This leads to the notion that the socio-political life on the Steppe required a faster pace or metabolism in replenishing its leadership than in a sedentary agricultural society, which, with a large civil administration machine feeding on immense and reliable revenues from intensive farming, could afford to have unresponsive and politically uninterested elderly monarchs continue to occupy the throne (incidentally, this was exactly what became of Emperor Xuanzong, the last Turco-Xianbei monarch of the Tang). In my view this was the real root of the semilegendary Steppe tradition of regicide, ritualistic or real, found as far as the Khazar Empire, that a khan had a preordained time limit on his reign, after which he would be murdered.56
On this account we see also how Turco-Mongol traditions adapted, or shall we say mellowed, in their transition to the Central Kingdom. Unlike the harsh political realities on the Steppe where a khan normally would have to hang on until his natural or not so infrequently violent death, a sedentary society opened up a less draconian option: the position of a retired emperor, albeit as our examples have shown, life as such would seem not greatly more enviable than the Steppe alternative. Following the Turco-Xianbei traditions of its Northern dynasty predecessors, the Tang, especially in its first century and a half, had numerous such retired emperors, whereas none were found in more than four centuries of the two Hàn dynasties. This is one more reason why the early Tang should be more aptly called a Särbo-Chinese regime.
I further observe that in subsequent major native dynasties, namely the Song and the Ming, only a handful more such cases were found, almost invariably the consequence of catastrophic military invasions from the north.57 Only in the Qing dynasty did we find another case of a purely domestic nature, which curiously enough was allegedly prompted by the “filial wish” of Emperor Gaozong that his reign not exceed a preset limit, namely the length of the reign of his grandfather Emperor Shengzu.58
Having examined the father-son feature, the maternal aspect in the alleged Oedipus complex should also be reviewed to do it full justice. First, once the mother changed herself into a “surrogate father” in the sense that she became a contender for the throne, as in the case of Empress Wu Zetian, the mother-son relation would turn out much less romantic than the complex prescribes, one more indication of the phenomenon's politico-cultural rather than alleged psychosexual root. Also the supposed affection was evidently not always reciprocal, as political filicide by the mother was noted from the late Tuoba Wei period onward.
Nevertheless, in comparison with the fate of the fathers, royal matriarchs did seem to fare a lot better, even in extreme cases such as Empress Wu Zetian and the grandmother of Emperor Xiaowen of the Tuoba Wei (ZZTJ 134.4187, 137.4302.). However, instead of the either too individual or too universal trait of Oedipal drive, I think a more plausible explanation lies elsewhere. In this regard classical historians would seem more down-to-earth than psychoanalysis-leaning modern authors when Hou Hàn shu (The History of the Late Hàn, 90.2979) provides the following hint in describing the Wuhuan's unmistakable Steppe traits of patricide and fratricide: “[They] kill their father and elder brothers when angry, but would never hurt their mother, for mothers have a clan whereas fathers and elder brothers do not [have someone to take] revenge for themselves.” Here we clearly see remnants of matriarchy at work, which in my view is a more realistic factor on the Steppe than a man's subconscious Oedipal desire for his mother, for this can also explain the Northern women's traditionally strong role, attested by their prominent social status in the Northern dynasties,59 and culminating in Empress Wu becoming the first and only woman emperor in Chinese history, the latter of which could only happen in a Särbo-Chinese dynasty with deeply entrenched Turco-Mongol traditions. A Steppe mother's near-sacred status and complete dominance of her son in my view also provide a most natural explanation for the unprecedented Tuoba Wei custom of killing an heir apparent's birth mother before crowning the prince son. The case of Lady Gouyi of the Former Hàn dynasty (ZZTJ 22.744–45), from which the Tuoba custom had allegedly taken its cue, was evidently an exceptional, ad hoc measure. The case of Empress-dowager Hu, the first birth mother of a future Tuoba emperor to escape this fate, demonstrates that the draconian rule was not an unwarranted and overcautious precaution: by her complete domination of her emperor son and her final act of filicide (ZZTJ 152.4739), Empress-dowager Hu was blamed for the eventual collapse of the once powerful Tuoba regime in northern China.
Other Aspects of the Tang Blood Tanistry
The established Hàn tradition of having, at least formally, an heir apparent means that the succession struggles in the Central Kingdom usually happened prior to the death of the current ruler and around the institution of heir apparent. This may be the most important departure from the Steppe, where the hell of succession wars normally broke loose with the death of the khan. But as Joseph Fletcher has detailed in his “Turco-Mongol Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire,” such a feature or adaptation to the sedentary society was not unique in China, as it was also attested in other “conquest regimes.”
In his pioneering treatise on the political history of the Tang, which provided the first systematic examination of the phenomenon of the unstable Tang institution of heir apparent (to which I owe much of the inspiration for the current chapter), Chen Yinke has analyzed the importance of controlling the Xuanwu Gate in the capital in numerous coups d'état during the early Tang.60 However, I depart from his theory by considering the discussion of the key factions of people instead of geography in these incidents a more consequential topic. Not only does one see the reason for the notoriety of the Xuanwu Gate in the period, but it also sheds light on the process of how this Särbo-Chinese regime slowly evolved into something more in line with a native dynasty.
For the era under examination, namely the first 150 years of the Tang, one of the key elements in the succession struggle was various imperial guard units. This in my view was the cause for the Xuanwu Gate's prominence in these coups during the period. For blood tanistry struggles in an agrarian society, Fletcher has introduced the term “surrogate nomads” for the equivalent of tribes and tribal military elites who would fight out the succession wars on the Steppe. For the early Tang, the “surrogate” qualifier would seem almost superfluous, because the ranks of imperial guards were filled with people not just of nomadic origin but literally fresh from the Steppe. A good example was the three hundred Türk troops Prince Jiancheng planned to use to attack Li Shimin's residence (Xin Tang shu 79.3542).61 In fact at times these figures were said to be so numerous that they filled half of the positions at court (ZZTJ 193.6098), which were apparently mostly military. Many were actually mentioned or even named in succession struggles. Li Duozuo, a prominent imperial guard of Mojie ethnicity (widely regarded as the predecessor of the Manchu), on whom was bestowed the royal family name (Jiu Tang shu 109.3296–97), was a typical case. This was hardly the best indication of a “native” dynasty, though the standard records have almost certainly suppressed or played down as much as possible the role of these “Barbarian” figures in setting the course of Chinese history.
Another important dimension of the unmistakable Turco-Mongol trait of the early Tang was its continued military and political expansion in almost all directions. Again a great number of non-Hàn ethnic generals and naturally an even greater number of such troops were used in this endeavor. In fact, the Tang ethnic generals have became a fecund study subject for modern historians.62 These studies demonstrate that the phenomenon was a rather unusual case in Chinese history. That is, if we exclude the Mongol forces in the Qing's march into Central Asia, an exact repetition of the Tang's advances one millennium earlier. As the imperial guards actively participated in these campaigns, their prestige at the court and their role in the succession struggle continued. The ancient Orkhon inscriptions mentioned explicitly that the Türk troops had fought the wars for the Tabgach/Tuoba emperors.63 But this complaint masked the other side of the coin: the important role of these Türk generals and soldiers in choosing the very emperors they would serve under as well as the grossly out of proportion positions they filled at the Tang court.
The expansion of the Tang was gradually checked by the advent of two new