72. VA 1.488.
73. See also a similar passage at Diss. II.19.21-28.
74. See my discussion further in this chapter, as well as the discussion in Rist (1982).
75. M. Aur. Med 8.1.
76. On Cynicism’s lack of sophisticated intellectual content, and the debate in antiquity over whether it should be classed as a αἵρεσις or not, see, for example, Diog. Laert. 1.19, 6.103, Julian Or. 6.186B, and the discussion in Branham (2018, 597–602). Regarding Plato’s critique of the Cynics, see Papas (2016, 55–57).
77. For example, see Morgan (1998) and Bénatouïl (2006).
78. On such schools consult, for example, Von Staden (1982) and Cribiore (2007). On the competition between philosophy and rhetoric, as well as the Stoic critique of it, see the useful overview in Reydams-Schils (2015, 126), and on Epictetus’ criticism of rhetoric Diss. III.23.33-38, cf. III.1. On the variance of opinions in antiquity regarding the status of physicians Mattern (2013, 21–27) is useful.
79. On the propensity of education in antiquity to establish a “them and us” divide, see especially the comments from Watts (2006, 1–7) and Johnson (2010, 166–170).
80. See Cicero De. Part. Orat. 90; Tusc. II.1.4; Contra Cels. 1.27.13; Adv Prax 3; Lactantius Div. inst. 3.25. Carrier (2016, 11–31) estimates that 0.4 percent, or 1 in 250 people in the early Roman Empire would have undertaken higher education. Meanwhile, Brookins (2014, 132–146) argues that at least in urban areas 7–10 percent of the population would have undertaken training in a gymnasium, wherein some limited instruction in philosophy would have likely taken place.
81. Amm. 1.1.
82. VS 529, and Herm 21. See also Dio. Or. 32.8 and comments from Eshleman (2012, 44).
83. Arat. 5.2.
84. See the discussion in Dillon (2004, 409) and also comments at Att. 3.102.a and Ep. 108.5.
85. Barnes (2002, 306) briefly avers that a philosopher in antiquity can be recognized from their interest in “logic, physics and ethics and you would recognize them by the congruence between their intellectual interests and those of the Greek masters.” On philosophical schools as institutions, and their relationships with their pupils, see, among others, Dorandi (1999), Snyder (2000, 14–121), and Dillon (2002, 2004). See also the fascinating study from Goulet (2013, 33–39). On the range of topics that would likely be included in a Stoic education (and the division between logic, ethics, and physics), and in particular under Epictetus’ tutelage, see Long (2002, 97–128) and Cooper (2007, 9–15). On the place of logic especially within Epictetus’ school, see Diss. I.7.9-12, II.21.20-21, II.25 (passim). On Epictetus’ students practice of openly deliberating on philosophical themes with each other, see also Diss. II.17.34, and 21.11.
86. Lucian Herm. 1.
87. See Trapp (1997).
88. Tab. Cebes 14.2-3.
89. Tab. Cebes 14.3-5.
90. Hilton (2018, 71).
91. Idyll. 4.18.22.47-50.
92. Math. 233-235.
93. Flor. 13.3.
94. Diss. III.23; III.21. Seneca. Ep. 80.10-11, and see the discussion in Dupont (2017, 171–173).
95. Pers. 5.63, Diss. II.21.19; IV.4.41, cf. Diss. III.15.11.
96. For example, see Diss. II.6.4, 17.34.
97. Diss. II.21.13.
98. On Manilius’ comments at Astron. 3.38-39 and his stated satisfaction regarding the impenetrableness of his work, consider the valuable discussion in Bartsch (2015, 166–167). Consider also reflections on the complexities of Stoicism at Cicero Parad. 2, Plutarch De virt. mor. 449AB, Gellius Att. 12.5.6, and discussions at Gowers (1993, 180–181) and Roskam (2005, 16).
99. See Diss. I.25.33, II.11.7-14.
100. Diss. II.12.10-12.
101. Diss. I.20.13. See, respectively, Diss. I.26.13-14; 10.13; 20.13. See also Diss. I.7.5-12, 30, along with the comments of Dobbin (2007, 115).
102. Diss. II.16.34. Regarding Epictetus’ frustration at people who cannot properly identify a philosopher, consider Diss. I.8.14.
103. Or. 70.1.
104. See the useful discussion on the use of δίαιτα in antiquity in Bartoš (2015).
105. Flor. 7.9-10.
106. Epit.1.52.11-22. On this point, see the discussion in Lauwers and Roskam (2012, 185).
107. Eun. 4-5, 9. Regarding this passage, see the useful commentary in Frede (1999, 792) and Eshleman (2012, 36). Consider also Pl. Sym. 174 on the selection of Xenocrates to be Speusippus’ successor in the academy.
108. Pedersen (1976).
109. Cribiore (2007, 198).
110. On this, see also the reflections of Haake (2015, 76, 78).
111. Herm. 21. On the Stoic idea of belonging to a city consider Schofield (1991).
112. Dion 1.1. On this passage, see also Trapp (2007, 15), cf. Apul. Apol. 64, 536, and Galen Aff. Pecc. Dig. II.68.9-10.
113. Boys-Stones (2018, 10) and Baltzly (2014).
114. On this practice with regards to Bion’s school, see the valuable comments at Dorandi (1999, 62). At Herm. 82, 86, Lucian implies that students of Stoic philosophy might grow their beards to mark themselves out as being philosophers. On the importance of uniforms and shared symbols for social identity theory, see Jenkins (1994, 145).
115. For example, see Plut. Demetr. 45, Jos. BJ 1.209, Ath. 6.78, and Dio Or. 1.43.
116. Respectively, Polyb 1.69.11, Thuc 2.48.3, Isocr 4.11, Plato Theag. 124c, Xenophon Hiero 6, Plu. Symp IV.2.3, and Sextus adv Theag. 124c.
117. For example, see 1 Cor. 14.16, 23, 24. For further uses of ἰδιώτης that are not derogatory, see also Galen Affect. 1 and the discussion in Kraus (1999).
118. For example, see De Anima 81.27 and Plut. Cic. 26.6.
119. Luc. Dom. 2, Plut. Compar. 1, and Ath. 9.20.
120. For example, respectively, Ps.-Xenophon Const. Ath. 1.5, Rep. 6.494, 489, Med. 11.23. As Maxwell (2006, 16) notes: “aristocratic condescension toward ordinary people is often cited as an indication of the gulf separating elite and mass culture . . . Remarks about ‘masses’ usually indicate an unquestioned sense of superiority over ordinary people.”
121. Stock (1982, 28–29).
122. For example, at Parat. Orat 90 Cicero contrasts the indocti (uneducated) and agrestes multi (uncultured/rustic majority) with the humani (well educated) and politi boni (good/refined men).
123. Diss. I.3.3-4.
124. Diss. II.14.23, 25, 39. This analogy appears to have been first used by Pythagoras (Diog. Laert. 8.8, Iamblichis, V.P. 12.58-59), from which Fitzgerald (2013, 136) argues that Pythagoras must have “believed that ‘philosopher’ was sufficient to distinguish the minority who devoted themselves to the contemplation and discovery of nature from the majority who gave themselves to other pursuits.”
125. Diss. I.2.22. Stephens (2007, 120, 121) significantly comments: “this quotation is essential for establishing that Epictetus believes Stoicism is for the few, not the many. . . . His judgment, which probably derives from empirical observations, is that the multitude judge themselves wretched because they judge their physical condition to be wretched . . . only a rare few, as it turns out, have the prowess