Following his teacher Rufus,57 Epictetus also advocates bringing to light (δείκνυμι) a false philosopher not by having any deficiencies that exist in their comprehension of philosophical theory highlighted, but rather by their failure to let its teachings impact upon their lives:
From this conduct it can be observed what sort of person you are; why do you want to display it in any other way? Do you not know that Diogenes showed up one of the sophists in such a manner, by pointing at him with his middle finger, and when the man became enraged at that, Diogenes said: “That is the man; I have pointed him out to you.”58
βλέπεται ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων. τί θέλεις ἐξ ἄλλων δεῖξαι; οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι Διογένης τῶν σοφιστῶν τινα οὕτως ἔδειξεν ἐκτείνας τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον, εἶτα ἐκμανέντος αὐτοῦ ‘οὗτός ἐστιν,’ ἔφη, ‘ὁ δεῖνα: ἔδειξα ὑμῖν αὐτόν.
In another passage, Epictetus imagines an individual who has not apprehended that improper behavior disqualifies someone from being a philosopher—regardless of whether they style themselves as one or not. Instead of looking to appearances, Epictetus argues that it is a person’s actions that will reveal if they are a philosopher:
But he [the person who views an apparent philosopher’s misdeeds] should rather have said, on the evidence of the indecent behavior, that he was not a philosopher at all. For, if this is the preconception of what a philosopher is and his profession, namely to wear a cloak and have long hair, they would be correct; but, if it is to keep himself free from faults, why, when he does not meet the demands of his profession, do they not remove the appellation of philosopher from him?59
ἔδει δ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἠσχημόνει μᾶλλον λέγειν αὐτὸν μὴ εἶναι φιλόσοφον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόληψις καὶ ἐπαγγελία, ἔχειν τρίβωνα καὶ κόμην, καλῶς ἂν ἔλεγον: εἰ δ᾽ ἐκείνη μᾶλλον, ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι, διὰ τί οὐχὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πληροῦν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτὸν τῆς προσηγορίας; οὕτως γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.
It is within this context of prioritizing inner resolve and its accompanying actions, instead of mere appearances, that Epictetus elsewhere approvingly highlights that the Stoic Euphrates did not (as Epictetus appears to have done60) adopt the dress of a philosopher, but was instead happy to live as a philosopher should.61 Finally, on this topic I suggest that it is worthwhile to give Discourse II.23, which is entitled To Those Who Read and Dispute/Declaim for Display (πρὸς τοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκaοντας καὶ διαλεγομένους ἐπιδεικτικῶς), extended consideration. Within this discourse no epithet is used to describe the type of people who Epictetus has in view, but he portrays them as styling themselves in fine robes, speaking from rostrums that are in spacious and well-attended lecture halls, and humoring their audiences’ desires in order to obtain praise (ἐπαινέω) and shouts of “bravo” (οὐά) from them.62 The discourse is lengthy, but its tone and purpose are well summarized in its closing lines:
But tell me, who, upon hearing you recite or lecture, has come to be anxious about himself, or turns to look upon himself, or has left saying: “That philosopher has really grabbed hold of me: I must no longer behave as I do?” No, to the contrary, for all that you are in high repute, one man says to another “That bit about Xerxes was neatly expressed,” to which the other replies, “No, I found the bit about Thermopylae to be better.” Is that what it means to listen to a philosopher?63
ἢ εἰπέ μοι, τίς ἀκούων ἀναγιγνώσκοντός σου ἢ διαλεγομένου περὶ αὑτοῦ ἠγωνίασεν ἢ ἐπεστράφη: εἰς αὑτὸν ἢ ἐξελθὼν εἶπεν ὅτι ‘καλῶς μου ἥψατο ὁ φιλόσοφος: οὐκέτι δεῖ ταῦτα ποιεῖν;’ οὐχὶ δ᾽, ἂν λίαν εὐδοκιμῇς, λέγει πρός τινα ‘κομψῶς ἔφρασεν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ξέρξην,’ ἄλλος ‘οὔ: ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Πύλαις μάχην;’ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀκρόασις φιλοσόφου;
Through inference and direct censure, Epictetus seeks to expose the superficial nature of the envisaged speaker’s speech. He asserts that no introspection or anxiousness (ἀγωνιάω) is elicited from the audience regarding their behavior (ποιέω), only amusement at considering the figures and events that happened to be mentioned in the talk. Like with Arius Didymus above, Epictetus therefore expects that a person will not just seek to understand the theoretical points that they have encountered when they listened to an explication of philosophical themes, but they will utilize them to impact their life, here expressed through the language of the individual turning his attention onto himself (περὶ αὑτοῦ ἠγωνίασεν ἢ ἐπεστράφη). Given such qualities, it should not be surprising that Epictetus frequently calls the legitimacy of this hypothetical speaker’s philosophical status into question. For example, in response to the speaker’s professed intention to obtain a large audience, Epictetus mockingly replies: “Here is the language of a philosopher! Behold the frame of mind of a man who wants to benefit his fellow humankind!” ἰδοὺ φωναὶ φιλοσόφου, ἰδοὺ διάθεσις ὠφελήσοντος ἀνθρώπους, and “who ever heard Socrates say, ‘I know something and will teach it’? But instead he used to send people to different instructors,” διὰ τοῦτο τίς ἤκουσέ ποτε Σωκράτους λέγοντος ὅτι ‘οἶδά τι καὶ διδάσκω’; ἀλλὰ ἄλλον ἀλλαχοῦ ἔπεμπεν.64 In addition, Epictetus castigates the speaker’s intention of seeking to entertain an audience with philosophy, by saying: “Was this what Socrates used