It seemed to the Committee that the A and B squadrons fairly represented the full British and French forces in home waters. These two squadrons together were the entire British naval force available for general purposes in wartime – to reinforce the Mediterranean and distant squadrons, to maintain superiority in the Channel, and to maintain a considerable light squadron off the Irish coast. The manoeuvres implied that the Channel Fleet had to be powerful enough to blockade the French Atlantic ports, leaving a sufficient reserve to hold the Channel and protect the coasts and commerce of the United Kingdom, with sufficient battleships and cruisers to reinforce squadrons abroad and to form detached squadrons.
As of July 1888, the British had in home waters (in commission or in reserve) 22 battleships and 23 cruisers and gunboats. In the Mediterranean were 8 ironclads (including the torpedo ram Polyphemus), 4 cruisers, 3 sloops, 4 gunboats, and a despatch vessel. Including ships in reserve but ready for commissioning in Toulon, the French Mediterranean fleet consisted of 15 ironclads, 2 armoured gunboats, 5 first- and second-class cruisers, 11 third-class cruisers and gunboats, 4 torpedo cruisers and avisos, and 7 seagoing torpedo boats.
Had war broken out, to give the Mediterranean Fleet equal forces, 9 ironclads and 13 cruisers would have had to go there, leaving 13 battleships (including 3 coast defence ships) and 10 cruisers in the Channel and reserve squadrons. They would be watching a French fleet in Cherbourg of 5 seagoing ironclads, 6 coast defence ironclads (including 2 gunboats), 6 cruisers, 8 avisos (including 4 torpedo avisos), and 4 seagoing torpedo boats. In addition, the French had ships at Brest (2 ironclads, 4 first- and second-class cruisers, 1 third-class cruiser), Lorient (7 cruisers, 6 of them third-class), and Rochefort (5 third-class cruisers and avisos).
The total British force was ‘manifestly altogether inadequate’ against France alone; ‘and should the fleets of one other Power – say of that Great Power [Russia] whose Imperial interests may be said to clash most with those of the British Empire – have been joined to those of France against Great Britain at that time, the balance of maritime strength would have been most decidedly against her’. As an emergency measure, the old but still serviceable ironclads should be brought into condition to be activated in an emergency. The system, in force since 1870, of recommissioning ships abroad over and over again ‘has, in great measure, brought about a dearth of reserves’.
None of the analysis took into account ships under construction, and the Committee thought the situation would be better in 1890-91; but no ironclads had been laid down since 1886 (i.e., since the Northbrook Program) and ‘as there is nothing, in our opinion, to justify the belief that the days of ironclad battleships are over’, further new construction was urgent. Since England could not control the question of peace and war, at any time a maritime power might challenge her; so ‘we are decidedly of opinion that no time should be lost in placing the Navy of England beyond comparison with any two powers’.
‘Putting Russia beside the question, there can be little doubt but that, were England involved in a war with France, and she were to resume her natural rights as a belligerent [i.e., rights of blockade and of seizing neutral ships with enemy cargoes on board], which appear to have been voluntarily laid aside by the Declaration of Paris, troubles with the United States would inevitably ensue, and her whole commercial position, and the immense carrying trade by which it is sustained, would be jeopardized at the outset were war to be forced upon her at a time when her Navy was weak.’
France had both military and naval power, but the British position depended entirely on naval supremacy, ‘which has never seriously been challenged since the close of the last Great War [i.e., against Napoleon]. The defeat of her Navy means to her the loss of India and her Colonies and of her place among the nations.’
To the Committee, the arrangements made by A squadron to protect commerce, and those by B squadron to attack it, were much those that would be made in wartime by the admiral commanding the sole British Channel squadron and an enemy force. The B admiral at Berehaven judged that he was justified in breaking out both to attack trade and to attack major coastal cities, causing panic and inflicting great damage. He did so by attracting attention to his main body coming out of harbour while three of his cruisers escaped unobserved. He took a considerable risk, and almost lost two of his ironclads to torpedo attack, but the cruisers got out. B squadron cruisers also managed to break out of Lough Swilly unobserved; they also raided shipping and coastal towns. The British admiral blockading these fleets had decided that if as many as three ships broke out, he was unjustified in continuing the blockade and leaving the approaches to London, the heart of the Empire, uncovered. He also detached ships to cover Liverpool. That freed up the enemy forces, which merged and seized Liverpool. It seemed clear that the British fleet had not had enough cruisers to watch the enemy force, and thus to bring them to battle (as nearly happened off Liverpool, the British force having recently left). The British defending force had never had enough ships.
The blockaded force had an important advantage: continuous access to telegraph lines and thus to current intelligence, so long as it remained in port. Off Bantry the blockading admiral was 200 miles from the nearest telegraphic centre (and for purposes of the manoeuvres he was cut off from the natural source of intelligence, the Admiralty).
Overall, there could be no doubt that any maritime enemy ‘would adopt every possible means of weakening her enemy; and we know of no means more efficacious for making an enemy feel the pinch of war than thus destroying his property, and touching his pocket’. The British admiral trying to protect British commerce was badly hampered by the lack of intelligence (under manoeuvre rules) and also by the absence, under his command, of coast defence ships which would otherwise have prevented single enemy cruisers from getting close to defended cities near which shipping would concentrate (i.e., he could not mount a focal area defence). The B fleet won. By definition, B had no floating commerce worth attacking, and the British could not spare any force to attack its capital and its coastal towns.
No cruisers could be spared to protect British commerce. Had Britain been fighting France, all such ships in commission would have been required by the Channel Fleet, watching the French naval ports, preventing their escape, and helping bring them to action if they broke out. Assuming that the enemy did not arm privateers, British commerce would have been relatively safe near British shores. It would be necessary to arrange convoys for the slower steamers (12kts or less); sailing ships would presumably be laid up. The Committee suggested further that groups of merchant steamers with strong bows, steaming together, might give a good account of themselves against unarmoured enemy cruisers, using their bows as a weapon. Without enough unarmoured cruisers to form detached squadrons off the entrances to St George’s and the English Channels, and on the fishery grounds, merchant ships would have to be taken up from trade for that purpose.
The Royal Navy needed many more fast cruisers, in addition to the battleships the Committee obviously wanted. This mass of cruisers appeared in the Naval Defence Act of 1889, which might be seen as the outcome of the 1888 manoeuvres (and other efforts). A supplementary report examined the behaviour of various classes of ships; its remarks are given in the discussions of the Leander, Mersey, and Archer classes in later chapters.
The 1889 manoeuvres tested the extent to which a British fleet could mask an enemy fleet from strategic bases, its scouts keeping watch on