It was therefore no surprise when the ANC secretary-general announced that the investigation into state capture had not yielded any results;18 effectively, state capture was not underway, at least not as far as Zuma and the Gupta family are concerned. The SACP was not happy with the results of the inquiry; the party stated that there is a clear case of influence on government by the Gupta family. The leader of the Young Communist League said that under Zuma corruption has been ‘institutionalised and legalised’.19
The closing of the ANC’s inquiry into state capture did not lay to rest the question at hand. The question is, why is the control of the National Treasury so important for the project of Zuma and his allies? It is also necessary to confront the reality of competing interests at the centre of state capture. First, the ANC seems to believe that the party ought to control the state, and that this can be achieved by creating an alternative capitalist class – progressive capital. If this is still the ANC’s belief, it is important to probe the ongoing attempts to bring the Treasury into line. Whose interests are actually served by control of the National Treasury?
Thabo Mbeki shielded the National Treasury from direct political threats or interest groups. An indication of this can be seen in the way Mbeki repelled Cosatu’s and the SACP’s populist criticism of the Treasury for pursuing fiscal discipline. Mbeki’s pursuit of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) macroeconomic policy required that the Treasury be shielded from public assault by the left-leaning labour movement.20 This is also because the Treasury was not hostile to any of his projects, including Gear. Even more beneficial to Mbeki was that, during his tenure as president, the general public had lower expectations of accountability, which meant less disruption when it came to implementation of public policy. The idea that a leader and his cabal could squander public resources was not understood as a reality at that time. This was in the wake of the glorious Mandela years, and the government and the political elites were still basking in Mandela’s glory. Under such circumstances, the Treasury was not at a point where it saw the need to aggressively protect public resources from the very political elites responsible for governing.
Under Zuma the picture changed dramatically, and there arose a heightened sense of the need to protect public resources against the dominant political elites. Zuma’s administration ushered in a deep suspicion about the motives of the political elites. This is not to say that Zuma was the first leader to do wrong things. It did mean, however, that his ascension coincided with rising suspicion of political elites. Perhaps this suspicion would have emerged with or without Zuma. Perhaps Zuma was merely unlucky in the sense that his administration coincided with the end of the Mandela glory days. This could also mean that Mbeki’s administration, its policy implementation and worldviews about politics, including race relations, accelerated the end of the glory days, and created the space for the emergence of a brand of politics dominated by suspicion and lack of trust of politicians.
What can be said with certainty is that Zuma’s conduct in government has justified the public suspicion of politicians, and has consequently raised people’s demand for accountability on the part of government. If that is the case, and I believe it is, Zuma’s administration – particularly his aggressive distaste for accountability – naturally drove institutions such as the National Treasury to define themselves against the looting of state resources by Zuma’s cronies. Under Zuma’s administration, the brazen nature of corruption and the violation of rules of accountability have resulted in a situation where state institutions have to take a stand either against or in support of his project. Under Mbeki, the battle was not as openly declared, and Mbeki’s diplomatic nature and evasive stance on issues allowed for institutions to remain relatively neutral towards his project, while effectively not opposing his plans. Under Mbeki, the National Treasury could afford to stay out of the ‘politics of the belly’, because it and other state institutions were not expected to take a position in relation to the president’s plans.
The recent debacle over the control of the National Treasury indicates that the situation regarding state capture has become brazen and transparent, such that many institutions of state have been forced to pick a side. The courts have taken a strong stance by stating unequivocally that corruption is a real scourge, and the Public Protector’s office deserves praise in this respect.21 On the one hand, the prosecution authorities and the police – the crime prevention cluster – have taken a position in support of Zuma, and investigations into matters that could implicate Zuma have been thwarted. On the other hand, the National Treasury has taken a position against Zuma22 by raising the alarm about the high level of corruption, and by questioning proposed expenditure that is blatantly in the interests of the few (read: Zuma’s allies).
This is the reason why Zuma sees it as important to bring the Treasury back under his control. Zuma inherited Mbeki’s Treasury, and he is working hard to convert it. This has pushed the Treasury to take a position, with Finance minister Pravin Gordhan accelerating his crusade against Zuma and corruption in general. Zuma’s attempt to rein in the Treasury in December 2015 by appointing his ally failed, and he was forced to make a U-turn by bringing back Gordhan, who seems to enjoy a good relationship with the markets. It is naive to think that Zuma would give up in his attempt to install a different minister at the Treasury. The president is aware that perseverance is required to complete his project of capturing key government institutions, such as the Treasury. Gordhan’s position as Finance minister is untenable, given that the minister is openly at war with the president. Ministers serve at the pleasure of the president. It seems that Zuma feels the markets hold him ransom when it comes to exercising his executive privilege to decide who serves in his Cabinet; Gordhan is a market minister, and Zuma wants his own man in that position.
Realising that his return to the Finance portfolio has propelled him to stardom, Gordhan has used his position to his advantage. Unlike Zuma, Gordhan has the markets in his corner, and he is also an expert in using the media to build the image of someone who is protecting state resources against the depredations of Zuma and his allies, including the Gupta family. Zuma’s strategy is clearly to isolate Gordhan, by giving him a long rope to hang himself with. By resorting to press conferences and speaking of himself as an ‘activist’, Gordhan has broken the code of allegiance to the ANC. His enemies in the ANC can use this to accuse him of airing the party’s dirty laundry in public, and of being captured by corporate interests.
It is untenable for Gordhan to continue in his position when he is openly defiant towards Zuma’s project. He has raised concerns about the decision to proceed with the nuclear deal with the Russians, openly stating that the deal is too expensive and may not be in the best interests of South Africa.23 He has also sought to deal with rampant maladministration within state-owned entities such as South African Airways.24 Further, he is a nuisance to local government tsars, who are often corrupt and who fail to deliver services for communities. This is too big a mandate to be shouldered by a single department within the executive. Ministers are generally prone to spend more in their departments, and increasing their budgets is a sign of importance. Wastage is part of the commotion. Therefore, one way or another, Pravin Gordhan’s Treasury will have to keep on saying ‘no’ to other government departments, since the minister’s return to Treasury is solely justified by his ability to say ‘no’ to maladministration. If Gordhan lives up to expectations from the general public and accountability activists by continuing to say ‘no’ to government departments who waste money, he will eventually find himself isolated even from the moderates within government. This could mean that he will find it difficult to secure backers in government, and it could make his position as Minister of Finance untenable. Zuma has been fighting Gordhan indirectly through the investigation of the minister’s role in the so-called rogue unit within the South African Revenue Service (SARS),25 which allegedly illegally gathered intelligence on targeted individuals. Even if Zuma’s tactic does not work, it is quite possible that Gordhan will eventually tire of the battle against Zuma and resign. The ANC tradition is such that mavericks are not to