In this book, I bracket discussion of why states’ interests diverge to focus on the question of why they use FIRC when their interests diverge. States may enter into disputes for any number of reasons, but the causes of those disputes do not necessarily dictate the means used to resolve them. Policymakers, for example, may prefer to replace the opposing side’s leader in an ideological dispute, but they may be forced to bargain if they cannot defeat that leader militarily. Similarly, policymakers may be inclined to negotiate when a dispute arises with a longtime ally, but they may find themselves pursuing regime change if that ally suddenly refuses to cooperate. Although my argument indicates that domestic forces play a pivotal role in determining the strategies states use to resolve their disputes, it does not reject the possibility that other forces could explain why those disputes occur. Psychological bias, ideological competition, credibility problems, bureaucratic pressures, and miscalculation could each generate a dispute, but how that dispute gets resolved, I argue, depends on the target’s domestic opposition. The argument in this book is meant to complement theories on the causes of interstate disputes by helping us better understand when those disputes will end in FIRC.
In addition to explaining why states choose FIRC, this book also addresses how states impose it. I argue that whether they remove the leader or change political institutions depends on the type of opposition the targeted leader faces. All else being equal, strong states prefer to effect what I call full regime change, the installation of an entirely new set of political institutions. To do so, they work with those I call external opposition groups. These groups are composed of domestic opponents who live either in the target state or in exile, and who are disadvantaged by the current regime and, therefore, have an incentive to overthrow it. External opposition groups are often motivated to collaborate with the foreign power. However, they can be costly to install, because they cannot seize power from within. Full regime change, therefore, often requires the foreign power to launch an invasion or assist rebels in obtaining a military victory over the government.
When the external opposition lacks sufficient strength to overturn the government, the greater power might instead turn to the leader’s internal opposition to bring about partial regime change. This involves removing the target state’s leader or top policymakers, whether by convincing regime insiders to launch a coup or by pressuring the leader to resign. Partial regime change also involves risk for the foreign power. Internal rivals are often less willing to accommodate the stronger power’s policy aims because they are vulnerable to some of the same domestic political costs as the targeted leader. As a result, even when a leader’s internal rivals are willing to launch a coup, the foreign power may have to maintain incentives to ensure their cooperation over time. When a coup is not feasible, the foreign power may attempt to coax the leader into stepping down. Successful attempts to coerce the leader’s resignation, however, are surprisingly rare. Not only is it difficult to convince leaders whose supporters remain loyal to sacrifice power, but this approach is also less likely to leave behind a stable, friendly regime. I address the benefits and costs associated with both approaches to regime change—full and partial—in Chapter 2. Figure 2 diagrams my argument.
Figure 2. The Logic of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
Why Study Foreign-Imposed Regime Change?
In the years since President George W. Bush’s administration ordered the invasion of Iraq, a rich literature has blossomed attempting to explain the causes of that war. Yet only a handful of studies, most of which predate the Iraq War, examine the causes of FIRC writ large. Although these studies offer valuable insight, they tend to focus on only one specific type of FIRC, such as that which occurs after a major war, entails covert methods, or involves just the removal of the target’s institutions rather than its leaders.10 Few studies examine the causes underlying the full spectrum of FIRC. This is surprising, given the frequency with which states, particularly strong ones, have sought to use regime change to attain their foreign policy aims. Since becoming a major power in 1898, the United States has been involved in a total of thirty-eight regime-change attempts. Since 1816, the United Kingdom has undertaken nineteen regime change attempts; the Soviet Union/Russia, seventeen; Germany, fifteen; and France, thirteen (see Appendix 1).
The vast majority of studies on FIRC examine its consequences rather than its causes. These are of undeniable importance, but the causes of FIRC could very well determine the nature of the consequences we observe. If FIRC is more likely to occur in states already experiencing domestic instability, then we might expect that domestic instability commonly follows FIRC. If so, it would be wrong to infer that FIRC causes domestic instability, though we could conclude that FIRC does little to correct for it. We might also find that FIRC seldom creates democratic regimes because the domestic instability that plagues the target state hampers efforts to democratize the target. The methods states use to impose FIRC may also affect the outcomes we observe. Partial regime change, for example, may enable a foreign power to obtain its short-term objectives relatively cheaply but may fail to produce lasting change. It may also be less likely to resolve the underlying domestic struggle for power that led to regime change, and so leaves the target susceptible to additional FIRC attempts. In short, we must study the causes of FIRC in the many forms it can take to fully understand its consequences.
The study of FIRC is also important for understanding whether and when it can be avoided. Critics of the decision to impose regime change in Iraq, and later, in Libya, argued that these were wars of choice, not necessity.11 The dominant rationalist explanations for war, however, imply that there is no such thing as a war of choice, because if an enforceable bargain were attainable, policymakers would choose it. War, according to these theories, occurs because information or credibility problems impede a bargaining agreement. War, therefore, results because a peaceful bargain is impossible, which makes war unavoidable and, hence, not a choice. This book challenges the conventional view that states would prefer a bargain if one were possible. Instead, I show that while bargaining agreements often are feasible between states of asymmetric power, the costs of obtaining and enforcing them can make these agreements undesirable. This may prompt policymakers to choose war, even though a peaceful settlement is possible.
Studying FIRC also paves the way for new insights into international relations theory. Neorealism, which typically sees international conflict as stemming from structural forces, such as a change in the balance of power, has difficulty explaining why nations would expend resources to replace foreign leaders and regimes.12 If security threats are mainly determined by growth in another state’s military power or alliances, then replacing its leadership should do little to diminish the threat that it poses. By explaining why policymakers care about who rules in a target state, this book expands our understanding of why states fight.
Although my argument has implications for the study of all conflict, I focus on FIRC because it represents a unique and particularly puzzling type. Wars can be fought for many reasons and in many different ways, but FIRC is unique in that it excludes a settlement with the enemy. In this sense, FIRC is akin to what Thomas Schelling calls “brute force,” which differs from coercive force not so much in degree as in intent.13 Brute force involves taking what you want.14 In contrast, coercion entails the use of negative incentives to ensure an opponent prefers to give you what you want. Although both can involve military hostilities, coercion is aimed at achieving an agreement with the opposing side’s policymakers, while brute force is aimed at eliminating those policymakers altogether. Even when coercive methods are used to obtain agreements that require regime change, the goal is still to remove the leader rather than continue dealing with the leader. Schelling argues that the advent of nuclear weapons made war more of a “bargaining process” in which coercive force dominates.15 And yet the persistence of FIRC shows that some conflicts still very much involve brute force. The strong still sometimes