4 THE DEFEAT OF THE FIRST FRENCH INVASION OF PORTUGAL AND THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA, 1808
The increasingly harsh rule of Junot during the winter of 1807 and spring of 1808 gave rise to an incremental unwillingness by the Portuguese to obey Prince João’s instruction to cooperate and not oppose the Franco-Spanish invader. Junot’s despotic behaviour resulted in the withdrawal of local officials’ cooperation and active popular resistance. It is sometimes not fully appreciated that such resistance emerged very quickly, notwithstanding the royal directive to cooperate with the French invader. The replacement of the Portuguese flag with that of France on the Castelo de São Jorge on 13 December 1807 led to unrest in Lisbon that was quickly put down by French arms.1 Junot’s intentions became even clearer when nine days later, on 22 December, he reduced the numbers of regiments in the Portuguese army, ultimately virtually extinguishing it with the formation of the Portuguese Legion, which was dispatched to northern Europe where they fought for Napoleon under pro-French officers with considerable distinction until the end of the war.2 In early 1808 Junot dissolved both the militia and the ordenança.3 The situation was further aggravated by acts of aggrandisement along with the plundering of Portuguese churches and households.4
On 1 February, Junot disclosed that Napoleon had declared that the house of Braganza had ceased to rule in Portugal and imposed a substantial imposition of 40 million cruzados on the country.5 Napoleon’s real intentions were now made clear with the announcement that the entire kingdom of Portugal would become a French dependency with Junot as Governor. On the same day he dissolved the Regency Council and replaced it with a council of his own appointees, made up of French and Portuguese.6 Resentment was rising. In February, nine Portuguese were brutally executed in Caldas da Rainha on the orders of General Loison, who was to make a name for himself as a merciless soldier in the Peninsula.7 In March, the French army occupied the fort of Elvas.
The spark that ignited serious opposition to Napoleonic ambitions in the Iberian peninsula proved to be the enforced abdication of Carlos IV of Spain and the waiving under duress of a claim to his throne by his son Ferdinand VII.8 The French managed to crush the resistance of the ‘Dos de Mayo’ in Madrid, but opposition to French rule in the shape of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain soon spread throughout much of the country. The divisions of the Spanish army in northern and southern Portugal managed to extricate themselves to Galicia and Badajoz, respectively, though Junot disarmed and imprisoned the division under Carafa based in Lisbon on 11 June.9
While Junot retained his grip on Lisbon and a number of important strongholds including the fortresses of Almeida, Elvas and Peniche, the vacuum left by the departing Spanish soon resulted in the emergence of increased opposition to French rule. In Alentejo that opposition was firmly put down by General Loison, but Porto witnessed an uprising on 6 June and the emergence of the self-styled Supreme Junta under the Bishop of Porto, which could dispose of a not inconsiderable armed force under Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire de Andrade (Bernardim Freire).10 On 1 May, the Prince Regent declared war on France from the safety of Rio de Janeiro, having been informed that the Regency Council he had left in Lisbon had been dismissed by Junot.
In London, the risings against French domination in Spain and Portugal were seized upon with alacrity. In early July the government was informed of the rising in Porto and on 7 July a delegation was sent to London to request help with arms and soldiers.11 The government had been assembling a force at Cork for embarkation for South America, where it was designated to assist Francisco de Miranda in his quest for Venezuelan independence from Spain. The emergence of Spain as Britain’s ally changed the political dynamic. In late June, Sir Arthur Wellesley received orders to proceed to Cork and to sail with the force for the Peninsula, without any particular destination being named. There was talk of a landing in the Asturias or Galicia, but also Cádiz as well as Portugal.12 Wellesley was directed to proceed to La Coruña to ascertain the situation there, as it was understood that while the Spanish wished for arms they were not keen on British forces landing on Spanish territory. Wellesley was told that another force of 10,000 would follow about three weeks behind his own, and that the objective was ‘the entire and absolute evacuation of the Peninsula by the troops of France’.13
Wellesley sailed from Cork (Cobh) with his force of just under 10,000 men on 12 July.14 Stopping briefly at La Coruña, he ascertained the local junta did not wish for British troops to be landed to assist in Galicia. Wellesley therefore proceeded to Porto, arriving there on 24 July, and on the following day met the Bishop who headed the Supreme Junta. Bernardim Freire informed Wellesley that he had about 5,000 men under his command available, though some of them were in Coimbra; additionally about 12,000 peasants were armed ‘in different modes’.15 A small portion of the Portuguese forces, with some Spanish assistance, was blockading French occupied Almeida while others were trying to guard Trás-os-Montes against a background of the Spanish having suffered defeat at Rio Seco on 14 July.16 The Bishop promised to supply the British commander with 150 horses for his dragoons together with 500 mules for transport purposes to be delivered at Coimbra.
Wellesley himself then sailed to the British squadron off the Tagus, where he met with Admiral Sir Charles Cotton undertaking a blockade of Lisbon, which included the confinement and isolation of a Russian fleet anchored in the Tagus.17 Cotton advised disembarkation at Mondego or Peniche, both north of Lisbon; Peniche being a somewhat curious choice as it contained a strong French garrison. From General Brent Spencer in Andalucia, Wellesley received intelligence which suggested there were perhaps 20,000 French troops in Portugal rather than the local estimate of 16,000–18,000. The latter figure is not necessarily incompatible as it may reflect the number of troops available to Junot given that there were 600–800 in each of Elvas, Almeida, São Julião and Peniche fortresses. Wellesley ordered Spencer and his force to join him in Portugal and returned to the estuary of the river Mondego, where a landing – though physically challenging through the Atlantic surf – was made eminently feasible tactically due to the seizure of Figueira da Foz, the port at the river mouth, by the students from Coimbra University on 26 June.
Arriving off Mondego, he heard of the Spanish victory at Bailén on 20 July.18 He began disembarkation of the British army at Mondego on 1 August, but not before he apparently received some important news on the previous day. On 15 July, Castlereagh had written to him telling him the troops from the Baltic under Sir John Moore would follow as soon as they were re-victualled, together with another 5,000 under Generals Anstruther and Ackland as more French than were previously thought were stationed in Portugal. A total force of 30,000 was promised for the Peninsula. These included the 3rd Regiment (‘The Buffs’) which were being dispatched from Madeira under Major General William Carr Beresford to join Wellesley. A second letter, dated 15 July, was also received on the 31 July. It may not have been so welcome for it notified him of the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Hew Dalrymple to command with Lieutenant General Harry Burrard as second in command. Wellesley was slipping down the command chain.19
Wellesley lost little time in moving south from Mondego towards Lisbon. He met Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire de Andrade and General Manuel Pinto Bacelar with their Portuguese forces at Montemor-o-Velho on 7 August and by 12 August the combined forces were at Leiria.20 A disagreement on tactics followed, with Wellesley wishing to take a coastal route to Lisbon (with a view to staying in touch with his provisioning fleet) and Bernardim Freire anxious to secure central and eastern Portugal by following a route through Santarém.21 Wellesley also claimed that the Portuguese General had demanded the British feed the Portuguese force, which they were unable to