The Central Legislature in British India, 192147. Mohammad Rashiduzzaman

end it from within.”⁹⁶ In the (provincial) general elections held in the winter months of 1936–37, the Congress found itself in an absolute majority in the legislatures of the five provinces, namely Madras, U.P., C.P., Bihar and Orissa. With the support of pro-Congress groups, the Congress could also command a majority in Bombay and it was the largest single party in the North West Frontier Province, and in Assam. With this position at hand, the Congress refused to accept office in any province unless the Governor gave an assurance that he would not use his special powers in defiance of the provincial cabinet. So minority ministries were formed in the provinces where Congress members were in a majority but refused to form the cabinet. The ← 25 | 26 → constitutional deadlock was, however, settled in a rather conciliatory declaration by the Governor General on 22nd June, 1937. After this announcement, the Congress-led ministries were formed in 7 provinces: Bombay, Madras, Orissa, North West Frontier Province and the U.P., C.P., and Bihar. However, the acceptance of office by the Congress leaders and their sharp political turn was rather paradoxical as they earlier pledged to combat the constitution. It was difficult to ignore that in reality, a kind of dual control was imposed on the newly formed provincial Ministries. Firstly, they were invariably under the control of the Congress “high-command” asserting a sway from outside.⁹⁷ Secondly, they were also expected to work within the precincts of the constitutional stipulations of the Government of India Act 1935. An outstanding example of the partisan hegemony by the Central Congress authorities was at last manifested when the Congress ministries resigned in the autumn of 1939 under the Congress Party’s central directives.⁹⁸ Earlier in 1939, the Congress as well called upon its members in the Central Legislature to refrain from attending its session.

      The outstanding reason for the withdrawal of Congressmen from the legislatures and ministries was the declaration of WW II.⁹⁹ It would have been feasible, tactical and wise to give the Central Legislature an opportunity to declare by a resolution the hostility of India to the Axis.¹⁰⁰ But the Viceroy declared India’s participation in the War and he suspended the Federal Scheme (of the 1935 Act) in his address to the Central Legislature on the 11th September, 1939.¹⁰¹ The explicit purpose of the address was to rally support for the war effort; but to the Congress leaders, it was an open defiance of public opinion to drag India to a global war. Earlier on the 15th February, 1938 the Congress had given its verdict by passing a resolution in the Legislative Assembly: it clearly stated that the Indian troops should not be dispatched outside without consulting the Central Legislature.¹⁰² When Indian troops were sent out to Egypt and Singapore without consulting the Central Legislature, the All India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C.) took a serious exception to this. This action was, however, defended by Lord Birkenhead on the plea that the party-leaders of the Central Assembly were consulted privately about the dispatch of Indian troops.¹⁰³ The deadlock created by the Congress-resignation stood as a big challenge; it amounted to India’s “forced” participation in the raging war. In November 1940, the Government met a formidable situation when the Congress-members dramatically returned to the Assembly Chamber to reject the Supplementary Finance Bill for additional revenue of two cores of rupees to meet the war expenditure. As the Muslim League ← 26 | 27 → remained neutral, the Congress members were successful in rejecting the Bill and thereby re-affirming its stand on the war policy of the Government.¹⁰⁴ In the momentous debate on the Finance Bill, the Government tried to persuade the Congress leaders and other political groups to accept the War as a threat to India’s security. Had it been possible to get the Bill passed, it would have been easier for the Government to show to the outside world that India’s war efforts had the sanction of her elected representatives. The denunciation of the excessive war expenditure by the Congress-members in the Assembly had earned appreciation from outside among people.¹⁰⁵

      From 1940 to 1943, the Congress elements absented themselves from the legislative sessions most of the time and the absence of the Congressmen reduced the Central Legislature to only a formal entity that could be easily neglected by the British Raj. Its foremost job was only to discuss the normal routine business: the absence of Congress Party’s members gave an easy time to the Government-led legislation. The rump that existed could not resist the Government from rushing several controversial measures, such as the Defense of India Act and the Excess Profits Act. Political demonstrations were rare as the security was tight. Relevance of the legislative proceedings so declined that several times, the House business had to be postponed even though a few leaders felt that the country’s interests were not best served by the policy of abstention from the Assembly floors.¹⁰⁶ The Congress-Nationalists, however, stuck to the policy of attending the sessions regularly as they felt their abstention would be harmful to the country and the Muslim League members also continued to participate in the sessions.

      The legislative standing in British India during the war years was further dwarfed by the range of unprecedented political developments beyond the walls of the Central Assembly, the continuing war and the devastating Bengal famine killings hundreds of thousands of civilians. One the most significant and unparalleled developments in the Indian political history since the WW II surfaced was the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan in 1940. This history-making resolution emphatically rejected the scheme of Federation embodied in the 1935 Act and put forward the alternative plan of Pakistan for the future constitutional set up of India. Henceforth the unleashed communal issues accelerated the political acrimony throughout India that overshadowed the Central Legislature’s standing and influence. From 1940, the Muslim League leaders made it a point to raise the Pakistan demand on the floor of the House whenever constitutional grievances were brought forward. Two other great events which took place outside the Legislature had also their impact ← 27 | 28 → on it; one of them was the so-called Cripps offer. The concluding stages of the budget session in 1942 triggered another kind of tension when Sir Stafford Cripps came to the Central Legislature in New Delhi.¹⁰⁷ His Mission was not even discussed in the Legislature as all parties agreed that it would be embarrassing to do so while negotiations were in progress.¹⁰⁸

      After the failure of the Cripps mission, the Congress decided upon a mass disobedience on August 8, 1942 known as the “Quit India” movement—it was also an unprecedented phenomenon that diverted public attention from peaceful constitutional politics practiced through legislatures. It was an attempt for direct action against the “British Raj” for national independence, which soon took the shape of a virtual “rebellion.”¹⁰⁹ In order to exhort the Indian politicians to support the government in suppressing the “rebellion,” the Home Member introduced a vital debate on the 15th September 1942 which lasted for four days.¹¹⁰ The debate provided an opportunity for the Government to justify its “preventive action” in dealing with the situation. None of the parties openly justified the Congress action of an implicit rebellion, as it was understood then. The Congress-Nationalists sought to explain why such a defiant step was initiated by the Congress; even in its waning period, the Central Legislature was able to bring the both sides face to face on the floor though it was indeed a heated moment in the Indian legislative history. The Muslim League joined the Government to deplore this “Quit India” movement as it was intended not only to force the British Government but to coerce the Muslims to surrender to the Congress terms and action. The Budget session of 1943 was overshadowed by Gandhi’s fast and the excitement it caused.¹¹¹ An adjournment motion was moved on the 15th February 1943 to draw the Government attention to the great apprehension caused by Gandhi’s fast, and eventually, the proposition was talked out.¹¹² At this time, the devastating famine and terrifying food crisis of Bengal was causing great disquiet to the legislators. During the November session 1943, most of its time was spent on the discussion of the food situation.

      With the return of the Congress Party to the legislative session in the autumn of 1944, the Assembly regained its enthusiasm and delivered several censure motions on the Government.¹¹³ As no elections had been held after 1934, the Legislature was already out of date and the elections of 1945 and 1946, as indicated earlier, were a great victory for the Congress and the Muslim League in the Central as well as provincial legislatures. The Congress-led ministries were formed in Assam, Bihar, U.P., North West Frontier Province, Bombay, Madras and C.P. and Orissa and soon the Congress Party ← 28 | 29 → in the Assembly saw a new leader in Sarat Chandra Bose. The Congress hold over the House was proved by the election of G. V. Mavalankar as its