and perpetual, which, being subject to no other laws, do command and rule all. This, which in every action doth offer itself to our eyes and minds, and whether we will or not, abides in our breasts, our predecessors followed; being always armed against violence, and ready to suppress tyrants.—And now for the present, what have we done, but insisting in the footsteps of so many kingdoms and free nations, suppressed tyrannical licentiousness, extolling itself above all order of laws, not indeed so severely as our predecessors in like cases; if we had imitated them, not only would we have been far from all fear of danger, but also have escaped the trouble of calumnies.—What would our adversaries be at? Is it that we should arm with authority tyrants convicted of grievous crimes, maintained by the spoils of the subjects, having hands embrued in loyal blood, and hearts gaping for the oppression of all good men? And shall we put them upon our head, who are infamously suspected of parricide, both projected and perpetrated?' To which we may add, a foreign conclusion indeed, but adduced and maintained by Mr. Craig, in the assembly, in the 1564, which had been determined by learned men in Bononia, 'All rulers, be they supreme or subordinate, may and ought to be reformed, or bridled (to speak moderately) by them, by whom they are chosen, confirmed, or admitted to their office; so oft as they break that promise made by oath to their subjects, because princes are no less bound by oath to their subjects, than are the subjects to their princes: and therefore ought it to be kept and performed equally, according to law and condition of the oath that is made of either party.' By comparing which two testimonies together, we may see the reasons, why neither of the two royal brothers, that have ruled in our day, could be conscientiously owned as magistrates, in the case they have been in for several years past: the first testimony is for the second brother, the latter is for the first that's gone. But, as for Mr. Knox's opinion, it is evident he had written a book against the government of women; which though he did not intend it particularly against Mary of Scotland, yet it did invalidate her authority as well as other women's. This book he owns and maintains, in his first conference with her, and consequently could not own her authority as of the Lord, tho' he gave her common respect, as the title of majesty, &c. yet when he was particularly urged by the Queen's question, you think, said she, 'That I have no just authority;' he would not answer in the affirmative, but shifted it, by telling her, 'That learned men, in all ages, have had their judgment free, and most commonly disagreeing from the common judgment of the world. And though, he says, he could live under her government (so may, and would the greatest disowners of tyranny, if they be not troubled with questions about owning it) yet he affirms that with the testimony of a good conscience, he had communicated his judgment to the world, and that if the realm found no inconveniences in her government, he would no further disallow than within his own breast.' Certainly then, in his conscience, he did not, and could not own her, as the magistrate of God; and that though many things which before were holden stable, had been called in doubt, yet neither protestant nor papist could prove, that any such question was, at any time, moved in public or private. Neither could ever such a question be moved, if the conscience were not posed; and then, when it must speak, it must of necessity be unpleasant to tyrants. Thus we have heard both the positions and scruples of this witness; let us also hear his arguings, that people may punish princes for their idolatry and murder, &c. and therefore much more may disown them: and therefore again much more may they forbear to own them, when called; for can a dead man, by law, be owned to be a magistrate, and keeper of the law. 'Idolatry' (saith he in his conference with Lethington) 'ought not only to be suppressed, but the idolater ought to die the death; but by whom? By the people of God, for the commandment was given to Israel; yea, a command, that if it be heard that idolatry is committed in any one city, that then the whole body of the people arise and destroy that city, sparing neither man, woman, nor child. But shall the king also be punished? If he be an idolater, I find no privilege granted unto kings more than unto people, to offend God's majesty. But the people may not be judges to their king.——God is the universal judge; so that what his word commands to be punished in the one, is not to be absolved in the other; and that the people, yea, or a part of the people, may not execute God's judgments against their king, being an offender; I am sure you have no other warrant, except your own imaginations, and the opinion of such as more fear to offend their princes than God.' In the same conference we have the instance of Jehu adduced to prove that subjects may execute God's judgments upon their princes. It was objected, Jehu was a king before he executed judgment upon Ahab's house, and the fact was extraordinary, and not to be imitated. He answered, He was a mere subject; 'No doubt Jezabel both thought and said he was a traitor, and so did many others in Israel and Samaria. And whereas it was said, that the fact was extraordinary; I say, it had the ground of God's ordinary judgment, which commandeth the idolater to die the death; and therefore I yet again affirm, it is to be imitated of all those that prefer the true honour of the true worship and glory of God, to the affection of flesh and wicked princes. We are not bound, said Lethington, to follow extraordinary examples, unless we have the like commandment and assurance. I grant, said the other, if the example repugn to the law, but where the example agrees with the law, and is, as it were, the execution of God's judgment expressed within the same; I say, that the example approved of God, stands to us in place of a commandment; for as God, in his nature, is constant and immutable, so cannot he condemn, in the ages subsequent, that which he hath approved in his servants before us.' Then he brings another argument from Amaziah who fled to Lachish, but the people sent thither and slew him there. Lethington doubted whether they did well or not: he answered, 'Where I find execution according to God's law, and God himself not accuse the doers, I dare not doubt of the equity of their cause: And it appears, God gave them sufficient evidence of his approving the fact, for he blessed them with peace and prosperity. But prosperity does not always prove that God approves the fact: yes, when the acts of men agree with the law, and are rewarded according to the promise in that law, then the prosperity succeeding the fact is a most infallible assurance that God hath approved it; but so it is, that there is a promise of lengthening out prosperity to them that destroy idolatry. And again, concluding Uzziah's example, he says there, the people ought to execute God's law, even against their princes, when that their open crimes, by God's law, deserve punishment; especially when they are such as may infect the rest of the multitude.'
V. There is another thing for which people have suffered much in our day of blasphemy, rebuke and trouble, which yet we find was not so odious in our reformers eyes as this dull and degenerate age would represent it. That in some cases it is lawful and laudable for private persons, touched with the zeal of God, and love to their country, and respect to justice trampled upon by tyrants; to put forth their hand to execute righteous judgment upon the enemies of God and mankind, intolerable traitors, murderers, idolaters; when the ruin of the country, destruction of religion and liberty, and the wrath of God is threatened, in and for the impunity of that vermin of villains, and may be averted by their destruction, always supposed, that these, whose office it is to do it, decline their duty. The mind of our reformers as to this is manifest, both in their practice and opinion. We heard before of the slaughter of Cardinal Beaton, and of the fiddler Rizzio: we shall find both commended by Mr. Knox, giving account how these that were carried captives to France for this cause from St. Andrew's were delivered. 'This (saith he), we write, to let the posterity to come to understand, how potently God wrought in preserving and delivering of those that had but a small knowledge of his truth, and for the love of the same hazarded all; that if we, in our days, or our posterity that shall follow, shall see a dispersion of such as oppose themselves to impiety, or take upon them to punish the same otherwise than laws of men will permit, if such shall be left of men, yea as it were despised and punished of God: yet let us not damn the persons that punish vice, (and that for just cause,) nor yet despair, but that the same God that dejects will raise up again the persons dejected, to his glory and their comfort; and to let the world understand in plain terms what we mean; that great abuser of this commonwealth, that poultron and vile knave Davie was justly punished, March 9, 1565, by the counsel and hands of James Douglas, Earl of Morton, Patrick Lord Lindsay, &c. who, for their just act, and most worthy of all praise, are now unworthily left of all their brethren.' This is not only commended by the author alone, but we find it concluded by all the brethren at that time, when the Queen brought in the idol of the mass again, and the proud papists began to avow it: Then let it be marked that, 'The brethren universally offended, and espying that the Queen by proclamation did but delude them, determined to put to their own hands, and to punish for example of others; and so some priests in the West land were apprehended,
