Thus was created a most interesting triangular power structure between the emperor, his full sister Princess Taiping, and the young but capable Crown Prince Longji. The triumvirate showed deep rifts from the very beginning (ZZTJ 210.6656–57). Although Prince Longji, later Emperor Xuanzong, apparently made sure that not much was left in the history records that would cast doubt upon his filial relationship with his emperor father, there was ample evidence, for example, the story in ZZTJ (210.6673–74), showing that Emperor Ruizong did feel daunted by this intellectually and militarily gifted son, and the menace of patricide, which the Li boys (and girls) often showed little reluctance in plotting and executing, would seem a major factor in Emperor Ruizong's heavy dependence on his sister Princess Taiping against and as a way of balancing his son's power. No sooner had the son forced the aunt to commit suicide by a preemptive military move than the father decided to go into genuine retirement for good.
In many aspects Emperor Xuanzong could be called the last Turco-Mongol or Turco-Xianbei monarch of the Tang ruling house. The military and political expansion continued and reached its zenith during his reign. The emperor also showed remarkable openness and reception to foreign cultures, music and dance in particular, which was eagerly and wholeheartedly imitated by an equally receptive populace, with various Hu (foreign) fashions and styles soon becoming the dominating vogue of the time (Jiu Tang shu 45.1957–58). Xuanzong's dependence on and trust in his non-Hàn ethnic generals were also unprecedented (which would eventually cause his fall from grace). It is indeed very tempting to compare the first half of his reign with that of the brilliant Manchu emperor Shengzu (Kangxi), the best emperor the Central Kingdom ever had, according to many. But this would be a little beyond the scope of this chapter.
At issue here is that, just like Emperor Kangxi,47 Emperor Xuanzong was dogged by the problem of succession and the choice of an heir apparent. What is most remarkable and revealing of his Turco-Xianbei heritage is that, in the spring of 737, the emperor had three of his sons, including his first heir apparent, killed in a single day (ZZTJ 214.6829). Such a resolute act of filicide, later indignantly denounced as a “breach of heavenly principles” by the Song dynasty historian Fan Zuyu,48 would put Xuanzong on an equal footing with, say, the Ottoman sultan Selim I (Selim the Grim), who was believed to have, on November 20, 1514, killed three of his four sons,49 leaving but one (Süleyman the Magnificent) to succeed him. It can be added that filicide also figured in the succession struggle during the Qing dynasty, in particular that carried out by the eventual successor to Emperor Kangxi, despite some modern authors' effort to whitewash or deny its occurrence.50
Emperor Xuanzong's radical measure, plus further act of filicide (ZZTJ 216.6916–17), did not relieve him in the end from the by now almost trademark Tang succession trouble. In the wake of the An Lushan Rebellion, another heir apparent son would part ways with Emperor Xuanzong and declare himself the new emperor (Emperor Suzong), handing his father a coup de grace (ZZTJ 218.6975–76, 218.6982.). Furthermore, after both had returned to the recovered Tang capital, the now retired Emperor Xuanzong would find himself nearly assassinated in a kidnap plot devised and executed by his son's most trusted courtier (ZZTJ 221.7094–95). With all his loyal ministers, attendants, and eunuchs dead or exiled, this retired emperor would eventually die a bitter, lonely, and helpless old man under virtual house arrest.
Such an unceremonious exit of, in my view, the last Turco-Xianbei monarch of the Tang by no means spelled the end of the imperial house's Turco-Mongol-style succession problems. Indeed, even prior to that, Emperor Suzong had to overcome and kill another royal brother, Prince Yong (Li Lin), who, apparently at the encouragement of Emperor Xuanzong (ZZTJ 218.6983, 219.7007), began to harbor imperial ambitions too. A side note is that this episode of fratricide had profound effects on the life and career of the two greatest Tang poets, Li Bai (Li Po 701-ca. 762) and Du Fu (712–70): Li Bai signed on with the losing side of this fratricidal struggle for the throne, for which he almost received a death sentence. He was eventually exiled to Yelang, which was by far the most serious crisis in the poet's life (Xin Tang shu 202.5763). This in turn led Du Fu to write several immortal poems over his deep concern for his dear friend's fate.
Despite further act of filicide, which saw one of his able sons, Prince Jianning, killed and the eldest, the future emperor Daizong gravely endangered (ZZTJ 219.7013.), Emperor Suzong would die, of natural cause or otherwise, amid the chaos of yet another fratricide coup d'état in 762 (ZZTJ 222.7123–24).
The Tang's succession troubles and the “unstable institution” of the heir apparent were far from over after this. What is more, there would emerge much more frequent lateral successions than the almost unbroken lineal tradition of the early Tang. However, there were many gradual but important changes in the aspects and circumstances of succession struggles, some of which will be covered in later sections. For my major contention that the early Tang was a Särbo-Chinese regime with strong Turco-Mongol characteristics, the documentation of blood tanistry cases can stop at this point. The following sections will be devoted to various aspects and implications of the Tang succession struggles.
The Oedipus Complex
Arthur Wright first proposed that the Sui emperor Yangdi represented an instance of the Oedipus complex.51 Victor Xiong later repeated and in fact reinforced the case.52 In my view, the Oedipus complex depiction here has overstretched the sphere of psychoanalysis. It is obvious from my narration that acute father-son enmity and rivalry were characteristic of the first two centuries of the Tang. In addition to the Sui, one can easily trace the phenomenon back to the Tuoba Wei state and other earlier dynasties established by various tribal groups, as well as in the An Lushan-Shi Siming rebel regime (both leaders were murdered by their respective sons). Boodberg is more to the point: it was a much more general and wider phenomenon on the Steppe.
Wright's Oedipus complex diagnosis would make this father-son adversary a rather personal trait of Emperor Yangdi. Even if the label stuck, it would have to be extended to so many other political figures of Steppe origin or background, both in China and elsewhere, that any utility of the term would appear lost. This father-son enmity was so typical of the Turco-Mongol culture that the vendetta against a dead father or the rush to reverse his policies can be clearly shown in a wide variety of cases, ranging from the Ghaznavid sultan Mas'ud in the Turco-Iranian world,53 to the late Manchu monarchs such as Emperor Gaozong (Qian-long) of the Qing.54 But if one invokes the Oedipal drive in the pretext of universal human traits, then in addition to losing the specificity, and hence the very reason for introducing the term, one would face the daunting task of explaining the relative scarcity of similar cases in the two Hàn dynasties as well as in other stable and prolonged native dynasties.
It is my view that the so-called Oedipus complex is in effect a convenient way to bypass the real socioeconomic and politico-cultural issues. I note that even the Shakespearean play Hamlet, which has often been cited as a quintessential case of such a complex, may in fact have actual historical succession struggles in the background.55
As many modern researchers have concluded, contrary to conventional misconception, pastoral nomadism was a very complex way of life that required sophisticated planning and great effort. In contrast to agriculture, it in fact allowed a much smaller margin of error in decision making and very low tolerance of natural and man-made disasters, as a severe spring storm could easily wipe out one's entire stock in a matter of days. The highly mobile way of life, the relative low economic return on a per-acre basis, and the constant threat of tribal and other warfare meant that tribe and other polity leadership must be very personal and militaristic, without the luxury of a large, permanent, civil bureaucratic establishment.