Indeed, many of the thirteenth-century quaestiones on the proper ministry of the sacraments have a curiously prophetic quality—they indicate the shape of things to come in late-medieval England. This need not surprise us, given that the Church had considerable experience of dealing with earlier versions of heresies espoused by Wyclif and his followers, within Catharism and Waldensianism.110 Certain “contrary opinions” which were canvassed in the course of the affirmation of orthodoxy, allowed a brief span of life within the firmly controlled thought structure of the quaestio, were to return to haunt the establishment. Excellent examples are afforded by discussions of the relationship between the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist included in the Alexandri summa111 and Bonaventure’s Sentences commentary,112 particularly since both address the issue of the moral goodness of the person administering the sacraments, whether priest or layman. The Alexandri summa lists inter alia the following arguments against the proposition that priests alone can confect the Eucharist. The works of a man who is just and good are pleasing to God, so why can’t he consecrate? Also, the sinner loses all dignity, and if such dignity is necessary for consecration, then surely the just layman possesses the potestas consecrandi? If the unjust priest is said to have this power, does not the just layman have it to an even greater extent? Then there is the telling parallel with the sacrament of baptism. Priests are given this power ex officio, yet nevertheless if a lay person baptizes, the sacrament is efficacious. Although priests have the power of baptizing, laymen can do it also: so, the same argument would seem to apply to the consecration of the Eucharist. Since the power of baptizing is widely granted, so also should be the power of consecration. At I Peter 2:9 God says to all just men, “you are a chosen race, a royal priesthood”; it follows that priestly privilege belongs to all just men, and hence they can consecrate.113
Naturally, the Alexandri summa gives these arguments short shrift. Unjust priests do possess the potestas consecrandi: after all, the works of the unjust may actually may be pleasing to God, as when they afflict those who have turned away from Him. Then again, while it’s true that whatever the just man does is pleasing to God, his justice does not enable him to consecrate—holy orders are required. Concerning dignity, it may be said there are two kinds: dignity of merit and dignity of office or authority. If a priest lacks the dignity of personal merit he does nevertheless possess the dignity of office and authority; on the contrary, the just layman lacks the dignity of office and authority though he enjoys the dignity of merit. But the power of consecrating depends on the power of authority and not on the power of personal merit, and hence the just layman cannot consecrate. What, then, of the analogy with baptism? The answer is that this is a quite different case. Baptism is a sacramentum necessitatis, and thus, although the office of baptizing is given spiritually to priests, it is conceded to everyone in time of need. The Alexandri summa is unequivocal in its affirmation that the power of consecrating belongs to priests alone, because it is related to sacerdotal orders. This is the teaching of the church, as transmitted by the Apostles who were instructed by Christ Himself, and anyone who asserts otherwise is deviating from the truth of the faith.
In similar vein, Bonaventure claims that this is a matter of faith, as received from the Apostles and from the Lord Himself. The sacrament of the altar is held in great reverence and hence only specially commissioned persons may legally dispense it. Such a commission rests on one of two possible bases, sanctity or authority. Heretics (obviously Bonaventure has Donatists in mind here) say it depends on sanctity. But that raises a major difficulty: in the case of a bad priest’s mass one could not be sure if the Eucharist was certainly made, and our salvation would be dependent on the goodness of another. However, if the commission rests on authority, and of course Bonaventure believes that this is the case, it is evident that authority can be granted to the bad as well as the good—auctoritas potest tam bonis quam malis concedi. Both bad and good priests possess the authority of holy orders, and hence both can confect the Eucharist.
But if a lay person can baptize, why can’t he confect? Bonaventure’s predictable answer is that unlike things are being compared here, because baptism is the primary sacrament, and necessary for salvation, and not held in such veneration as is the sacrament of the altar. He had given space to the contrary opinion that “The good layman is more worthy to be a minister of God than the impious priest”: magis dignus est ministrare Deo bonus laicus quam impius sacerdos. If at the invocation of a bad priest God converts bread into body, surely this is done far more securely on the word of a good layman? This argument is rejected on the grounds that individual goodness is not crucial for the power of consecrating, whereas authority is—and priests possess such authority by reason of the character (an imprint, mark, or stamp) which they receive at ordination.
At least some of Wyclif’s followers were not willing to accept that the argument from character resolved all the problems attendant on conceding authority to good and bad alike, suspecting that what was at stake was indeed a matter of personal sanctity. Some went so far as to claim that the virtue of the Eucharist was in some way related to the virtue of the priest who had confected it, a potentially Donatist viewpoint which some of Wyclif’s own (rather more subtle) remarks in De Eucharistia could easily have been taken as supporting.114 A related Lollard view was that the works of a righteous layman are worth a lot more than those of the bad priest; indeed, just men are ipso facto a chosen race, members of the royal priesthood (to adopt the idiom of I Peter 2:9). In such arguments, the fact that baptism can be conferred by a lay person, whether male or female (albeit in necessitate), is seen as a weak link in the orthodox theologians’ case, insofar as it opens up the possibility of people other than officially ordained priests having sacramental power and authority.115 Clearly, the comparison between the sacrament of the altar and baptism was troubling inasmuch as it raised the specter of the legality of lay ministry of all the sacraments. But the theologians had two powerful weapons in their armory, namely, the doctrines of the priestly character and the power of the keys.
What exactly made a priest so special? At ordination he received an imprint or character which indicated that he was marked off to perform certain spiritual functions. “It has been customary,” Aquinas explains, “that whenever anyone is deputed to some definite function he is marked off for it by means of some sign.” Thus “in ancient times” soldiers on enlistment for military service were “marked with some form of physical ‘character’ in recognition of the fact that they were deputed for some function in the physical sphere. In the same way, therefore, when in the sacraments men are deputed for some function in the spiritual sphere pertaining to the worship of God, it naturally follows that as believers they are marked off by some form of spiritual character.”116 Thus the sacrament of ordination—which was instituted by Christ himself—leaves a particular imprint on the soul, which indicates that those in holy orders are marked off to perform certain spiritual functions. It is not in itself a sanctifying gift, being of a legal and official nature rather than a moral one. Empowered by the character a man can enjoy all the privileges and carry out all the duties of priesthood, including preaching and the ministry of the sacraments.
Once a priest, always a priest; having been conferred, the character is there to stay. This is made abundantly clear in the many quaestiones which defend the validity of that supreme sacrament, the Eucharist, as confected by the priest who has become either a heretic, schismatic, or excommunicate. The Alexandri summa canvasses the various opinions in some detail.117 Some say the consecration of a heretic is not valid. Others believe that a notorious heretic who has been damned by the Church cannot consecrate, whereas a man who is secretly a heretic can do so. Others say that heretics can consecrate because, although they are separated from the Church, they retain their priestly orders, which give them the necessary power. The last of these views is affirmed by the Alexandri summa, which enlists the support of Augustine, who argued that just as baptism remains in such men, so too their holy orders remain entire.118 A comparison is offered with the situation of a married couple who separate. Their marriage is not dissolved, even though they are cut off from conjugal works. Aquinas draws on the same passage from Augustine,