Berehaven played the part of a Russian port the fleet might blockade. The fleet anchored outside, protected (it was hoped) by controlled mines it laid, by a boom, and by searchlights. The corvette Conquest was sent out with four torpedo boats to watch the port. The corvette squadron (Conquest, Mercury, Racer, Mariner) and four torpedo boats represented the inshore squadron of a blockading fleet. The ships in port were to sortie while torpedo boats (the other four first-class boats and four second-class from the ironclads) drove off the blockading squadron. The blockaders were to keep in touch with the escaping squadron long enough to be sure of their course. The three escaping ironclads were spotted by a torpedo boat. At daylight they had Mercury and Mariner on either side, out of gun range. A passage to Blacksod Bay proved that the torpedo boats working with the fleet could hardly be considered seagoing.
HMS Swallow was a composite-built Nymphe class sloop. All later sloops had steel hulls. She was not too much smaller than ships classified as corvettes (cruisers) a few years earlier, displacing 1140 tons (195ft pp × 28ft × 12ft 6in), and she had about the same speed as Calypso class cruisers (13.5kts on 1570 IHP). She was armed with eight 5in guns and eight machine guns. Swallow was built by Sheerness, launched 27 October 1885. She was sold for scrap in 1904.
A temporary base would have been created so that an anchored fleet and its service vessels (including colliers and transports) could shelter from Russian torpedo attacks. The fleet tested a combination of booms and mines (both contact and controlled). Admiral Phipps Hornby wrote that ‘a boom to [rams] is as a bit of pack-thread’ – Polyphemus smashed the boom at Berehaven. It would take mines to deal with rams.
Existing torpedo boats (Nos 21 and 22) were unable to attack Mercury when the latter was steaming in open water at 16kts. Mercury was deemed to have sunk one of the torpedo boats by the fire of her stern and machine guns.
In a second phase of the exercise, the fleet split into attacking and defending squadrons. The attackers had six ironclads plus the torpedo ram Polyphemus. Their six lookouts were the fast cruiser Mercury, the sloop Racer, the seagoing gunboat Express, the coastal gunboats (each with a heavy gun) Medina and Snap, and the tug Seahorse. One object was to see whether small handy ships like the gunboats and the tug could defend a fleet against night torpedo attack. The gunboats proved slow, particularly in a seaway (Admiral Phipps Hornby: ‘during the forenoon we had striking evidence of what a clog on the speed of the squadron the heavy-gun gunboats become, invaluable as they are in narrow waters and for many purposes’). For the long passage the gunboats had to be towed by the armoured ships, badly reducing their speed. Finally the fleet included the torpedo depot ship Hecla with four first-class torpedo boats. The defenders (seven ironclads) had four lookouts: the fast converted liner Oregon (taken up from trade due to the war emergency), the corvette Conquest, and the sloops Mariner and Cormorant. It included two gunboats (Medway and Pike) and four first-class torpedo boats.
Other exercises had the attacking fleet running at night to elude surveillance by the fast armed merchant cruiser Oregon. Phipps Hornby noted: ‘the only thought in everyone’s mind was “Where is she?” If she caught sight of us our chance was gone, as we had nothing fast enough to prevent her from dogging our steps and acquainting her admiral what place we were steering for.’ However, the exercise proved that no one could prevent a squadron of ironclads from getting to sea in thick weather, even when nights were short. The enemy fleet’s object was to get 30 to 35nm offshore before daylight, for which 8kts sufficed. The line of eight ironclads was only 8 cables long (one cable was a tenth of a nautical mile) and the width 2 cables, ‘a small space to find in thick weather’. It was pointless to maintain a blockading squadron of ironclads at sea off a port, burning down their coal supply. They would be better off sheltering in a nearby port with bunkers full, waiting for a scout’s report.
HMS Mutine was one of the last sloops built for the Royal Navy. She built under contract by Laird, launched on 1 March 1900. She was one of six Condor class, which were followed by six Cadmus class. These ships survived to fight during the First World War. Armament was six 4in QF: two on the forecastle, two in the waist, two on the poop. Twenty years before, her steaming performance would have matched that of a Comus class cruiser – 13.5kts (1400 IHP) – but by 1900 cruisers were making 20kts or more. Thus Mutine and her like were considered specialist maritime police ships. She was steel-hulled and entirely unprotected.
A few cruisers offshore were not enough. Ideally there should be a line of torpedo vessels (i.e., torpedo cruisers) between port and blockading fleet, at the least to warn the fleet that the enemy was sending torpedo boats against it. The line of patrols should be as far as possible from the fleet. Although sloops like Mariner and Racer were both handy and well-armed, they were not fast enough. Mercury was fast but too large and expensive to risk against a torpedo boat. She would have to move so far from the port mouth at night to avoid attack by a torpedo boat so as to make her a useless picket.
Phipps Hornby concluded that he wanted (i) fast vessels, (ii) seagoing torpedo boats in numbers, and (iii) the means to shelter the fast torpedo boats while coaling, so that they could accompany the fleet overseas. To some extent the first two requirements were combined in torpedo cruisers and also in faster cruisers.
Captain J A Fisher, the future First Sea Lord, accompanied the fleet as Captain of HMS Excellent, the gunnery school (and ordnance experimental establishment). He supplied both the detailed narrative in the official report and detailed conclusions. Ironclad squadrons (six ships) should be accompanied by at least four fast unarmoured ships (cruisers) with moderate heavy gun power but with numerous quick-firing guns (to deal with torpedo craft). They would serve both as lookouts and as supports for the torpedo boat destroyers (torpedo boats armed mainly with guns, the first time this term was used) working with the ironclads. ‘It is obvious that they cannot perform these duties efficiently or avoid certain destruction by the modern fast ironclads unless their speed is also great and approximate to that of the first-class torpedo boats.’
Each ironclad squadron should also be accompanied by at least two seagoing torpedo boats plus a fast torpedo depot ship with commanding speed (such as the Oregon) carrying second-class torpedo boats, and also stores (mines and booms) to defend a temporary fleet anchorage. The torpedo boats should have an alternative gun armament to beat off torpedo boat attacks (Fisher used the phrase ‘torpedo boat destroyer’ for this role). Half the boats, equipped for defence, should be placed ahead of the squadron on going into action, the others (attackers) steaming astern of their ironclads, ‘ready to act in the smoke and confusion when the opposing ironclads pass each other’.
Fisher foreshadowed much of the cruiser development which followed soon after. His fast cruisers were the Medeas and their successors. His seagoing torpedo boats were the torpedo cruisers and then the torpedo gunboats. Fisher specifically rejected