Figure 1. Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Attempts, 1816–2007
The Logic of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
This book explains why states choose to overthrow foreign leaders or regimes rather than bargain with them. In so doing, it addresses three related questions: (1) Why do the weak resist the strong? (2) Why do the strong respond by imposing regime change? And, (3) when is FIRC aimed at deposing a leader versus at upending or transforming political institutions? The answers to all three questions, I argue, hinge on the strength of the targeted leader’s domestic political opposition. When a conflict of interest arises between a strong and weak state, the stronger state may pressure the weaker one to accept a settlement. Targeted leaders, however, have an incentive to resist or renege on these settlements whenever compliance will weaken them at home. If leaders accept terms that compromise their already tenuous political positions, their domestic opponents may challenge them. These opponents could be rivals within the regime or insurgents seeking to overthrow it. Opposition can also be latent, ready to erupt if the leader’s concessions provoke widespread anger. No matter its form, the stronger this opposition already is, the more successful its domestic challenge will likely be and, thus, the more resolved the targeted leader will be to reject the foreign power’s demands. Even when defeated in war and forced to accept imposed terms, leaders may later renege to shore up their domestic political power.
Two conditions must be met for a foreign power to achieve its aims at the bargaining table and reject attempting regime change. First, the foreign power must give the target reason to concede by proving that the foreign threat the target faces is greater than its domestic one. Although the foreign power may have a greater military capacity, the targeted leader may not believe the more powerful state will use its full capabilities. To make its threats credible, the stronger state can use “costly signals,” actions so costly that less resolved actors would avoid them. By mobilizing troops or acquiring arms and allies in preparation for war, a foreign power could convince others of its determination to fight. To be sure, costly signals may not always convince the target to back down. When targeted leaders face particularly intense domestic threats, they may risk war, hoping to hold out in a protracted conflict. Yet, even in these cases, foreign powers often can convince militarily weak leaders to concede by applying coercive force or, in extreme cases, defeating the target militarily. Once the foreign power achieves a military victory, it should be able to force the targeted leader to accept its terms.
Second, once the targeted leader submits to a settlement, the foreign power must give that leader reason to abide by it. If the agreement requires the weaker nation to implement politically risky policy changes, its leader might try to avoid doing so once the stronger state’s initial threat diminishes. A variety of enforcement mechanisms can be used to monitor the targeted leader’s adherence to the agreement and punish violations of it. The foreign power, for example, could call on a third party to ensure the agreement is carried out. Or, it could keep its own troops mobilized or stationed on the target state’s soil to maintain a credible threat to renew hostilities if cheating occurs.
When these two conditions are met, a lasting settlement with the targeted leader should be feasible and regime change should be unnecessary. The problem, however, is that the measures necessary to achieve these conditions can be costly for the foreign power. These expenses entail a variety of costs—not just financial ones, but also political, military, diplomatic, reputational, humanitarian, and opportunity costs. For example, mobilizing troops can impose diplomatic and domestic political costs on the stronger state if its allies or domestic public oppose war. Even when the foreign power’s public and allies support belligerencies at the outset, the long-term stationing of troops might later become unpopular, making enforcement measures politically and diplomatically costly over time. Nonmilitary coercion, such as economic sanctions, can also entail costs beyond financial ones. If sanctions take a humanitarian toll on the target state’s people or hurt an ally’s commercial interests, they might alienate allies and/or damage the foreign power’s international reputation. The foreign power could soften its demands to let the targeted leader save face. However, even these dispensations could cost the foreign power by upsetting its public, angering its allies, damaging its reputation, and/or generating humanitarian costs.
The size of the costs the foreign power incurs to achieve a sustainable bargain depends on the strength of the targeted leader’s domestic opposition. The stronger this opposition, the more extensive the measures the foreign power must take to convince the target to accept a politically risky settlement: the larger the army it must mobilize, the bigger the coalition it must build, the harsher the sanctions it must employ, and/or the more bombs it must drop to force compliance. This means that it can be especially costly to coerce leaders facing strong opposition at home into lasting settlements, because their incentive to resist or renege forces the foreign power to spend more to obtain their compliance.
The strong must, therefore, choose. They can either invest in the measures necessary to obtain and enforce a settlement, or they can attempt regime change. Given that their targets are typically militarily weak, the strong are often inclined to exploit their power advantage and forcibly impose the leaders they want. But there is something else that also tempts policymakers to pursue regime change—the target’s domestic opposition; that is, the force also driving the target’s resistance. Politically weak leaders can appear not only costly to coerce into lasting settlements but also comparatively cheap to overthrow. The stronger the domestic opposition, the greater the burden it can carry in helping the foreign power impose regime change. This presumes, of course, that the opposition is willing to collaborate with the foreign power. Yet, even when their interests are imperfectly aligned, the opposition is often willing to trade policy concessions for foreign assistance in attaining power. When the opposition causing the leader to resist also opposes the foreign power, other opposition groups are often willing to collaborate. Thus, domestically weak leaders should be especially prone to FIRC. Their domestic vulnerability increases the stronger power’s expected costs of obtaining a settlement with them, while simultaneously decreasing its expected costs of overthrowing them.
Leaders without opposition will not necessarily concede to a foreign power’s demands. Their decision to make concessions (or not) depends on other factors as well. If they have the means to defend themselves from military or economic coercion, for example, they may resist, even though they face no domestic threats. Leaders may also resist for fear that concessions will create domestic opposition. However, all else being equal, politically strong leaders can be expected to make greater concessions than leaders facing stiff opposition, because compliance costs them less. Foreign powers are also more likely to negotiate with these leaders because there is no alternative to them. In contrast, when faced with politically weak leaders, not only is the foreign power less likely to exact concessions, but also it can install the opposition as an alternative bargaining partner.
I do not contend that FIRC is cheaper than negotiating an enforceable settlement. Rather, I offer a rational choice argument that explains why a foreign power’s expected costs of negotiating might be less than its expected costs of FIRC.8 Such expectations can turn out to be wrong, and, indeed, in some instances but not all, they are wildly off the mark.9 Yet, as I show in this book, neither miscalculation nor misperception—on either side—is necessary for FIRC to occur. Contrary to conventional wisdom, even rational policymakers with complete information may pursue regime change, based on the expectation that a bargain will be too costly to achieve.
Skeptics might note that rational choice arguments rest on the heroic assumption that human beings are utility maximizers who choose among competing strategies based solely on their relative costs and benefits. This criticism is understandable but misplaced. By starting with idealized assumptions, rational actor theories can show what would happen in a world populated by decision makers unhindered by misperception, emotion, or psychological bias. These theories show that even in this perfect world, rational actors might still choose to fight. This means