The myriad of auxiliaries, minesweepers and other small vessels that had been commissioned during WWI were largely put in the reserve, sold or scrapped. The most modern ships were kept, meaning that newbuilds were not even considered before the late 1920s, by which time financial constraints applied. By 1926–27, fourteen vessels of a ‘sloop’ type were included in the building programme for the years 1927–30. In spite of their classification, they were essentially multi-purpose minesweepers equipped for escort and patrol duties and anti-submarine (A/S) work. As usual, when trying to put too many functions on one keel, none worked very well. Too slow for A/S work, too large for efficient mine-sweeping and too weakly armed for patrol duties, the ships were nevertheless complicated in design and needed time and resources to build. From minor differences, they were known as Bridgewater-, Hastings- and Shoreham-classes. The subsequent Grimsby- and Halcyon-classes were simpler, but not necessarily more suitable for wartime service. By 1936, eight Grimsbys and eighteen Halcyons had been built. Later, the Bridgewaters, Hastings, Shorehams and Grimsbys were reclassified as patrol sloops and even later as escort vessels, while the Halcyons became minesweepers. All forty vessels were first and foremost minesweepers, though.13
Sloop Dundee was launched in 1932. She was torpedoed and sunk in September 1940 by U48, which was at the time under the command of Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Bleichrodt (see Chapter 12). (Author’s collection)
From 1936 to 1938 the Naval Staff construction programmes were chiefly concerned with larger vessels – destroyers and above. As war did not appear imminent, the focus was on traditional larger ships, tying up large amounts of resources. There would, it was expected, be sufficient time to fill in the gaps with smaller ships later, should tension increase. When Parliament cut the navy estimates in 1938, the decision was made to maintain cruiser and capital ship programmes and push the smaller ships even further into the future. Instead, arrangements were made for some 200 trawlers to be made ready for rapid conversion to auxiliaries, should necessity dictate. In addition, specifications were prepared whereby further auxiliary minesweepers of trawler design could be built at regular shipyards should the need arise. In early 1939, the first of these ‘Admiralty trawlers’ were ordered. Pending their completion, twenty-six commercial trawlers were bought and put into the yards for conversion. Fifteen of these were ready for service on 3 September 1939.14
Limited in relative and absolute strength, the Royal Navy of the early 1930s was no longer the battle-hardened senior service of Admiral Beatty that had watched the German Hochsee Flotte sail into internment.15 The military historian Correlli Barnett argues that ‘once again a kind of fashionable yacht-club more apt for elegant displays of ship-handling and royal tours of the Empire than for battle’ had emerged.16 In a meeting of the Committee on Defence Programmes, held on 20 March 1939, there seems to have been contentment with the 200 or more ships under construction and no immediate urgency to accelerate the building programme in a systematic manner. ‘A little of everything’ seemed to be the solution, in spite of the meeting admitting to the ‘completely inadequate number of A/S escorts [and] minesweepers’.17
In all fairness, a good number of the officers and sailors strove to maintain the quality of the old navy, but peacetime routines and a return to a Victorian-style social divide between the decks created challenges. Neither the Admiralty nor the naval educational institutions were devoting much time to systematically gathering, analysing and applying the lessons of WWI into the development of new and modified strategies, tactics or doctrines for the next conflict. An alarming number of deficiencies would be brought along into the opening stages of WWII and cost many lives.
Marine Nationale
The French Navy or Marine Nationale of the late 1930s was steeped in tradition, conservative in utilisation of new technologies and limited in individual opportunities. Still, it was large and modern, 200 ships being commissioned between 1920 and 1935, averaging around thirty thousand tons per year. After the collapse of the disarmament talks during the mid-1930s, the building accelerated even more. Except for five renovated capital ships, the oldest ship of the Marine Nationale was seventeen years old in 1939. At the outbreak of WWII the Marine Nationale was the fourth largest navy in the world, and in Europe it was second only to the Royal Navy. It could muster about 160,000 men and was far better prepared for war than either the French Army or the French Air Force.18
For most French naval officers, WWI had been spent escorting convoys to and from the colonies and lying in wait for the Austro-Hungarian fleet that never emerged from its anchorages. Little had come out of the alliance with Britain, and animosity towards the Royal Navy existed well into the 1930s. Students at the Naval Academy (École de Guerre Navale) learned that the Marine Nationale’s main task was to uphold and defend the ports and coastlines of France and its colonies and to protect the merchant routes. Unless absolute surprise and numerical dominance could be achieved, the fleet should not be deployed aggressively. The Washington Naval Treaty was seen as favouring Britain, the USA and Japan while curbing France and Italy, and its restrictions were taken lightly. The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement underpinned the belief that Britain was hostile to France and the other Latin countries. The strategies and mentalities of the French Navy were not primed for cooperation with the Royal Navy.19
Vice-Amiral François Darlan, who took over as Chief of Staff on 1 January 1937, had a grudge against Britain in general and the Royal Navy in particular. Shy and reserved behind a brusque exterior, he was known for improvising frequently and not acting on advice. In June 1939, he was made Amiral de la Flotte, a rank created especially for him, and given command of the entire French Navy, including direct control of all operations in all theatres. As he was answerable directly to the government, it made him independent of general political support and to a large extent free from political control.
The 6,000-ton French cruiser Emile Bertin, which was commissioned in 1935. Her main armament consisted of three triple 15-cm turrets and she was reasonably well equipped with A/A guns. (Author’s collection)
There is no doubt that Darlan and most of his senior officers believed the Marine Nationale could match even the combined German and Italian navies if put to the test, without the support of the Royal Navy. Hence, there was virtually no exchange of plans or points of view between the Admiralty and the French Naval Staff prior to the outbreak of war, largely due to common mistrust and an absence of mentors advocating the need for a common strategy. Joint Anglo-French naval staff conferences were held in London on 31 March, 27 April and 3 May 1939, but these had little influence on the practicalities in either navy. On 23 August, the French naval reservists were called, all leave cancelled and men ordered to report back to their ships immediately. Plans for liaison with the Royal Navy were activated and French naval officers were sent to Malta, Gibraltar, Plymouth and Dover while similar British contingents arrived in Bizerte, Toulon, Brest and Dunkirk, in addition to large naval missions in London and Paris, respectively. On the 25th, a common signal code, prepared in utmost secrecy, was activated. Still, the cooperation between the Marine Nationale and the Royal Navy would never prosper, and by the summer of 1940 Admiral Darlan’s inability to develop a proper cooperation with the British virtually sidelined the Marine Nationale.20
Starting to Rearm
In their annual review for 1933, the British Chiefs of Staff wrote: ‘Germany is not only starting to rearm, but she will continue this process until within a few years hence she will have to be reckoned as a formidable military power.’ The Baldwin cabinet responded by establishing a Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) under the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to assess ways of meeting the worst defence deficiencies and re-establishing