Preface
Scholars have written much about the Cyprus crisis of more than forty years ago and the resulting arms embargo that Congress imposed on Turkey. The crisis lasted more than four years (July 1974–October 1978) and strained US-Turkish relations to the breaking point. Most experts agree that it marked a turning point. The Turkish government would never again depend so completely on American support, and Ankara would pursue a more independent foreign policy in which Turkey’s interests were paramount.
Many of those earlier scholarly works are now more than a generation old, and since their publication, new archival materials have become available at both the Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries in Ann Arbor and Atlanta, respectively, as well as in the holdings of the National Archives. In addition, scholars have access to many new private collections of both individuals and organizations. Thus, it seems an appropriate time to revisit this crisis, incorporating new evidence and a broadened perspective.1
The current crisis in US-Turkish relations is arguably the worst in more than forty years. The two allies are espousing radically different policies regarding relations with the Syrian Kurdish militia and ties with Russia. Thus, it seems worthwhile to revisit the last occasion when bilateral relations deteriorated so markedly, as I believe that history can offer some guidance in addressing the current situation.
Although this study is rooted in US domestic politics, I have taken great care to elaborate on the contemporary situations in Turkey and Cyprus and, to a lesser extent, Greece, to make them understandable to readers.2 Ultimately, developments there were as important to the continuation of the crisis as those on Capitol Hill, in the White House, or among the many ethnic lobbying groups across the country.
My research has led to a number of new and, I believe, important insights that are set out in detail in the following pages. One of the most significant led me to assign enhanced importance to the role of heroin in the deterioration of US-Turkish relations. The dispute over drugs preceded the Cyprus crisis and exacerbated tensions between the two allies, feeding a growing US exasperation with Ankara. Previous accounts viewed heroin as a subsidiary concern, whereas I have concluded that for many members of Congress and much of the American public, it was the central concern. As we find ourselves confronting rising levels of opioid abuse in the United States today, readers can readily appreciate how such an issue could undermine harmonious relations.
Earlier accounts centered almost exclusively on the Ford administration because the crisis originated at that time, as did the embargo itself. In addition, relevant archival records for the Ford years (1974–1977) became available to researchers much sooner than did those of his successor. And yet, the embargo and its legacy continued to trouble US-Turkish relations throughout the Carter administration. It also influenced support for that administration within the Greek American community. Therefore, approximately, one-third of this study focuses on the years 1977–1981, when the Democratic administration took up the challenge it inherited from its Republican predecessor.
When we compare the handling of this issue by the Ford and Carter administrations, some little-noticed facts come to the fore. Although the Carter administration enjoyed substantial majorities in both houses of Congress, while Ford had majorities in neither, Carter faced considerable congressional opposition from his own party on this issue. In fact, he never got a majority of Democrats to support lifting the embargo. Thus, to achieve victory, he relied heavily and repeatedly on the support of the Republican opposition. When questions arise today about the wisdom of depending on minority party support to pass key pieces of legislation, as they did during the speakerships of John Boehner and Paul Ryan, we would do well to examine the effective roles played by House minority leader John Rhodes and Senate minority leader Howard Baker in lifting the embargo, as well as the lobbying efforts of former president Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. In that era of bipartisanship, cooperation could achieve significant benefits for the country. Republicans were active and effective participants under the Democratic administration.3
Whereas earlier accounts focused broadly on the struggle between President Ford and Congress, this study provides substantially more detail on the inner workings of the White House and Congress. For Congress, I was able to draw on a broad array of rarely used personal papers of key individuals, including Congressmen John Brademas, Donald Fraser, Lee Hamilton, Wayne Hays, Tip O’Neill, John Rhodes, Benjamin Rosenthal, and Paul Tsongas and Senators Robert Byrd, Thomas Eagleton, Robert Griffin, and Walter Mondale.4 They stood at the political center of the crisis. Although diplomatic historians often overlook these records, they are valuable because they reveal the constant interaction and complex maneuvering involved in fashioning strategies related to foreign policy outside of either chamber. I came away much impressed with this behind-the-scenes activity that is so vital to the legislative process in a democracy. I should emphasize that although many of these actions took place out of the public view, they were nevertheless in the public interest; they provided opportunities for difficult political issues to be discussed, understood, and eventually resolved through compromise.
Much attention has centered on the large national lobbying groups such as the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association, and they were, of course, important. But here, using the records of local lobbying groups, I have been able to show how rank-and-file members organized to encourage grassroots support for Cyprus and opprobrium for Turkey. With access to records from Minnesota and California (just two examples from a nationwide movement), I have pieced together the process by which these groups carried out their mission. This turned out to be one of the most important and interesting aspects of the entire project.
One less attractive element of the Save Cyprus movement was the slanderous characterization of Turks as barbarous and uncivilized, claims that were repeated vehemently in public and even more caustically in private correspondence. Admittedly, such criticisms came largely from traditional foes—Armenians, Greeks, and Greek Cypriots—but occasionally they became weapons in the hands of politicians associated with none of these communities. Turkophobia has a centuries-long history, but I was surprised at the extent of it and by the fact that so little of it had appeared in earlier studies. I emphasize this element not due to any particular preference for one party or another but because its pervasiveness helps us understand why this crisis repeatedly eluded so many well-meaning attempts at resolution. The presence of so much invective and misleading charges and countercharges makes it difficult to separate fantasy from fact. Some statements are blatantly inaccurate and easily dismissed, but plausible claims require more careful analysis. Researchers must pick their way through the evidence with the utmost care to arrive at sound conclusions.
In this volume I also reflect on the conflicted response of the American Jewish community and the government of Israel to the extended crisis. Many of the Greek American lobbying groups modeled themselves on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a very successful organization that pressed US politicians of both major parties to support Israel. But Israel itself had a number of concerns that led Tel Aviv to turn against the embargo, and many members of the American Jewish community turned with it.
Many issues analyzed in this study still concern us today, the most central being the proper role of Congress in making foreign policy. Then there are questions of civility in political campaigning, the propriety of ethnic Americans