What I say here may seem obvious – that the idea of the NPC was flawed from the beginning. But the creation of the commission drew no criticism from well-informed observers and pundits. In most cases, when government announces an initiative, the pundits wait for it to be implemented before they give their views. While it may seem a logical and circumspect approach to wait before we pronounce on whether or not an initiative is sound, some projects need to be interrogated even before they are implemented.
But the establishment of the NPC was welcomed, with some lukewarm qualifications to the effect that success would depend on the calibre and character of the commissioners. The idea that they would be drawn from the general public, and would include independent academics and business people, seems to have convinced many commentators that the commission would be open and consultative. But no one raised the objection that superimposing a planning commission on top of existing government departments was never going to work. In my view, the commission is merely another boondoggle to create the impression that the president is doing something.
We don’t need the commission because we already have the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), which relies on input from ministers, provincial premiers and directors-general. There is something fundamentally democratic and participatory about the manner in which each and every government department provides a realistic view of the challenges that confront it. A plan so derived cannot be said to be imposed from above. Challenges identified by individual departments and provincial governments are consolidated into a single strategic framework.
The horizontal positioning of government departments and agencies allows for an equitable contribution into government programmes. Even if we consider the reality that some departments, such as National Treasury, have more influence than others, the fact that all departments are represented means that it is a bottom-up process. This allows for a swift implementation of plans across government departments and agencies. The system allows for departments to group themselves to pursue outcomes. For example, the departments of Police, Justice and Correctional Services, Defence and Military Veterans, State Security, and Home Affairs work in a cluster called JCPS (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security) to improve safety and security as an outcome. But the so-called cluster system in South Africa is not pursued rigorously. National departments are not effectively held accountable on the basis of cluster outcomes. Instead, they account only on their specific departmental outputs. In a more rigorous application of a cluster system, government departments would account collectively by showing how their operations directly contribute to cluster outcomes. Using the JCPS cluster as an example, these departments would then collectively be held accountable on how exactly they have contributed to safety and security as a goal within the cluster. To fulfil this level of accountability, a mere statement by the department that their operations generally contribute to, say, safety and security would not suffice.
This system does not mean that departments deviate from the pursuit of their specific mandates. Instead, they account for individual mandates on one level, and on another level they must demonstrate how their individual operations contribute to broader government goals in the MTSF. This means departments and agencies could be tied to government goals instead of working in isolation. The cluster system could be tightened for a more rigorous pursuit of government targets.
The basic flaw in the NPC is that it sits on top of government departments and imposes a top-down power on government planning. National departments and agencies find it difficult to implement plans that are derived in this way. Apart from this awkward system, there is a lingering question: why should a full-fledged democracy adopt central planning? Central planning is essentially based on a siege mentality, and works better in non-democratic countries – usually in a war-economy situation. I suspect the existence of the commission frustrates national departments, which follow a wait-and-see scenario and no longer see fit to engage in bottom-up planning, but instead use the commission’s top-down plans.
The adoption of the commission is an indication that Jacob Zuma is a bureaucrat whose manner of organising state administrative machinery is no different from that of Thabo Mbeki. In fact, Zuma seems to have accelerated the centralist process. For some, the growth of bureaucracy under Zuma is an indication of commitment to deliver services, and a boost for his image as a president who listens and responds to the people.
As part of Zuma’s consolidation of bureaucracy, the Department of Minerals and Energy was split in two. The same thing happened with Education, as tertiary institutions were hived off into a Department of Higher Education and Training. And I must add the creation of the Ministry of Women, Children and People with Disabilities – run from the Presidency. In a sense, this type of reorganisation amounts to the proverbial shifting of chairs on the deck of the sinking ship.
But at least the president was seen to be doing something, and that in itself was an indication of commitment towards action, and ability to spur government into doing something. President Zuma’s quest for a more visible government was also seen in the much-hyped creation of the presidential hotline, established in 2009. It was inaugurated under the directorship of a kwaito star, Eugene Mthethwa, and was meant to address the poor response of government departments, whose phones seemed to be permanently on voicemail.5 The Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation department within the Presidency would also keep and evaluate a central depository of information about government progress.
But each and every government department already has monitoring and evaluation responsibilities. Individual departments may not have carried out these responsibilities due to lack of skills, capacity or the right attitude. It may be the case that for every departmental oversight agency, there is an equivalent institution in the Presidency. With time, these parallel institutions may create confusion and undermine the development of government departments.
The Mbeki administration came under attack for its heavy bureaucracy, which was misdiagnosed and blamed on Mbeki’s personal fascination with power. And now the Zuma administration is genuinely frustrated by the bureaucracy’s inability to deliver on the party mandate, and also by its poor response to popular demands. But the two presidents are not that far apart in terms of how they organised the state bureaucracy. In fact, Zuma has in many ways intensified Mbeki’s bureaucracy. Under Zuma, we have seen increased incorporation of institutions in the Presidency – the very problem that led to Mbeki’s administration being characterised as too distant and disconnected from the ANC.
Zuma has failed to resolve the problem that partially carried him to power. He has failed to radically reverse the growth in the number of public servants. The growth in the public sector wage bill in effect ‘crowds out all else’,6 reducing or undermining the government’s ability to deliver even the bare minimum of services. The growth of the public sector is becoming a major concern. Once the state has entered into a phase of bureaucratisation, any leader who attempts to radically reverse it may be undermined by the global community. By this I mean finance and business, whose economic policy preferences are usually smoothly implemented under a rigid government bureaucracy. So, Zuma would appear delinquent if he tried to reverse or even halt the further growth of bureaucracy.
Zuma has admitted that a democratic system is difficult to work through, and he would prefer ‘dictatorship’. While campaigning ahead of the 2016 local government elections, he openly stated that:
If you just give me six months to be a dictator, things will be straight … At the moment to take a decision, you need a resolution or petition. If it was up to me, education would be more than compulsory … if you are found walking in the streets, police would stop you and ask what is it that you’re getting in the streets and not at school. If it was up to me, we would put stronger measures to ensure that in 30 years’ time no one would be uneducated.7
This is not the first time that Zuma was unable to conceal his admiration for the type of decision-making process possible only under a dictatorship. In March 2015, he opened up about what he would do, if only he could be a dictator:
If I was a dictator, I would change a few things … For an example I would say to a family, you need a house, here is the material and only bring the government person to supervise. Build your house. That is what I would