To sum up: the position generally held was that a lay person can (in extremis, to be sure) confer the sacrament of baptism, imposing its distinctive, and permanent, character; however, since he lacks the character of ordination, that same layman is unable to consecrate the sacrament of the altar. On the other hand, the sacraments—including the confection of the Eucharist—which an ordained priest administers, are equally genuine whether they are administered by an evil priest or one who lives a holy life and is in good legal standing. Anyone can baptize if need be; even an old woman—that extreme test-case—could do it. Vetula baptizat, et baptizatum est.120 But only a priest should do it. The ecclesiastical hierarchy is duly affirmed, its power maintained through that most exclusive of sacraments, the sacrament of holy orders.
Authority and Agency in the Tribunal of Penance
With the bestowal of the character came the gift of the power of the keys,121 as bequeathed by Christ to St. Peter and his successors in perpetuity: “I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven” (Matthew 16:19). This awesome legacy constituted the very basis of Christian priesthood, and legions of schoolmen sought to comprehend its grave responsibilities and celebrate its high prestige. “We have no doubt that we must entertain the most magnificent and lofty sentiments about the keys of the Church, their power and their priestly office,” says William of Auvergne (d. 1249), who taught first arts and then theology at the University of Paris and became Bishop of Paris in 1228. “For the keys have been given to the Church and their office and power to priests for the purpose of dispensing the riches of God’s mercy,” that they might make them open to those who knock, and lead in those who wish to enter.122 Pope John XXII succinctly defined the keys as “a special power of binding and loosing by which the ecclesiastical judge should receive the worthy into the kingdom of heaven and exclude the unworthy therefrom.”123 But is the door of heaven not already open to Christians, especially in view of the fact that Christ Himself is the door (cf. John 10:7)? Yes indeed, explains Aquinas; the door of heaven “considered in itself ” is indeed open, but it is said to be closed to someone in the sense of there being some obstacle which prevents entry. That obstacle is sin, both original and actual. “Hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church.”124 The sacrament of baptism removed original sin; the sacrament of penance was there to effect absolution from the guilt of sin (culpa) as committed by errant mortals after baptism. In the “tribunal of penance,” the penitent has to do his part, in being sincerely sorry for his sins and wishing to make amends, and the priest must do his, in judging the spiritual state of the sinner and, if he thinks fit, pronouncing the formula of absolution and imposing an appropriate punishment. On the part of the minister, the sacrament presupposes, in the first instance, valid reception of the order of priesthood. Not even the pope himself, declares Peter of la Palud O.P. (c. 1275/80–1342),125 can give a nonpriest the power of absolution in foro poenitentiali. Second, it requires legal jurisdiction over the recipient; hence a priest is not supposed to hear the confessions of people who do not belong to his diocese. On the part of the recipient, the sacrament presupposes contrition, confession, and at least the promise of satisfaction. Generations of theologians agonized about the respective roles of priest and penitent in the remissio peccatorum.
Peter Lombard had, not for the first or last time, presented a crucial theological problem in a challenging way. He describes remission of sin as a gift of God that is given in the contrition stage of penance, before confession or satisfaction: “in contritione iam deletum sit peccatum.”126 Sins are effaced by contrition and humility of heart, without oral confession of the mouth and payment of the external penalty.127 No-one who has a contrite and humble heart lacks charity, and he who has charity is worthy of eternal life.128 Thus he is not freed afterward from eternal wrath by the priest to whom he confesses, since he was already freed from it by the Lord. God alone cleanses a man inwardly from the stain of sin, and absolves him from the debt of eternal punishment. True, priests have the power of the keys, but this does not mean that a priest has power to absolve from sin (a peccato), that is from guilt (culpa), so that he wipes away the stain of sin.129 That does happen in the sacrament of penance, to be sure; what is at issue is the part played by the priest. According to the Lombard, that role is declarative: priests merely show men to be bound or loosed, and declare that the guilt of sin has been remitted by God through contrition.130 This doctrine has several important concomitants, potentially subversive of sacerdotal authority: in the first instance one should confess to God, and if a priest is not available one may confess to a wise layman.
For all these reasons the Lombard has been termed a “staunch contritionist.”131 And he certainly differs from those twelfth-century “confessionists” who stressed the importance of the priest’s role in achieving absolution. Gratian, for example, while noting the necessity of contrition, had emphasized the importance of the external, juridical form of confession; “the moment when the penitent’s sins are remitted” being located at “the point when the priest pronounces the words of absolution.”132 Yet Peter Lombard was no naive believer in contrition. True, confession should be offered first to God. But, he adds, subsequently it should be offered to a priest, if the sinner has the opportunity to confess—“nor can the sinner otherwise approach the entrance of paradise.”133 “He is not truly penitent who does not have the desire to confess”;134 “it does not suffice to confess to God without the priest, nor is the sinner truly humble and penitent if he does not desire and seek the judgment of the priest.”135 The full context of his remarks about the substitution of a layman for a priest is particularly revealing. Such a substitution should be done only if a priest is lacking; in general “the examination of a priest should be zealously sought.” And if one does confess to a companion, that action is given value by the evidence it affords of one’s “desire for a priest.”136
The Lombard’s thirteenth-century commentators reviewed the competing authorities the magister sententiarum had marshaled, and sought to mitigate the possible dangers of some of his remarks. They had at their disposal the Aristotelian ideology of causality, which offered invaluable discourses relating to instrumentality and the relationship between formal and material causes. Hence Bonaventure could elevate the priest’s absolution as the formal element (the forma sacramenti), with the penitent’s expression of contrition, confession, and satisfaction constituting the material element.137 To say that culpa is remitted before the power of the keys operates would be as absurd as saying that the sacrament of baptism operates before the actual baptism has taken place. For Bonaventure, the priest—“he who has the key”—is a necessary mediator between God and man. “Through him the sinner mounts to God, and thus the priest is the mouthpiece of the sinner, speaking on behalf of the sinner; through him God descends to man, and thus the priest is the angel of God, in fact, the mouthpiece of God.”138 Similarly, Aquinas argued that the absolution of the priest is the forma sacramenti, and consequently confession, contrition, and satisfaction must in some way constitute the matter of the sacrament.139 “God alone on his own authority absolves from sin and pardons sin,”140 but He uses the instrumentality of absolution which, with confession, contrition, and satisfaction, concurs in obtaining forgiveness, in opening the kingdom of heaven. Delegated power this may be, but it is profound, substantial, indispensable. The Aristotelian theory of causality confers genuine agency on instrumental causes which operate under the primary efficient cause, which in this case is the prime and unmoved mover, God Himself.141
Echoing Peter Lombard, Aquinas argues that the