Polk came into office, and Calhoun returned to the U.S. Senate representing South Carolina. He had helped Polk win the presidency, but Calhoun soon showed his well-known independent streak. Polk prosecuted a war against Mexico over disputed lands in south Texas, and Calhoun opposed the war. He understood that during wartime, a president assumes extraordinary powers that require greater government centralization, which Calhoun opposed. Although he voted against prosecuting the war, he believed that any new territory acquired as a result of the conflict should be open to slavery. When Pennsylvania congressman David Wilmot proposed that the peculiar institution be banned from newly acquired lands, Calhoun was one of many southern members of Congress to howl in protest at the proviso.122
Calhoun was open to political compromise when it was possible to do so without undermining state rights and the honor of the South. In one instance, he worked with the Polk administration to reach a compromise with Great Britain over the Oregon territory. The president supported the concept of Manifest Destiny, which called for Americans to gobble up territory from coast to coast. Great Britain still claimed ownership to lands encompassing present-day British Columbia as well as the western states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. During the 1844 presidential election, Democratic expansionists had used the slogan “54–40 or fight” to argue that the United States should go to war if the British did not recognize American claims north of the 54–40 line. Calhoun worked with his successor, Secretary of State James Buchanan, to negotiate a treaty that essentially split the difference, allowing England to retain British Columbia at the 49th parallel and ceding other territory to the United States. The Senate ratified the treaty in 1846.123
Although Calhoun remained an integral participant in national affairs during this time, his health declined as he entered his sixties. A recurring bout of tuberculosis left him sidelined. His last major act as a public figure occurred shortly before his death, when Congress debated the series of laws known as the Compromise of 1850. He was sixty-eight years old when the measures came before the Senate. Although he was too short of breath to speak, he wanted his views made known. On March 4, 1850, Calhoun’s friend and colleague, Senator James Mason of Virginia, agreed to read a statement on the South Carolinian’s behalf.124
He was in no mood for compromise, despite Henry Clay’s plea to preserve the Union even at great cost. When Calhoun appeared in the Senate chamber that March 4, he looked ghastly. It was clear that he was not long for the world. “Acting under the advice of my friends, and apprehending that it might not be in my power to deliver my sentiments before the termination of the debate, I have reduced to writing what I intended to say,” he explained, his voice little more than a whisper, a far cry from the booming Calhoun voice of old. He turned it over to Mason, who stepped forward. “It affords me great pleasure to comply with the request of the honorable senator,” Mason said in agreeing to read the remarks aloud.
Calhoun, speaking through Mason, opened with conciliatory words. “I have, senators, believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion,” he said. It was true, although Calhoun was a little disingenuous in referring to “agitation.” He had been the cause of much agitation, and he might have relieved some of the tension by supporting Clay’s compromise as a “timely and effective measure.” He continued with his assessment. “Entertaining this opinion, I have, on all proper occasions, endeavored to call the attention of both the two great parties which divided the country to adopt some measure to prevent so great a disaster, but without success. The agitation has been permitted to proceed with almost no attempt to resist it, until it has reached a point when it can no longer be disguised or denied that the Union is in danger. You have thus had forced upon you the greatest and gravest question that can ever come under your consideration: How can the Union be preserved?”
Relying on the metaphor of a physician examining an ill patient, Calhoun suggested that a diagnosis of the Union’s malady was necessary. “The first question, then, presented for consideration in the investigation I propose to make in order to obtain such knowledge is: What is it that has endangered the Union?” He offered his analysis.
“To this question there can be but one answer—that the immediate cause is the almost universal discontent which pervades all the States composing the Southern section of the Union. This widely extended discontent is not of recent origin. It commenced with the agitation of the slavery question and has been increasing ever since.” The South had been mistreated repeatedly, and eventually the region could no longer tolerate such abuses.
Calhoun cautioned against accusing the South of overreacting or exacerbating the crisis. The problem was “the long-continued agitation of the slave question on the part of the North, and the many aggressions which they have made on the rights of the South during the time. I will not enumerate them at present, as it will be done hereafter in its proper place.”
Calhoun lamented the loss of balance between sections that had governed the nation for decades. “The equilibrium between the two sections in the government as it stood when the Constitution was ratified and the government put in action has been destroyed,” he charged. “At that time there was nearly a perfect equilibrium between the two, which afforded ample means to each to protect itself against the aggression of the other; but, as it now stands, one section has the exclusive power of controlling the government, which leaves the other without any adequate means of protecting itself against its encroachment and oppression.”
Mason, speaking for Calhoun, laid out the argument against Clay’s compromise, namely that it was too slanted against the South. “Having now, senators, explained what it is that endangers the Union, and traced it to its cause, and explained its nature and character, the question again recurs, How can the Union be saved? To this I answer, there is but one way by which it can be, and that is by adopting such measures as will satisfy the States belonging to the Southern section that they can remain in the Union consistently with their honor and their safety.”
Calhoun’s literal voice could no longer raise objections, but his pen remained booming and powerful. He set forth the principal reason that he and his southern colleagues could not agree to additional compromises:
The South asks for justice, simple justice, and less she ought not to take. She has no compromise to offer but the Constitution, and no concession or surrender to make. She has already surrendered so much that she has little left to surrender. Such a settlement would go to the root of the evil, and remove all cause of discontent, by satisfying the South that she could remain honorably and safely in the Union, and thereby restore the harmony and fraternal feelings between the sections which existed anterior to the Missouri agitation. Nothing else can, with any certainty, finally and for ever settle the question at issue, terminate agitation, and save the Union.
In Calhoun’s opinion, the South was weaker than the North. It had already compromised far too often in the past. It was too late to save the Union with yet another series of half measures cobbled together at the last minute. Clay harped on the desire to save the Union, but Calhoun had never believed that the Union was worth saving if the South must be humiliated to achieve that goal. Only the North could save the Union now: “At all events, the responsibility of saving the Union rests on the North, and not on the South. The South can not save it by any act of hers, and the North may save it without any sacrifice whatever, unless to do justice and to perform her duties under the Constitution should be regarded by her as a sacrifice.”
Calhoun offered no olive branch, would entertain no compromise, but he did not call for Civil War. “It is time, senators, that there should be an open and manly avowal on all sides as to what is intended to be done,” he wrote. “If the question is not now settled, it is uncertain whether it ever can hereafter be; and we, as the representatives of the States of this Union regarded as governments, should come to a distinct understanding as to our respective