ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι, ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία.
Here the few (ὀλίγοι), namely the philosophers, are openly contrasted against the multitude (πολλοὶ)—the nonphilosophers. Utilizing the same language, Epictetus elsewhere compares philosophers to be like a small (ὀλίγοι) number of people who attend a cattle market to observe and reflect upon the procedures that govern its operation, but who find themselves being laughed at by the bemused multitude (πολλοὶ):
Only a few people come with the purpose of looking at the fair, and observe how it is organized, who set it up and for what purpose. . . . Few are those who attend the fair because they enjoy looking on considering it . . . and what is the result? They are mocked by the multitude.124
ὀλίγοι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ θέαν ἐρχόμενοι τῆς πανηγύρεως, πῶς τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ διὰ τί καὶ τίνες οἱ τιθέντες τὴν πανήγυριν καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι . . . ὀλίγοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ πανηγυρίζοντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοθεάμονες . . . τί οὖν; καταγελῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν.
Often though Epictetus’ estimation of the narrow constitution of philosophically observant/aware members of humanity is relayed through his employment of analogies, such as his appeal for his listeners to consider philosophers to be like the narrow line of purple is in a senatorial toga (the latus clavus) in comparison to the color white which that chiefly constitutes the garment, and that he depicts as representing the nonphilosophically minded majority of society.125
Although Epictetus cautions that hostility should never be directed toward laypeople as their vices are the result of ignorance,126 he consistently uses evocative language to describe them, such as referring to them as being confused, ignorant, wretched, miserable, children, slaves and fools, and deluded.127 He also consistently presents laypeople as being the antithesis of the philosopher,128 candidly stating, for example, to his pupils: “you must assume either the stance of a philosopher or that of a layperson,” τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι φιλοσόφου στάσιν ἔχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου.129 An important point to highlight here is that his advocacy for his students to assume the same attitude (στάσις, standing state) of either a philosopher or a layperson is framed around moral rather than intellectual attributes, specifically whether his students’ ruling faculties (ἡγεμονικόι) and desires are for the things that are inside of them/concerning them (περί), rather than outside (ἔξω), that is, to be focused upon internal attributes rather than external circumstances or appearances. As our preceding discussion would suggest, here it is clearly seen that in Epictetus’ estimation being a layperson is not solely based upon whether the individual in view is ignorant of philosophy’s doctrines, but also if they neglect to let these principles impact their life.130 Similarly, it can be observed that he considers the status of being educated, παιδευομένοις, to include a person’s successful implementation of philosophical teachings into their daily life, as he defines “to be properly educated,” ὄντι παιδευομένοις, to be marked by an individual’s possession of “tranquility, fearlessness, freedom,” ἀταραξία, ἀφοβία, ἐλευθερία.131 If readers miss this point, however, they might conclude that Epictetus makes perplexing, perhaps even contradictory, statements, such as that a person who has learned about syllogisms and eythmemes, but who is conceited/puffed up, χαυνόω, is uneducated, ἀπαίδευτος.132 This position can unfortunately sometimes be obscured in commonly utilized translations. For example, in Diss. II.1.2 there is no contextual reason for rendering ἰδιώτης as “illiterate” as Hard does,133 especially since ἰδιώτης is not synonymous with the word αγράμματος that normally carries this meaning.134 When we are attuned to Epictetus’ perspective that philosophical education incorporates both intellectual and moral criteria, we realize that the ἰδιώτης in this passage in fact might just as easily be a highly schooled individual, but one who does not understand how, or who refuses to let their actions accord with the philosophical principles they have learned.
Returning to consider the broader point about Epictetus’ portrayal of laypeople, it can be noted that in another passage he can present a firm distinction as existing between them and philosophers, for instance by averring:
It is proper that for laypeople to inquire of you philosophers, just as people who come to a strange city do of the citizens who are acquainted with the area, to ask you what is the best thing in the world, so when we have heard what it is we may seek it out and look at it, as visitors to cities do.135
ἄξιον, ἔφη, τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἡμᾶς παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πυνθάνεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς εἰς ξένην πόλιν ἐλθόντας παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ εἰδότων, τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἱστορήσαντες μετίωμεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ θεώμεθα.
In the above passage, philosophers are again pictured as being individuals who look and evaluate the world in a way that differentiates them from the nonphilosopher, a theme that Epictetus reprises in another discourse in which he labels the masses as being deluded (τὸ δ᾽ ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν) and, elsewhere, when he reflects that they view philosophy and its paradoxes in a similar light to how an individual who has no medical knowledge might bemusedly look upon a physician who attempts to cure someone’s blindness by poking a lancet in their eye.136 In this regard, Epictetus elsewhere reflects upon the mutual confusion (φύρω) that can arise between philosophers and laypeople (ἰδιῶται) if they enter into dialogue with each other, with, he suggests, the nonphilosopher finding philosophical concepts to be obscure (δυσπαρακολούθητος) and to be vulgar/repulsive (φορτικός), while the philosopher is apt to revile (λοιδορέω) and openly laugh (καταγελάω) at their conversation partner and exclaim: “he is a layperson; there is no making anything of him,” ‘ἰδιώτης ἐστίν: οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι.137 Bearing this context in mind, it can surely be understood why Epictetus repeatedly feels the need to caution his students against entering into discussions on philosophical topics with laypeople,138 and at one point argues that if they recognize a person cannot understand or won’t accept philosophical truths, then they should hold their silence rather than announcing their views and prompting animus to occur. He similarly advises that they should clap along with laypeople as they enjoy their festivals instead of attempting to prompt a shift in their perception of the world.139 Epictetus even goes so far, as the following chapter will explore in more depth, to advise his students to limit their contact with nonphilosophically informed individuals,