My developing relationship with Escritt then proved to be very helpful in assessing the background evidence for my biography of Colonel Toosey. In the course of our correspondence I mentioned Futamatsu’s work and the need for its publication in English and this led to a direct link between the two men although they never met. This, then, resulted in Escritt spending a number of years translating the work while at the same time I was able to persuade my publisher at that time – The Athlone Press – that, suitably revised and edited, it would make an ideal companion volume to my own study of Toosey. In this way it was to be anticipated that these two very different, viewpoints would give posterity a better perspective in judging the actual events.
Sadly, although my biography was duly published as planned,10 the proposed publication of Futamatsu’s work did not proceed. This was partly due to the publisher requiring both a substantial revision of the manuscript and a large subsidy. Both of these difficulties might well have been resolved over time but the death of Escritt in 1991 was a critical factor which could not be easily overcome. At that time I was extremely busy with my own research projects and committed to other publications11 so could not step into the breach and accordingly a long hiatus ensued. However, I did retain permission from both Futamatsu and from Escritt’s widow, Mrs Ruth Escritt, to publish the translation and with other studies completed12 have now been able to give the biography the attention it deserves. A further essential factor has been the support of The Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation for the research, preparation and publication of the completed manuscript. Without this assistance it is almost certain that the entire project would have remained stillborn and I am, therefore, greatly indebted to both Peter Mathias and Stephen McEnally for their continued encouragement and practical help.
In the meantime Yoshihiko Futamatsu died and thus did not see the final outcome of a project close to his heart; however, his former colleague, Renichi Sugano, has been most helpful in clarifying many uncertain points in Futamatsu’s text. I am also most grateful to Professor Kunio Katayama,13 my academic collaborator, who kindly facilitated my final meeting with Sugano in Tokyo in October 2011 and whose skill in translation was a major factor in its success. The culmination of this work thus owes much to the assistance provided by Sugano and Katayama and their ongoing dedication deserves my sincere thanks. This support was considerably aided by that provided by Mrs Atsuko Broadbridge whose Japanese background proved to be most valuable in helping my understanding of many aspects of the original manuscript. I would also wish to acknowledge the huge contribution made to the study by Mrs Gill Wilson. Her skill and enthusiasm in preparing successive drafts for publication clearly demonstrated her great interest and commitment to the project and she clearly deserves the highest possible commendation for all her efforts.
Publisher’s Note: Japanese Names
In the title and introductory pages to this book, we have followed the Western custom of presenting the given name before the family name, thus Yoshihiko Futamatsu, whereas Japanese names are normally presented with the family name first followed by the given name – thus Futamatsu Yoshihiko. The Japanese convention, however, has been followed by translator Ewart Escritt.
FOREWORD
Peter N. Davies
The root cause of The Pacific War lay in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and China for eventually this led the United Stated to restrict its exports of oil and scrap metal on which Japan was heavily reliant. This policy was intensified after Japan joined the Tripartite Pack with Germany and Italy and a total ban on all strategic materials was imposed by Britain, Holland and the USA after Japan had occupied parts of French Indo-China in 1940–41.
This development left Japan with only two real choices – to withdraw from China and Indo-China as a condition for the lifting of the sanctions or to make itself self-sufficient by seizing the remaining territories of the South-East Asia.14 The weakness of the Western powers following the German victories in 1940 then encouraged those who favoured what was thought would be a short war and on 7 December 1941 Japan launched her secret attack on the United States’ fleet based at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. This was largely successful so that although the American aircraft carriers escaped damage as they were out of port the Japanese established temporary superiority at sea. However, what was regarded as an act of treachery had the effect of uniting the American nation and it became grimly determined to defeat Japan and its European allies.15
At about the same time Japanese forces began landing in Thailand and were quickly able to advance down the Malayan Peninsula. Japanese tactics were then to prove so decisive that on 15 February 1942 Singapore itself had been captured. These victories were achieved at relatively little cost due to the weakness of the British armed forces which was partly due to most of their intended equipment – especially aircraft and tanks – being diverted to aid Russia.16 However, this very success created its own problems for the Japanese authorities. In Singapore these were caused by the very large numbers of troops taken prisoner for whom little or no preparation had been made.17 On the wider front other early victories resulted in Japan gaining control over the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Burma. Further attempts to cut communications between the United States and Australia by seizing Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia and plans to secure the Aleutian Islands and Port Moresby in New Guinea were then to be frustrated by defeats in the Battles of Midway and the Coral Sea. These failures ensured that from May 1942 Japanese expansion in the Pacific was at an end but also meant that a defensive perimeter needed to be created to protect the vast area she had already occupied.18
The resulting lines of communication were of enormous length and placed huge burdens on the Japanese merchant marine. This was already finding it difficult to fulfil its prime task of bringing oil and other raw materials from the conquered territories to the homeland for it should be noted that in the last year of peace Japanese vessels had only been able to carry 65% of her imports.19 Although the production of cargo ships was to be greatly increased during the war their numbers and tonnage were never sufficient to offset those being sunk and this was to remain a major constraint on Japanese strategy.20 The overall decline in available merchant vessels together with the ever increasing scale of attacks by American submarines and aircraft then obliged the Japanese to examine ways in which economies could be made. As part of this process it was decided that the supply of their forces in Burma should be via Bangkok instead of using the port at Rangoon.
This proposed re-arrangement of routes offered two specific advantages. In the first place it was appreciated that a saving of over 1,200 miles could be made if Rangoon could be replaced by Bangkok as the shipping terminus. Second, was also understood that the attacks from aircraft based in India which were already causing heavy losses to shipping approaching Rangoon were likely to intensify. Thus, a potentially safer and shorter route had much to commend it but the problem with implementing such a scheme was that there was no existing provision for the ongoing movement of cargo landed at Bangkok to be carried into Burma. For this to be resolved required the Thai and Burma rail networks to be connected which