Western Europe’s Search for Security—The Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties
As the gulf between East and West became both wider and sharper, West Europeans began to acquire a ‘European’ consciousness.23 What was initially a political struggle, however, increasingly came to be seen in military terms. The military situation in Europe by this time was not what it had been at war’s end.24 Several proposals and discussions between Europe’s leading statesmen had taken place during the war concerning Europe’s future and the possibilities of some form of Western European Union (WEU).25 One of the key topics was how to contain a resurgent Germany in the future and the 1947 Franco-British Dunkirk Treaty was an attempt to do just that.
Among the studies and proposals regarding Europe’s postwar future was a study by Sir Nigel Ronald, an undersecretary in the Foreign Office, written in 1945. Ronald suggested that a Franco-British alliance, to include Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, and Spain, would be the keystone of a European defense system. He believed this system would both contain Germany and protect the smaller Allies from falling under Soviet influence.26 The British Foreign Office was skeptical because it felt that without US assistance, defense against the Soviet Union was unrealistic. Alfred Duff Cooper, British ambassador to France, however, contended that US interference would prevent the United Kingdom from achieving a position of equality between the two new superpowers. A federation of western European seaboard states plus the major Mediterranean powers could become “an alliance so mighty that no power on earth would . . . dare to challenge it.”27
The Anglo-French alliance idea was not followed up, however. Churchill did not believe that France—or any other West European country—would be of value to British security. Current Franco-British relations, moreover, were less than ideal. French and British troops had narrowly avoided a clash in Syria, and Charles DeGaulle, chairman of the provisional government of France, incensed over his wartime treatment by the Allies, was demanding the resolution of several Franco-German border disputes before discussions about an alliance could take place.28
The 1946 election of a Socialist caretaker government in France under Léon Blum allowed much Franco-British hostility to be put aside and on New Year’s Day 1946, Blum wrote Foreign Minister Bevin that he was willing to sign a Franco-British treaty. The problems that exercised DeGaulle remained, but Blum assured Bevin that they would not present a barrier. Accordingly, negotiations on a fifty-year treaty began that month.29
When this treaty, the Dunkirk Treaty, was signed on 4 March 1947, it became the first specifically European postwar security arrangement. Although designed specifically to prevent the reoccurrence of German aggression, it also became the first of several attempts to develop both an Anglo–Western European defense group and a North Atlantic security system.30
The collapse of the London foreign ministers meeting in December 1947 gave Bevin the necessary incentive to launch his plans for a western union. The London conference broke down over the question of reparations and the Allied refusal to acquiesce to Soviet demands. It was the last attempt to obtain a major East-West agreement on Germany.31 On 17 December, Bevin spoke in turn to French foreign minister Georges Bidault, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian high commissioner in London. The gist of these conversations was that the time had come to create “some sort of federation” in Western Europe.32
The first step toward such an arrangement would involve Britain and France signing bilateral treaties—modeled after the Dunkirk Treaty—with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Bevin publicly outlined his plan in a speech to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, saying that Britain could no longer stand outside Europe nor could it “be diverted, by threats, propaganda, or fifth column methods, from [its] aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts those nations of Europe . . . who [were] ready and able to cooperate.”33
Bevin was also clearly attempting to get the United States to commit to the defense of Europe. Without an American security guarantee, the British were not sure they could make the Western Union work. Until the union was successful, however, the United States would not discuss participation.34
The Benelux countries also put pressure on the United Kingdom.35 They did not like the Dunkirk model because they believed it was directed solely against Germany and did not reflect current realities. This view was strongly advocated by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister, who also urged that the collective arrangement be economic, cultural, and social as well as military.36 Paris, however, held to the Dunkirk model because of French sensitivity concerning Germany. Any pact directed against the Soviets that did not deal with the possibility of a rearmed Germany was unacceptable to France, a view Britain also shared.37 In fact, France had previously approached the United States and asked, in light of the fact that the treaty on German demilitarization was dead, whether the United States would be interested in entering a three-power treaty that contained similar stipulations.38
On 24 February 1948, a Soviet-backed coup d’état toppled the Beneš government in Czechoslovakia. This event sent a shiver of fear throughout Western European governments, magnified by the weakened state of the almost totally demobilized Allied forces. The coup prompted France to take a much broader view of European security and Britain now also accepted the need for a multilateral pact. Bevin was convinced that the Soviet Union was preparing to extend its grip over the rest of Europe; there were fears of a coup in Italy and the Soviets were pressuring Finland and Norway to sign treaties of friendship and mutual assistance.39 As a result, on 4 March, negotiations between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg began in earnest and on 17 March, in an atmosphere of pessimism and crisis, the Brussels Treaty was signed.40
The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) was more than a response to the apparent Soviet threat. It contained a consultative council, a permanent commission, and a permanent military committee comprised of the five defense ministers, meeting as the Western Union Military Committee. It was envisioned by Bevin as a basis for the organization of all of Western Europe, and as a vehicle to convince the United States that Europe could stand on its own. The immediate US response was a speech by President Truman supporting the new European organization as well as a request to Congress to complete its action on the Marshall Plan. Unknown to the Europeans, however, studies were initiated within both the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to determine how best to support the Western Union, including whether to associate with it at all (see chapter 3, this book).41
The French government, however, remained unsatisfied with the US response to the Brussels Pact. In May, France’s ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, told Theodore Achilles of the State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs that Europe was disappointed that the United States had not acted faster in support of the Brussels Treaty. Achilles said that the United States had made it abundantly clear that the Brussels Treaty countries needed to first formulate and carry out their own plans for an integrated defense before asking the United States for help. Bonnet’s response was that United States needed to understand the “French psychological difficulties” and need for reassurance on security in general. Achilles replied that France needed to understand US psychology as well, and gave the following US response to the Europeans: “You made a start, but it’s still a small start. Put some military ‘bones’ on that Treaty, preferably some collective ones.”42
The existence of the BTO as a viable, independent entity was short-lived, however.43 Concerned by events in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, which followed in June 1948, the five Brussels Treaty members joined the United States, Canada, and five other West European nations (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy) to sign the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, creating NATO. Two defense organizations—one spanning the Atlantic and the other containing the germ of a future integrated Europe—now existed in Western Europe where a year earlier there had been none.
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