceremony of the cadres at the provincial and ministerial level at Central Party School, People’s Daily, June 1, 2002.

      ¹⁴Huang Renwei, The future ten years: Strategic opportunity or strategic danger?, February 4, 2012, see http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/3741/c0, accessed August 20, 2016.

      ¹⁵Yu Zhengliang, Some thinking on China’s entry into the period of strategic challenge, International Outlook, no. 6 (2011), pp. 1–7.

       ¹⁶ Ibid.

      ¹⁷Yuan Peng, China’s period of strategic opportunity has not ended, People’s Daily, July 30, 2012.

      ¹⁸Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18^th Party Congress, Xinhua, November 17, 2012.

      ¹⁹Xi Jinping, Let the idea of community of common destiny take deep root in periphery countries, Xinhua, October 25, 2013.

      ²⁰Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,” delivered at the 19^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017.

      ²¹Han Lijun, Periphery order has entered a critical period of transformation, September 18, 2017, see http://www.chinareform.net/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=61&id=21817 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

      ²²Editorial, China’s diplomatic efforts pay off with peripheral nations, Global Times, December 25, 2017.

      ²³Wang Yi, The speech at the opening of Symposium on International Developments and China’s Diplomacy in 2017, December 10, 2017.

      ²⁴Trump’s Asia trip, Beijing scholars analyze China’s peripheral security situation, November 16, 2017, see http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=104878414 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

      ²⁵Wang Baofu, op. cit.

      ²⁶Zhang Yunlin, op. cit.