But on 9 October, the President exploded again, writing:
I have been disturbed by:
(a) The slowness of getting the East Coast, Caribbean and Gulf Patrol under way.
(b) The lag between the making of contacts and the follow-up of contacts.
(c) The weakness of liasion between Navy, Coast Guard and State Department.
It is, therefore, necessary to make the following orders clear:
(1) The patrol operations will be rushed to completion. . . .
(2) When any aircraft or surface ship sights a submarine a report thereof will be rushed to the Navy Department for immediate action. The plane or surface ship . . . will remain in contact for as long as possible. On the disappearance of the submarine, immediate steps will be taken ... to try to pick up the submarine again at dawn . . . and during the night endeavor to patrol such area as the submarine might use for a refueling operation from a tanker.
(3) On establishing contact with any suspicious surface craft of any nationality which might conceivably be carrying oil or supplies for a submarine, such surface craft will be followed day and night. . . .
(4) Planes or Navy or Coast Guard ships may report the sighting of any submarine or suspicious surface ships in plain English to Force Commander or Department. In this whole patrol business, time is of the essence and loss of contact with surface ships cannot be tolerated.
FDR20
Accordingly, a Galveston patrol was set up in November, although in the absence of naval facilities, a private firm, Todd Shipyards Corporation, had to service the destroyers. The Gulf Patrol was a response to the large number of German merchant ships hiding in Mexican ports preparatory to making a dash for home. The President’s “plain language” dictum was aimed at the German vessels, for it was they who behaved suspiciously by steaming evasively, showing no lights, and altering prominent design features. Allied merchantmen, far removed from the presence of their foes, had no need for subterfuge.21
On 30 September, in a routine transfer, Rear Admiral Hayne Ellis replaced Admiral Johnson as commander of the Atlantic Squadron. Ellis was a competent older officer, pleasant, forbearing, and settled in his ways; like Johnson, he ran a sensible, efficient command, but lacked fire. He commanded, but did not lead.22
Meanwhile, “submarine” sightings were coming in. They had begun on the very first day of war and continued thereafter. U-boats were reported being refueled off Cuba, and empty gasoline drums washed ashore on the Haitian coast spurred rumors of similar activity there; a German submarine was said to have refueled from a merchant ship in the Gulf of Mexico and transferred demolitions to be used for sabotage. Although Admiral Raeder as early as 1937 had considered the possibility of Germany sustaining naval operations against the United States from bases in Mexico and South America, it soon became obvious that this was impossible. Germany lacked the naval power, and Hitler lacked the inclination to challenge the U.S. Navy in the western Atlantic. There were no German submarine operations in the American patrol zone. Nevertheless, the sighting reports were usually lucid, quite detailed, and the work of sober, responsible individuals; but they were all false.23
Early in October, the four-stacker Borie investigated several eyewitness “sightings” at various ports in the Virgin Islands. She made an extensive, thorough search, but found no U-boats. As a cruiser officer caustically told the Borrie’s skipper: “The local inhabitants are very accommodating about furnishing rumors of submarines if that is what you want ... If there are German submarines in these waters they are making no attempt to sink British and French shipping, and it would therefore appear to be a very wasteful employment of German forces.”24
In December, the four-stacker Twiggs shadowed the British destroyer Hereward in Yucatán Channel, discreetly observing as the British ship refueled from a “G”-class cruiser. In the same month, the Twiggs and Evans and the heavy cruiser Vincennes trailed the Royal Australian cruiser Perth in Yucatán Channel, repeatedly asking her to identify herself; but the Perth persistently refused, responding vaguely, “British warship.” Her skipper, Captain H.B. “Fighting Freddie” Farncomb, searching for a German merchant ship, was annoyed at the presence of the Americans. Angrily he roared, “Queer ideas of ‘neutrality’ these Americans have!”25
The British were not pleased with the Neutrality Patrol because they feared it might protect German vessels in the western Atlantic from attack, and more importantly, because it symbolized America’s desire to remain aloof from the war. As the neutrality zone was too vast to be effectively patrolled, the British reserved the right to pursue German ships inside the zone. Thus, in December, three British cruisers chased the Graf Spee into Montevideo, where the luckless pocket battleship was scuttled. The State Department’s half-hearted protests were, the British felt, made strictly for the record.26
At the outbreak of the war, there were about eighty-five German merchant ships in hemisphere waters; approximately thirty-two eventually made it back to Germany. On a worldwide basis, however, the Germans were more successful; by 1940, about a hundred ships had reached Germany safely, while about twenty-six were lost as they attempted to return. The British were preoccupied with the hunt for important raiders like the Graf Spee and German auxiliary cruisers, allowing many of the German merchant ships to escape.27
The liner Bremen was in New York, and the President directed that State Department personnel make a thorough search of the ship for concealed ordnance; the investigation took three days, and included a one-by-one count of all the life jackets aboard! The President hoped that the Perth and HMS Berwick would be able to intercept the liner, thanks to the delay. But the Bremen, aided by fog off Newfoundland and a wise choice of route, reached Germany safely.28
In the fall, the tanker Emmy Friedrich was taken by British naval units shortly after leaving Tampico; Ranger planes also searched briefly for her. Transmission of contact reports by the destroyer Truxtun helped French ships in the pursuit of fleeing German merchantmen Wangoni and LaPlata. In January, the freighter Konsul Horn, although sighted by a PBY out of San Juan, evaded the British picket ships and made it back to Germany. In the same month, the Bahia fled Brazil and thanks to a tricky route made it safely home. In March, the tanker, Hannover was captured in Mona Channel by a British cruiser and Canadian destroyer after an attempt to scuttle failed dismally.29
The Navy tried to keep a close watch on the Mexican ports, because the patrol was much less effective in the open Atlantic than in the cul-de-sac of the Gulf; most contacts were made within two hundred miles of the coast. The ten PBYs at Guantanamo and San Juan flew 8,000 miles daily, but admitted that the flights were “efficient only for vessels passing from the Atlantic into the Caribbean.”30
Occasionally,