Broadly speaking, the Muslims stayed away from the Civil Disobedience movement; they did not boycott the elections of 1930.69 Only in the North West Frontier Province, the Muslims under the leadership of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan participated in the Civil Disobedience movement.70 There was a great response on behalf of the Muslim leaders to take part in the Round Table Conferences. It seems that the Muslim leaders at this stage were more ← 22 | 23 → attracted by the prospect of contributing to the growth of a new constitution.71 This attitude became very clear when the Muslim League later agreed to give a trial to the 1935 Reforms for “what they were worth.” The main reason for not taking part in Civil Disobedience was the growing feeling that the Congress movements were detrimental to the Muslim interests.72 It was the Nehru Report which roused the Muslim suspicion about the Congress motives; Jinnah was disappointed about the recommendations of the Nehru Report and he tried to bring the dissident Muslim groups together. The All India Muslim League Committee wanted to introduce certain amendments to the Report. On behalf of the League, Jinnah moved those amendments at the All-Parties Convention but they were lost.73 This rejection deeply shocked him personally; to him, it was the “parting of the ways between the Hindus and Muslims.”74 In the legislative bodies, suspicion about the Congress objectives was mounting—the demands for more Muslim representation in the services and welfare of the community in various spheres of life surely gained ascendancy. The Muslim support to defeat the Government on the legislative floor was no longer readily available. To the Muslim leaders, the Civil Disobedience Movement was little more than a contrivance to frighten the Government to grant Dominion Status to India with the communal settlement proposed in the Nehru Report; however, it was unacceptable to the Muslims.
The Congress leaders’ decision to contest the 1934 elections of the Central Assembly had a mixed reception. On the liberal sector the party, the leaders congratulated the Congress politicians for their “wise and patriotic decision” to re-enter the legislatures.75 It also pointed out that the Congress efforts of direct action outside had been a dismal failure.76 One delegate opposed the Congress resolution to enter the legislatures in its Bombay session of 1934: he pointed out that it was a mere waste of time to go to legislatures and it was a grave mistake to hope that the program would carry them nearer their ultimate goals.77 The newspapers representing the left wing of the Congress Party also opposed the decision;78 their main reason was the “failure” of the Swarajists in the past.79 One Hindu communal organ, the Rishi welcomed the Congress decision on the condition that it must agitate against the Communal Award.80 It also recommended that Congress members in the legislatures should work in co-operation with the Hindu Maha Sabha.81 To the Congress leaders themselves, the purpose of contesting the 1934 elections was “to use every weapon put into their hands.”82 It was quite clear that the Congress Party wanted to enter the Central Assembly to pass its verdict on the proposed constitutional reforms.83 The Congress entry in the election contest after a long period of ← 23 | 24 → civil resistance and abstinence from parliamentary activities attracted great public attention.84 With the emergence of a strong Congress group inside the Central Assembly, New Delhi again became the centre of political activities.85 The Assembly opened on January 21, 1935, when 40 members of the Congress Party in Gandhi caps occupied the opposition benches.86 Public galleries were then filled to capacity when the Viceroy had arrived to address the Assembly on the 24th January. The changed political mood which had brought the non-co-operators into constitutional places was hinted at even in the galleries where there were many adherents of the Congress.87
The country’s political mood at that time was basically defined by the controversy over the Communal Award announced by the British Government on the 17th August, 1932. As the Award retained separate electorates and also gave “weightage” to the Muslims in various provincial legislatures, the Muslims were largely satisfied with it. The Bombay session of the Indian National Congress held in October 1934 decided that its attitude to the Communal Award would be neutral.88 But there was a powerful section among the Congressmen known as the Congress-Nationalists who were bitterly opposed to the Award. Pandit Malaviya, leader of the Congress-Nationalists, went to the Congress Session in Bombay and moved amendments opposing the Congress neutrality to the Award; but his amendments were lost.89 Later the Congress-Nationalists contested the 1934 elections as a separate party and their faction of eleven Congress-Nationalists formed a new party in the Assembly with M. S. Aney as its leader. Outside the Assembly, the Congress-Nationalists started a regular protest against separate electorates and the Award: the dispute became the undeniable marker of the increasing Hindu-Muslim differences across the country. The All-India Anti-Communal Award Conference sponsored by them was held on 23rd February 1935—it appointed a Committee to carry on active agitation against the Award.90 The Muslims, on the other hand, held a pro-Communal Award Conference in New Delhi on the 24th March, 1935; this body reiterated its faith in the Award as the only way to an agreed settlement of the communal problem, and they condemned the sponsors of the on-going anti-Award movement.91
The newly elected Assembly reflected all these forces of nationalism and communalism that cast a spell of disunity inside the legislative body. On February 4th, 1935, the historic debate on the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee was launched; it continued for three days and brought political divergence on the fore.92 As many as 9 amendments were moved to the motion expressing various views of which three bids stood for the principal ← 24 | 25 → trends of Indian body-politic. Bhulabhai’s proposition stood for the Congress views: (a) a “root and branch” rejection of the Report and (b) the “neutrality” to the Award. But Jinnah’s motion implied (a) a trial of the Constitution for what they were worth and (b) acceptance of the Communal Award which rallied the support of practically all the Muslims. Bhai Parma Nand, representing the Congress-Nationalist views, demanded rejection of the Report as it was allegedly an arbitrary and unjust Communal Award.93 Eventually, Jinnah’s amendments were accepted by the House that also impacted the growing Hindu-Muslim schism over the subject.94 This Assembly was different from its predecessor in composition and outlook; it was now obvious to more people than ever before that the real battle for the country’s political liberation could be fought more vigorously among the people outside the floor of the House. The Central Assembly, politically speaking, lost its earlier political prestige; now the All-India legislative chamber was little more than a sounding board for the Congress leaders. Hitherto, its main role had been to criticize and censure the Government from time to time in order to justify their further demands for India’s constitutional progress. As a change of its strategy, the Congress leaders were no longer speaking of a wholesale holdup as they did in the 1920s; in fact, they supported, directly or indirectly, many measures which were intended to serve the country’s interest. Another observable phenomenon in legislative politics: though the Congress did not command a majority in the Central Legislative Assembly in New Delhi, the Congress supporters could find many issues on which other groups came forward to censure the Government.95
The Congress leaders repudiated the 1935 Act but they decided to participate in the provincial elections under it in 1936–37 (results of those elections were published in 1937). For them, the central purpose of entering the legislatures