most pleasing and acceptable to God, as these works are commanded by himself; and to suffer innocent blood to be shed, if we may withstand it, is affirmed to be sin, by which God's hot displeasure is kindled against the proud and unthankful world. And if there were no more to render the late test of Scotland detestable, that condemns all resistance of kings upon any pretence whatsoever, this may make all Christians, and all men, abhor the contrivance of it; that that same test that confirms this thesis, doth also impose the antithesis upon conscience. It obliges to this confession in the first part of it, and to deny it in the latter. But no wonder, that men of feared consciences can receive any thing, though never so contradictory to itself, and that men who deny sense, and that principle radicated in human nature, may also deny conscience, and make a tool of it in soldering contradictories. But not only did our reformers assert this truth, for which now their children adhering to their testimony, suffer both rage and reproach; but also gave their reasons for it. As (1.) Mr. Knox, in his first conference with the Queen, argues thus, 'There is neither greater honour nor obedience to be given to princes than parents; but so it is, that the father may be stricken with a phrensy, in the which he would slay his own children; now if the children arise, take his weapon from him, bind his hands, do the children any wrong? It is even so with princes, that would murder the children of God subject to them, their blind zeal is nothing but a very mad phrensy; and therefore to take the sword from them, and cast them into prison till they be brought to a more sober mind, is no disobedience against princes.' (2.) In his conference with Lethingtoun, he proves the same point, from the consideration of the justice of God, punishing the people for not resisting the prince. The scripture of God teacheth me (saith he) 'Jerusalem and Judah were punished for the sins of Manasseh; if you alledge they were punished, because they were wicked, and not because the king was wicked; the scripture says expressly, for the sins of Manasseh; yet will I not absolve the people, I will grant the whole people offended with their king, but how? To affirm that all Judah committed the acts of his impiety, hath no certainty; who can think, that all Jerusalem should turn idolaters immediately after Hezekiah's notable reformation? One part therefore willingly followed him in his idolatry, the other suffered him, and so were criminal of his sin; even as Scotland is guilty of the Queen's idolatry this day.' In the same discourse he makes it plain, that all are guilty of innocents murder who do not oppose it, from Jeremiah's words in his defence before the princes.——"Know ye for certain, if ye put me to death, ye shall surely bring innocent blood upon yourselves, and upon the city, and upon the inhabitants thereof:" Now, if the princes, and the whole people should have been guilty of the prophet's blood; how shall others be judged innocent before God, if they suffer the blood of innocents to be shed, when they may save it? (3.)
Ibid. He argues from the distinction between the person placed in authority, and the ordinance of God, the one may be resisted, the other cannot. The plain words of the apostle makes the difference, 'The ordinance is of God, for preservation of mankind, punishment of vice, which is holy and constant: persons commonly are profane and unjust: he that resisteth the power there, is only meant of the just power wherewith God hath armed his magistrates, which whoso resists, resists God's ordinance; but if men, in the fear of God, oppose themselves to the fury of princes, they then resist not God, but the devil, who abuses the sword and authority of God: it is evident the people resisted Saul, when he had sworn Jonathan should die, whom they delivered: the Spirit of God accuses them not of any crime, but praises them, and condemns the king: this same Saul again commanded the priests of the Lord to be slain, his guard would not obey, but Doeg put the king's cruelty in execution; I will not ask, whether the king's servants, not obeying, resisted the ordinance of God; or whether Doeg's murdering gave obedience to just authority? The Spirit of God condemns that fact, Psal. lii. that God would not only punish the commander, but also the merciless executor; therefore they who gainstood his command, resisted not the ordinance of God. (4.)
Ibid. He argues from examples, not only of resisting, but of punishing tyrants; chiefly the example of Uzziah is pertinent to this purpose, 2 Chron. xxvi. who after his usurping the priest's office, was put out of the temple.' When it was replied, that they were the priests that withstood the king, not simple people: he answered, 'The priests were subjects, as Abiathar was deposed by Solomon, &c. yet they made him go out of the temple for his leprosy, and the people put him from the kingdom.' It is noted also, that Mr. Knox, in that discourse, adduces examples of those, who use to be brought in as objections against defensive arms, even the primitive Christians, before that passage last cited: 'what precepts,' says he, 'the apostle gave, I will not affirm; but I find two things the faithful did; the one was, they assisted their preachers even against the rulers; the other was, they suppressed idolatry wheresoever God gave unto them force, asking no leave of the emperor, nor of his deputies: read the Ecclesiastical histories, and ye shall find examples sufficient.'
IV. In the next place, we may enquire into the judgment of these reformers, concerning that question that is now so puzzling to many; which indeed was never started before this time, as a head of suffering; but now, when it is started, we may gather from our ancestors actings and determinations about it, how it ought to be answered. They were indeed in capacity, and accordingly did improve it, for disowning the authority of both the Queens; for their capacity was not the thing that made it duty, if it had not been so before. Capacity makes a thing possible, but not lawful: it does indeed make a duty seasonable, and clears the call to it, and regulates the timing of affirmative duties, but the want of it can never dispense with negative precepts: and a duty, negative especially, may become necessary, when it hath not the advantage of seasonableness or capacity; certainly it were duty to depose the Pope from his usurped authority, and to disown it even in Rome itself, but there it would not be thought very feasible or seasonable, for twenty or thirty people to avouch such a thing there; yet, at all times, it is a duty never to own it. It is thought unseasonable and unfeasible to disown the tyrants authority; but it is made necessary, when urged, never to own it. And for this we have the grounds of our ancestors, shewing who may be disowned, and must not be owned. I shall first insert here John Knox's propositions, prosecuted in his second blast, extant at the end of Anton. Gilbie's admonition to England and Scotland, 1. 'It is not birth only, nor propinquity of blood, that maketh a king lawfully to reign over a people professing Christ Jesus and his eternal verity; but, in his election, the ordinance which God hath established in the election of inferior judges, must be observed. 2. No manifest idolater, nor notorious transgressor of God's holy precepts, ought to be promoted to any public regimen, honour, or dignity, in any realm, province, or city, that hath subjected themselves to Christ Jesus, and his blessed evangel. 3. Neither can oath, or promise, bind any such people to obey and maintain tyrants, against God and his truth known. 4. But if rashly they have promoted any manifest wicked person, or yet ignorantly have chosen such an one, as after declareth himself unworthy of regimen above the people of God, (and such be all idolaters and cruel persecutors) most justly may the same men depose and punish him, that unadvisedly before they did nominate, appoint and elect.' Accordingly this was done in deposing both the Queens; which is fully vindicated by the Earl of Morton, in his discourse to the Queen of England, as Buchanan relates it, book xx. page 746. 'The deed itself, neither the custom of our ancestors of taking a course with their governors, will suffer it to be accounted new, nor the moderation of the punishment to be odious; for it were not needful to recount so many kings punished by death, bonds, and exile by our progenitors. For the Scottish nation, being from the beginning always free, hath created kings upon these conditions, that the government entrusted to them by the people's suffrages, might be also (if the matter required) removed by the same suffrages: of which law there are many footsteps remaining even to our day; for both in the isles about, and in many places of the continent, in which the old language and institutions have any abode, this custom is kept, in creating their governors of clanns: and the ceremonies, used at the entering into government, do yet retain the express representation of this law. Whence it is evident, that the government is nothing else but a mutual stipulation between kings and people: which further appears, from the inviolated tenor of the ancient law, since the beginning of the Scottish government, reserved even unto our memory, without the least essay either to abrogate it, or disable, or diminish it. Yea, even when our fathers have deposed, banished, and more severely punished so many kings, yet never was any mention or motion made of relaxing the rigour of that law, and not without reason, seeing it was not of that kind of constitutions, that change with the times, but of those which are engraven in the minds of men from the first original, and approved by the mutual consent of all nations, and by nature's sanction continued
