Multiverse Deism. Leland Royce Harper

past several decades there has been an increasing amount of work done, both by philosophers and by scientists, addressing multiverse theories and their relevant hypotheses. From the philosophical side, multiverse theories have been motivated by a variety of factors, they have been argued for in various ways, and they have come in a variety of structures. Be they independently motivated, put forth by theists as a response to particular arguments for atheism, or put forth by atheists as an objection against particular arguments for theism, and whether the multiverses that they discuss comprise an infinite number of spatiotemporally disconnected universes, a finite number of spatiotemporally disconnected universes, or have any other kind of composition, a significant number and variety of multiverse theories have been discussed by and among thinkers. Because of the number of varying and divergent multiverse accounts that have been, and are currently being, discussed, even if we grant that a multiverse exists, there is still an equally large amount of competing views regarding the nature of the possible universes that are supposed to populate this multiverse. Of course, when discussing something of this nature, precisely what “possible” means is a crucial question that must be answered, and one that can spawn an entirely separate discussion altogether.

      Just as the discussion of multiverses has gone on in the philosophical world, so too has the discussion in the scientific world. Scientists from various disciplines have carried out work in the attempt to determine the plausibility of different structures and compositions of competing multiverse theories. Similar to the models and compositions discussed by philosophers that are alluded to above, scientific models have been set to determine many aspects of the multiverse discussion, as well. Scientists now engage themselves in providing answers for what could have been before the Big Bang, what will happen if and when our current universe ceases to exist, whether it is even really possible to conceptualize and construct a multiverse, what the existence of a multiverse would mean for us in this particular universe, what the possible compositions and physical constants of other universes may be, and the like.

      As I have put it thus far, I may have given the impression that there is a clear divide between the work of philosophers and the work of scientists when it comes to exploration of multiverse theories, but this is not the case. Philosophical work on the multiverse and scientific work on the multiverse are not mutually exclusive and the two can and often do influence one another, with each side borrowing and implementing information from the other, blurring the lines between the two disciplines. While the two sides are looking at the same ideas, it is the methodologies by which they go about exploring these ideas that differentiate the two from one another. So while philosophy, at one extreme of the spectrum, may be limited to making theoretical cases for a multiverse via inductive or deductive reasoning using a variety of previous knowledge, assumptions and postulations, physicists, at the other end of the spectrum, have the ability to engage in actual experimentation and field studies to ascertain answers to questions about the plausibility and nature of different multiverse theories. Of course, as this is on a continuum, in the middle, we will find differing accounts that appeal to varying degrees of hard science and philosophical outlooks, blending the two together. The philosophy of science, and the philosophy of math, for example, both lie closer to the middle of the continuum and can contribute to the multiverse debate through the philosophical examination of different principles of science and math that are being used by the scientists in their approaches.¹

      This particular chapter aims to do several things, all primarily in the way of setting the stage and providing a bit of context for what will come to be discussed in further chapters. In the first section, I discuss the philosophical case being made for a multiverse. I discuss several of the predominant multiverse views and their motivations, outlining the methodology and structure behind these multiverse theories. In the following section, I do the same for scientific approaches to the multiverse. This section, again, discusses the methodologies and structures of various proposed multiverse models, but this time from the scientific perspective. These two presentations, however, do not provide an evaluation of any of the theories proposed; instead they will serve to bring some of the recent and predominant work on the multiverse to your attention. Of course, the degree of plausibility of the competing multiverse accounts vary slightly, or perhaps even considerably, but that is not of prime importance in this case. What is important is the plausibility and worthwhileness of the multiverse discussion in its entirety. Finally, I discuss the multiverse pursuit as a whole, and its overall plausibility given both philosophical and scientific approaches. While my aim in this section is not to confirm or disconfirm the veridicality of the arguments for the existence of a multiverse, it is to show that the exploration of the discussion as a whole is fruitful and that it is worth continuing and advancing regardless of whether or not you subscribe to a particular multiverse account.

      The Philosophical Case for the Multiverse

      The role of this section is to serve as an introduction to some of the prevailing views in the world of multiverse-thought, outlining several of the predominant and well-known philosophical arguments for the multiverse. This is not intended to serve as a full-fledged survey chapter, as other substantial survey papers and edited volumes on the multiverse have already been written by others.² Furthermore, the limitation of my discussion of various philosophical views is due to the fact that any broader exploration of competing viewpoints is simply irrelevant to the overall aim of this section, which can be achieved through the discussion of just several accounts. The aim here is to provide a brief introduction to the variety of multiverse theories that exist within philosophy and to demonstrate that there is no single model to which the philosophical community as a whole subscribes. The variety of multiverse accounts present within philosophical discourse leads me to two conclusions: (1) that there are a number of highly intelligent academics working on different aspects of these ideas so we ought to afford, at least the initial idea of a multiverse, a certain level of plausibility and worthwhileness³ and (2) that the sheer number of different accounts means that there is more likely to be one that strikes the reader as more plausible than others, meaning that even in the case that the reader rejects the vast majority of philosophical multiverse accounts there still exists the possibility that he finds one as plausible and subscribes to it.⁴ Now, let us move on to the discussion of some of the philosophical views.

      Motivated to respond to the argument from evil, Jason Megill puts forward his account for the plausibility of a multiverse (Megill, 2001). While he does not explicitly outline exactly just what his multiverse would look like (i.e., how it would be formed, what it would consist of, etc.) he provides reasons for believing that a multiverse may exist, regardless of the particular composition-brand one may subscribe to. That is to say, the reasons that he provides are consistent with a variety of different multiverse compositions. The sole detail regarding any attribute of the multiverse discussed is the possibility of a threshold of inclusion that suggests that only universes that contain more good than evil will be created by God and thus will be the only universes contained within the multiverse. While he does not argue explicitly that this is the required threshold, it remains his sole discussion of and suggestion for what may constitute the composition of the multiverse (Megill, 2011, p. 133). Megill goes on to allude to several different scientific views about the multiverse, both to act as evidence for his claim that belief in the multiverse is a plausible position to accept and to demonstrate that, even within the scientific community, there is no single viewpoint on just what a multiverse may look like.⁵ Megill gives five reasons for the acceptance of the plausibility of the multiverse: (1) that his premise that a multiverse is possible is so weak that it is plausible, (2) that it has not been conclusively shown that a multiverse does not exist, leaving it epistemically possible that there is one, (3) that it is entailed by several current theories in physics, (4) given that it is entailed by current theories in physics it cannot be denied by some of the most likely opponents, and (5) that denial of the multiverse theory would strengthen the theist’s position by leaving God’s creative act as the only possible explanation for the fine-tuning, thus making such a denial imprudent for the atheist (Megill, 2011, p. 131).

      While the structure and overall argument forwarded by Megill differs, both in its motivation and in the kind of multiverse that it proposes, from the argument presented by Donald Turner (Turner, 2004) the two appear to share some common ground. Much like Megill, Turner argues for a multiverse⁶ that is composed only of universes⁷ with a “preponderance