4. Some strategic credit here is owed to St. Thomas Aquinas and his presentation of the Five Ways.
5. See Vaidman (2008), Section 1, Tegmark (2003), Jacobs (2009), Section 2a for more detailed discussion.
6. Which he calls a cosmos.
7. Which he calls simple universes.
8. While his discussion is typically confined to discussion of the fourth dimension of time-space, it is compatible with any larger finite number of space-time dimensions.
9. See Kraay (2010), Section 4.
10. This is essentially taken as an extension of free will theodicy which argues that free will is a higher-level good, but I go the extra step in asserting that it could be the greatest possible good. See Plantinga (1965).
11. As it is in the case of the classical God of Judeo-Christian monotheism.
12. In just the same way as a utilitarian is required to maximize utility.
13. It can generally be argued that the kinds of free choices that free will theodicy values are those that are morally significant, but I make or require no such distinction here.
14. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to each of these as simply being a different “kind” of happiness.
15. For additional scientific perspectives on the multiverse see Smolin (1997), Steinhardt & Turok (2007), Wallace (2012), Linde (2000), Veneziano (2006), Ellis (2011), and Carr (2007).
16. See Linde (1987), Abstract.
17. See Linde (1987), Abstract.
18. This is also touched on by Kraay (2010, pp. 359–60).
19. This will be discussed in chapter 7.
As we have seen, the case that is being made for multiverse theories is in full-force from a variety of different perspectives and motivations and also seems to have a level of credibility and plausibility backing it. Coming from both the philosophical arguments and the scientific experimentation and research it appears that there is a solid case for the existence or, minimally, the plausibility of a multiverse with the only questions remaining relating to the particular construct of multiverse of which we happen to be a part. It seems that this being the case, theists could reasonably be willing to accept the existence of a multiverse as an ontological view. But if this is to happen, what exactly does it mean for the theist? Does adopting such an ontological view harm or hurt him in any way? Is it compatible with his theological beliefs? What are the potential drawbacks for a theist in adopting a multiverse view? These are some of the questions that any theist would have to consider before the adoption of a multiverse account in favor of a single-universe account, and these are the issues discussed in this chapter.
The first section of the chapter outlines several of the difficulties that the theist will have to face and account for in accepting a multiverse theory. Some of these difficulties will not apply exclusively to theists; rather, they will apply to anyone considering the acceptance of a multiverse. With that in mind, however, each problem discussed in this section will be one that has to be faced by the theistic-minded multiverse proponent, nonetheless. The next section details how the theistic acceptance of a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes entails a deistic God rather than the God of classical theism. And finally, in the last section, I discuss how various accounts of free will and determinism play out in the multiverse in light of a deistic God, showing how various conceptions and combinations of free will and determinism are compatible with the deistic multiverse theory for which I ultimately argue.
Before beginning, I think it is necessary to define precisely what I mean when I refer to theists or the theistic God. As I want this definition to be as inclusive as possible, it will be quite broad yet still set us up with a conception that is narrow enough to understand, grasp and implement. I will first begin with an outline of the God of which I will be discussing, and then from that, one can take a theist simply as one who believes in the existence of such a God. The kind of God of which I am speaking is the traditional “3-O” God of Judeo-Christian theism, attributing omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence (among other things) to Him. The three “omni” attributes are the most important for our concerns here, so the discussion of God will generally only be taken to be a conception in which these three attributes are essential. Of course, the interpretations of what exactly each of these particular divine attributes entails can be widely divergent but, for our purposes at the moment, the particularities and details of the attributes themselves can be set aside, rather the primary consideration is that God possesses these attributes, regardless of their particular interpretation. To be considered a theist one does not need to practice any active worship of this God, be of a particular denomination or organized religion, or anything of that sort, or even accept the veridicality of any particular scripture. The simple act of belief is enough to qualify some individual as a theist, in this sense. Being a theist is simply an ontological status or view, one that is distinct from any religious practice. While it may seem a bit out of place to discuss the attributes of and belief in the God of classical theism here, given that the overall project being presented makes a case for a deistic God, I feel that such a brief mention is necessary. The adoption of the God of classical theism, at this point, begins with establishing a set of attributes that He is traditionally thought to possess. This is done so that, following the discussion of the attributes of the deistic God that will come to be presented, the reader can reflect and see that the differences between the two interpretations of God (at least in terms of the attributes that they are said to possess) are minimal. The attributes of the deistic God that I will ultimately come to argue for do not vary at all from any of the attributes of the God of classical theism, rather they will simply require that we envision some of them in particular ways, and this will hopefully illustrate that if one is inclined to believe in the God of classical theism then he can perhaps be persuaded to believe in a deistic God without much amendment to his current beliefs, as the two are not quite as different as some may consider them to be.
Theistic Concessions in Accepting a Multiverse Theory
With all of the different types of multiverse models that have been discussed, there are some potential drawbacks for the theist if he accepts any of them. Of course, the degree to which the drawbacks will affect the theist will vary depending on the particular multiverse theory of which he is a proponent and on the particular ways in which he interprets the 3-O divine attributes, but they will exist, nonetheless. In the first case, some multiverse theories will entail the actualization of a whole host of universes that theists would not necessarily want to acknowledge as existing given the nature of their omnibenevolent God, so this is something for which the theist will have to account and explain. In the second case, multiverse theories will often take away from or discount the design argument, which is generally an argument put forth by theists to argue for the existence of God based on the unlikeliness that this universe could have arisen purely out of chance.1 This argument, however, is generally most persuasive when applied to a single-universe ontological view, and would seemingly not work for the theist who is a proponent of multiverse theory. And in the final case, for multiverse theories that call for the actualization of all possible states of affairs,2 , 3 there is an ethical issue with which the theist must deal. Multiverse theories that call for the actualization of all possible states of affairs raise interesting ethical problems since it seems an agent can remain indifferent to whether he ought to perform a good moral action or a bad moral action since whatever he does not do will be actualized in some other universe. This final difficulty is not exclusive to theists, as it will equally apply to all those who adopt a multiverse theory of this model; it is a difficulty that the multiverse theist will still have to face.
A substantial number