The Gathering Storm. Geirr Haarr. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Geirr Haarr
Издательство: Ingram
Серия:
Жанр произведения: Историческая литература
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781612519319
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the British carriers were seen as scouts for the fleet, with defence of its own ships and attacking those of the enemy as secondary tasks. The offensive role, using bombs and torpedoes, was not ignored, but it was felt that this should only be considered under favourable conditions and then mainly to slow down enemy ships so that they could be brought to action. This concept of carrier deployment would dominate British naval thinking between the wars, leading to the building of heavily armoured carriers that would take fewer aircraft and preventing a dynamic development of their strategic and tactical deployment. By 1939, the doctrine had been modified somewhat, but reconnaissance and shadowing were still considered the primary roles for the FAA.

      A few years after WWI, three carriers remained in service with the Royal Navy: Furious, Argus and Vindictive, in addition to the seaplane carrier Pegasus. Of these, only Argus had a through deck. Vindictive was reconverted to a cruiser in 1923, while Furious was rebuilt and upgraded, emerging as a flush-decked fleet carrier with two hangars and lifts capable of operating up to sixty-one aircraft. Hermes, the first Royal Navy carrier built from scratch, was no more than 11,000 tons. She was intended as a scout assisting the fleet’s cruisers and carried only twenty-five aircraft. Eagle had twice the displacement but barely any more aircraft.32 Courageous and Glorious, originally completed as ‘large light cruisers’, had hull sizes and speeds rendering them suitable for adaptation to carriers, and conversion work was started in 1923. When completed in 1928 and 1930, respectively, they could operate some thirty-five aircraft each and were satisfactory stopgap vessels.33

      When Ark Royal was completed in November 1938, several novel ideas were introduced, including arrester cables and compressed steam catapults, making limited deck space available for arming, fuelling and flight preparation.34 The keel length was limited to 670 feet by dry-dock capacity in Gibraltar and Malta, but the flight deck was extended to 800 feet, with a pronounced overhang over bow and stern. As the two hangar decks were within the hull, the flight deck rose to some 65 feet above the waterline, giving the Ark a characteristic towering profile, unlike any other ship at the time. To save weight, welding was used where possible, while armour plating was limited to the belt, engine rooms and magazines.35 For the same reason, the flight deck was not armoured, making the ship vulnerable to air attack, but increasing stability and operational endurance. Six boilers powered three turbines, one to each propeller, giving a maximum speed of over 31 knots – a necessity to operate safely and efficiently during flight operations without slowing down the fleet she was meant to accompany. A/A armament was limited, but the Ark was not meant to be alone. A screen of destroyers and cruisers would always be near, while she could concentrate on operating aircraft. That the companions had limited A/A capacity themselves was overlooked. With a theoretical capacity of seventy-two aircraft, Ark Royal rarely operated more than fifty aircraft in the beginning of the war, reflecting the lack of aircraft and pilots. Normally, during these times, two squadrons of Fairey Swordfish biplane reconnaissance torpedo bombers and two of Blackburn Skua dive-bombers were on board, the latter also taking on the interceptor and defensive fighter role.36

aircraft carrier... aircraft carrier...

      Top, aircraft carrier Furious. (Sellicks) Below, aircraft carrier Ark Royal. (Valentines)

      In 1939, Ark Royal entered service alongside Hermes, Eagle, Courageous and Glorious, while Furious and Argus were used for training purposes. Furious was recalled to active service shortly after the outbreak of war, while Argus remained in a training role.37 Six new, fully armoured, 23,000-ton carriers of the Illustrious- and Implacable-classes had been laid down from 1937 but none of these would be operational until the end of 1940.

      * * *

      On 26 August 1939, Admiral Forbes took Nelson and the rest of the Home Fleet from Scapa Flow to patrol the Shetland–Bergen narrows. With four capital ships, one carrier, two cruisers and ten destroyers, it was but a fraction of the fleets Jellicoe and Beatty had commanded, but it would have to do. On 29 August, the order went out for a general mobilisation in Britain and at 16:38 the Admiralty issued a signal to all British Naval units to mobilise for ‘war with a European power’. Two days later, on the 31st, Admiral Forbes ordered his ships to: ‘complete fusing of all shells. Ship all warheads. Prepare for war.’38

      — 3

       The German Navy

       The Admiral’s Navy

      IN ADDITION TO GERMANY losing land and colonies and having to pay immense reparations to the Allies, the Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany’s military forces to a minimum after WWI. Conscription was abolished and the new voluntary German armed forces was to be no more than 100,000 men, ‘devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within its territory and control of its frontiers’. No aircraft, tanks or submarines were allowed. The General Staff and all similar organisations were dissolved and military schools shut down. The navy was reduced to eight 11-inch pre-Dreadnought capital ships, eight obsolete cruisers, twenty-four destroyers and torpedo boats, thirty-eight minesweepers and a handful of other smaller vessels.1

      In January 1921, all naval conditions of the Versailles Treaty had been met, and the German Imperial Navy was history. To try to heal the wounds and restore morale, the highly decorated Admiral Paul Behncke, who had led the Third Battle Squadron at Jutland, was recalled from retirement and appointed Commander-in-Chief. There was no lack of volunteers to fill the positions in the new Reichsmarine and it was not uncommon to choose between thirty to forty highly qualified applicants for each position. Some of these talents were put to active use in developing technologies that would get round the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Limitations in gun size were sought to be overcome through rockets and quick-firing guns; radar was developed, as were new welding techniques, diesel engines were tested and so on. In parallel, a substantial modernisation of the German merchant fleet and the early start of construction of replacement ships ensured that the specialist workforce in the yards remained active, maintaining their skills through the crisis.2

      To help him reinstate discipline and self-respect in his men, Admiral Behncke called Konteradmiral Erich Raeder and tasked him with reorganising the officer corps as inspector of naval education.3 Like the rest of the German officer corps, Raeder was irked by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, but had no option but to adhere to them officially while waiting for better times. Meanwhile, he circumvented the abolition of staff colleges by making his own ‘course for assistants to commanding officers’ based on private notes and files, gradually expanding it from two weeks to a full eighteen months. Simultaneously, he sought to achieve a closer relationship between the line officers and the branch officers, while specialist training for petty officers and enlisted men created confidence and loyalty in the ranks. All involvement in party politics was banned and several of the ways and customs of the Imperial Navy were reintroduced, particularly those that could underpin the pride of the navy and its place in society. By 1924, Behncke retired, considering he had achieved what he had been asked to do, passing command of the Reichsmarine to Admiral Hans Zenker.

      In 1927, the light cruiser Emden entered service as the first new-build ship after the war. She was robust and functional, but a top speed of 29.5 knots and single 15-cm guns in shielded mountings made her obsolete from the day of her launch. The Design Office used the definition of standard displacement in the Washington Treaty, announcing her as displacing 5,400 tons empty, some 600 tons less than allowed. In fact, she exceeded 6,950 tons, well over the limit of the Versailles Treaty. The Allied Control Commission failed to appreciate this and, once played, the trick was further exploited in all future designs until altogether ignored. The ambiguity between tons and long tons was also used to the full.4

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