Structure
I begin by presenting a survey of the current multiverse discussion, in chapter 2, from both the philosophical and the scientific perspectives. Through this, I show that the multiverse is a serious ontological view being researched by a good number of reputable individuals across different disciplines and that it ought to be given strong consideration. I also highlight the variety of different types of multiverse that are currently being discussed by philosophers and physicists, emphasizing the range of varying multiverse options that are available, while also noting that there does seem to be a general consensus on the existence of the multiverse, but that the debate arises in terms of determining the makeup of that multiverse. Furthermore, I go on to specify the kind of multiverse model that I will go on to operate with for the remainder of this research project as a model that calls for the existence of all possible universes—one roughly similar to modal realism.
Moving into the third chapter, I outline several of the difficulties that the theist faces and needs to deal with in accepting a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes. Some of these difficulties will not be exclusive to theists, rather they will apply to anyone accepting that particular brand of multiverse theory, but they are problems that the theistic proponent of the multiverse will have to face, nonetheless. The first section of the chapter addresses the overall thesis of this research project, and details how the theistic acceptance of a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes entails a deistic God rather than the God of classical Judeo-Christian monotheism. And finally, the chapter concludes with a presentation of how various accounts of free will and determinism play out in the multiverse when there is a deistic God, showing how multiple conceptions and combinations of free will and determinism are compatible with the deistic multiverse theory that I ultimately argue for.
Chapter 4 begins with a discussion on the vague nature of the deistic God, and some of the potential reasons behind that lack of clarity throughout history. Because of the lack of specific divine attributes or interpretations of these divine attributes within the historical literature of deism, I take the overall conception of the deistic God to be open, save for the fact that He does not intervene in the natural world. Moving into sections aptly entitled Omnipotence and Omnibenevolence I discuss my interpretations of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, which I take to be the most important divine attributes of the deistic God for the purposes of this project. In the following section I discuss omniscience, timelessness, immutability, and necessity, as these are some of the divine attributes that do not seem as crucial to the overall deistic conception as those discussed in the previous two sections but still need to be addressed in a discussion such as this. The final substantive section of the chapter, The Role That These Attributes Play in Deism, discusses how each of the particular interpretations of the divine attributes discussed up to that point ultimately factor into the overall conception of the deistic God that I present and argue for.
Chapter 5 is divided into two parts. In the first three sections I discuss the teleological argument, the ontological argument, and the cosmological argument to show how a deistic conception of God is compatible with these common arguments for the existence of God. In the second part of the chapter, the following three sections, I discuss the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of evil, and the problems with miracles as several of the stronger and more well-known contemporary arguments against God’s existence that generally pose challenges for the classical theistic conception of God. Finally, I discuss how a deistic conception of God may be able to get around some of the difficulties that classical theism faces in dealing with these arguments.
In chapter 6 I present a possible alternative to the kind of deism that I propose. This alternative is called noninterventionist special divine action, but I refer to it as epistemic deism and go on to explain why such a change in terminology is warranted. I detail the nature of three different noninterventionist special divine action theories, as presented by Nancey Murphy, Thomas Tracy, and Bradley Monton, and I discuss why and how each of these three theories can all be reduced to epistemic deism. I go on to describe how epistemic deism as a whole is ultimately an unviable ontological view and why it is substantially inferior to the kind of deism that I argue for in this project.
In chapter 7, I discuss some potential difficulties and further lines of thought that the multiverse deist will need to address at some point, but that are ultimately not within the scope of this project. I begin by revisiting several difficulties for the theist in accepting a multiverse theory without accepting deism that were discussed in chapter 3. Moving through the remainder of the chapter there are discussions of difficulties that may arise for the multiverse deist from explaining a deistic God’s role in creation of the universe, the need to determine the location of a deistic God within the multiverse, the need to abandon the idea of a personal relationship with God as the greatest possible good, reconciling the idea of a non-active God with the biblical accounts of an active God and, finally, accounting for the various miracles and religious experiences that have been reported throughout history. The aim of this chapter is only to draw attention to some of the other lines of research that can be pursued as a result of the work that has been done in this project to this point.
Finally, in chapter 8, as the title suggests, I address several of the practical and considerations and venture my concluding thoughts of the overall project. Here I note that there are still many serious questions that will need to be answered if there is hope to construct a full-fledged worldview. While these remaining questions and lines of thought are, by no means, easy to provide answers to, I remain optimistic that, at the very least, meaningful discussion can come from them.
In conceiving of and completing this project, while I made several arguments for the existence of a deistic God and for some particular interpretations of His2 nature, the overall goal is simply to open the discussion of, what I feel is, an under-discussed ontological view. Coming into this project I felt that deism could have been a plausible ontological view with some potential upsides and, in moving through my research, I think that I have not only confirmed that feeling but also pointed out precisely why it is plausible, where the upsides to deism are and bring to light some areas where it is potentially weak as an overall view. My hope is that, in bringing up this under-discussed topic of deism and discussing it in relation to the multiverse, which is one of the most active areas in the philosophy of religion today, I can rekindle some interest in this ontological view as a plausible alternative to classical theism. This work will, hopefully, serve as the starting point for much more research and discussion on deism, either as it relates to the multiverse or as a stand-alone ontological view.
NOTES
1. As is evidenced and noted by Buckareff & Nagasawa (2016).
2. I use the pronouns “He/Him/His” when referring to God because these are the pronouns that have typically been used to refer to God in historical, Western, analytic philosophy of religion and also in scripture. While I utilize these pronouns for reasons of personal comfort and consistency this, in no way, forces the presupposition that God is gendered in any way. These pronouns simply serve as placeholders that can be replaced by any other pronouns that the reader deems more appropriate.
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